Elsewhere on Ulster
This project is funded by:
Occupants of public offices, the head of state, the head of government, legislators, judges, military personnel, civil servants, jurors, central bankers, and so on are appointed to serve the public. Some of the most often used methods of selection to public office are (1) hereditary rule; (2) election; (3) sortition (appointment by lot); (4) command of the holder of a higher-tier office; and (5) meritocratic rule by some type of test. But public office holders may also be motivated by (often contradictory) personal objectives like income, job security, leisure, career advancement, influence on policy, and prestige. Since public officials have a degree of discretionary power, they may pursue their interests and the expense of the public. Therefore, citizens may be uncertain whether they will benefit from the actions of the appointed government officials. Citizens and officials are then seen as engaging in a game whose rules, the method of appointment, affect the outcome. The purpose of this research is to analyse how different methods of appointment affect the incentives of the public post-holders to pursue policies and conduct that maximise the utilities of the citizens. The research may compare institutions and may apply the methodology of game theory. |
Applicants should hold, or expect to obtain, a First or Upper Second Class Honours Degree in a subject relevant to the proposed area of study.
We may also consider applications from those who hold equivalent qualifications, for example, a Lower Second Class Honours Degree plus a Master’s Degree with Distinction.
In exceptional circumstances, the University may consider a portfolio of evidence from applicants who have appropriate professional experience which is equivalent to the learning outcomes of an Honours degree in lieu of academic qualifications.
The University is an equal opportunities employer and welcomes applicants from all sections of the community, particularly from those with disabilities.
Appointment will be made on merit.
This project is funded by:
Our fully funded PhD scholarships will cover tuition fees and provide a maintenance allowance of £19,237 (tbc) per annum for three years* (subject to satisfactory academic performance). A Research Training Support Grant (RTSG) of £900 per annum is also available.
These scholarships, funded via the Department for the Economy (DfE) and the Vice Chancellor’s Research Scholarships (VCRS), are open to applicants worldwide, regardless of residency or domicile.
Applicants who already hold a doctoral degree or who have been registered on a programme of research leading to the award of a doctoral degree on a full-time basis for more than one year (or part-time equivalent) are NOT eligible to apply for an award.
*Part time PhD scholarships may be available, based on 0.5 of the full time rate, and will require a six year registration period (individual project advertisements will note where part time options apply).
Due consideration should be given to financing your studies.
Besley, T. and Reynal-Querol M. 2017. The logic of hereditary rule: theory and evidence. Journal of Economic Growth 22(2). 123-144. Barnett, A. and Carty, P. 2008. The Athenian option: Radical reform for the House of Lords, 2nd ed. Exeter: Imprint Academic. Congleton, R. 2011. Perfecting Parliament: Constitutional Reform and the Origins of Western Democracy. New York: Cambridge University Press. Dowlen, O. 2008. The potential of sortition. A study of the random selection of citizens for public office. Exeter: Imprint Academic. Fishkin, J. S. 2009. When the people speak: Deliberative democracy and public consultation. New York: Oxford University Press. Jacquet, V., Niessen, C., and Reuchamps, M. (2020). Sortition, its advocates and its critics: An empirical analysis of citizens’ and MPs’ support for random selection as a democratic reform proposal, International Political Science Review. Available at: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0192512120949958 Kurrild-Klitgaard, P. 2000. The constitutional economics of autocratic succession. Public Choice 106(1), 63-84 Rutter, J. 2020. The public appointments process.How the public appointments process is run and who plays a role in it. Available at https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/explainer/public-appointments-process Stone, P. 2011. The luck of the draw. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Tridimas, G. 2012. Constitutional choice in ancient Athens: the rationality of selection to office by lot. Constitutional Political Economy, 23, 1-21. Tridimas, G. 2022. Policy Making by Randomly Selected Citizens. The Perspective of Elected Politicians. In Economou, E.M.L, Kyriazis, N.C and Platias A. (Eds.) Democracy in Times of Crises. Challenges, Problems and Policy Proposals, 117-136 Cham: Springer |
Submission deadline
Monday 24 February 2025
04:00PM
Interview Date
week commencing 31 March 2025
Preferred student start date
15th September 2025
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