UNICEF Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy Programme

Uganda Conflict Analysis

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Pillar of Peace, Gulu
Photographed by Bryan Lupton

Commissioned by the Dutch Embassy to commemorate their educational projects in Northern Uganda the monument was created by David Kigozi and is supposed to depict a departure from taking up arms and turning to education instead.
Though this report was sponsored by the Netherlands funded UNICEF Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy Programme, the views in this analysis do not necessarily reflect the views of UNICEF or the Government of the Netherlands.

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Acronyms

AMISOM—African Union Mission in Somalia
CAR—Central African Republic
COMESA—Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
DRC—Democratic Republic of the Congo
EAC—East African Community
ECD—Early Childhood Development
GBV—Gender-based Violence
GoU—Government of Uganda
ICC—International criminal Court
IGAD—Intergovernmental Authority on Development
INCAF—Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework
LRA—Lord’s Resistance Army
MDG—Millennium Development Goals
MoES—Ministry of Education and Sports
NDP—National Development Plan
NER—National Enrolment Rate
NRM—National Resistance Movement
PBC—Peacebuilding Commission
PBF—Peacebuilding Fund
PBSO—Peacebuilding Support Office
PCNA—Post Conflict Needs Assessment
PRDP 2—second phase of the Peace Recovery and Development Plan
PRDP—Peace Recovery and Development Plan
SCA—Strategic Conflict Analysis
SGACA—Strategic Governance and Corruption Analysis
UNCT—United Nations Country Team
UNDAD—United Nations Development Action Framework
UNDAF—United Nations Development Action Plan
UNLA—Uganda National Liberation Front
UPE—Universal Primary Education
VACIS—Violence Against Children in Schools
VAC—Violence Against Children
WNBF—West Nile Bank Front
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Uganda became an independent country in 1962 and is emerging from a long history of civil wars and violent conflicts, including a twenty-year insurgency by the Lord’s Resistance Army. It shares borders with five other African countries: South Sudan (to the north), Kenya (to the east), the Democratic Republic of Congo (to the west), Rwanda (to the southwest) and Tanzania (to the south). Uganda is home to a diverse range of cultures and tribes, some of which have strong cross-border ties, so relationships with neighbouring countries is essential to lasting peace. The instability from neighbouring countries has repeatedly spilled over into Uganda, straining relationships in the region and leaving the country vulnerable to entanglement in regional issues. Conflict in Karamoja, for example, remains closely linked to regional weapons smuggling in the Horn of Africa region.

Uganda also faces a series of security, political, economic and social development challenges at the national level. It is 161st (out of 187 countries) on the Human Development Index and is estimated to have almost 34.5 million people (UNFPA, 2011). Demographically it has one of the highest population growth rates in the world (3.1%) and has both the youngest population (57% under 18 years old; 78% under the age of 30) and one of the highest youth unemployment rates (83%) in the world (WDR, 2008; ILO, 2011). However, as this analysis shows, whilst there are a range of conflict drivers at the national level, there are distinctive challenges within regions at the sub-national level.

Purpose of the Report
This report provides findings from a conflict analysis undertaken as part of the UNICEF Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy Programme funded by the Government of the Netherlands. It identifies a range of conflict drivers at the national, sub-national and community levels. The intention is that a better understanding of underlying causes of conflict at each of these levels will help identify (formal and informal) education programming to support conflict transformation and peacebuilding.

Methodology
Increasingly donors and international development organisations are mainstreaming conflict analysis as part of their assistance for conflict affected countries (ADE, 2010). A variety of approaches and assessment tools have been developed to support this. At the UN level most agencies use the Conflict Analysis for Prioritization Tool as part of Post-Conflict Needs Assessment (PCNA). This shares many of the features of earlier assessment frameworks that build on the concept of ‘drivers of change’, such as the US Government’s Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (INCAF), the Netherlands Strategic Governance and Corruption Analysis (SGACA) framework, SIDA’s Power Analysis approach and DFID’s approach to Strategic Conflict Analysis (SCA). International NGOs such as International Alert and Search for Common Ground have also been at the forefront of developing conflict analysis tools and resources as a basis for training. The literature warns against generic approaches to conflict analysis and recommends that methodologies be adapted to the local context.

Most tools share a similar approach involving the need to identify underlying causes of conflict (drivers). These are normally identified in terms of security, political, economic and social factors. This is the approach that was used in this conflict analysis, although in the context of Uganda it is important to note that a number of drivers of conflict could also be grouped under the heading of ‘environment and management of natural resources’. This study followed this approach to identify drivers of conflict in Uganda, but also drew on a framework identified in an OECD (2009) report on ‘Statebuilding and Peacebuilding Priorities and Challenges’ which involved consultations in seven countries to assist governments in setting broad-level goals for peacebuilding. The categories are:
- Inclusive political settlements and processes;
- Basic safety and security;
- Justice and peaceful resolution of conflict;
- Capacity to raise revenues and meet expectations through service delivery;
- Effective management of resources and sustainable economic development;
- Societal capacities for reconciliation and peace; and
- Capacity to maintain constructive relations with neighbours and the region.

These priority areas are highly relevant in Uganda and were used in identifying drivers of conflict at the national level. The macro level analysis drew extensively on a number of existing documents including, a PBF conflict analysis (2009), PRDP 2009-2012, Bottleneck analysis of SRAs (2011), PRDP evaluation (2012) and the Uganda draft MTR (2012) as the starting point for an in-depth desk study of the existing literature from international development practitioners as well as academic sources.

The second stage of the study involved consultations in four different parts of Uganda to identify drivers of conflict at the sub-national and community levels, but also to gather inputs from various stakeholders on practical contributions that education might make to conflict transformation and peacebuilding in each region. In practical terms, the conflict analysis was carried out over a four-month period, involving four (one-week field visits) and consultations with the GoU as well as other key stakeholders. 12 focus group discussions were conducted with primary and secondary school students, students at teachers colleges, and youth not in school, as well as more than 30 interviews with key informants, and four stakeholder validation workshops at the field level.

To complement field-level stakeholder consultations, a workshop was held in Kampala to convene stakeholders and to present the findings from this conflict analysis and to discuss a draft proposal for programme. Relevant inputs and amendments were made to the draft and included in this finalized version. This workshop will be followed by more detailed discussions with government regarding their commitment and support for the programme.

Drivers of Conflict at the National Level

The following main drivers of conflict were identified at the national level:

- **Regional and national security concerns**: Uganda has highly developed security and defence capabilities, and has taken an active leadership in regional military interventions in the region. However, the military has been accused but never formally held to account for abuses during the LRA war as well as the “pacification” of West Nile (among others).

- **Tension between political and cultural authority**: allied in the fight against Obote, Museveni restored the “cultural” authority of Uganda’s historical kingdoms. It has become increasingly difficult to distinguish between “cultural” and “political” authority igniting competing allegiances.

- **Concerns about political inclusion**: particularly in northern Uganda, stakeholders repeatedly articulated feelings of political marginalization and a lack of representation at both the central and district level.

- **Shrinking space for civil society**: despite constitutional provisions which allow for freedom of expression and association, civil society organizations (particularly those active in areas viewed as controversial) have faced increasing pressure including reports of intimidation and obstruction by the NRM.
• **Uneven infrastructure development**: while the government has a challenging task in balancing competing infrastructure investments, there has been a notable lag in developing key infrastructure for Uganda’s poorest regions (including Acholi, West Nile, and Karamoja) which stakeholders identified as a form of marginalization and neglect.

• **Economic development**: despite notable growth over the past years, Uganda’s population growth rate and bulging youth population will present tremendous economic challenges over the coming decades.

• **Natural Resource Management**: despite the opportunities posed by the recent discovery of large oil reserves (and other natural resources), concerns are widespread about the lack of transparency around administration of these resources, as well as the degree to which local communities will benefit from these new industries.

• **Land disputes**: while owning and cultivating land is central to the identity and livelihoods of most Ugandans, land disputes are pervasive throughout the country and currently make up roughly 94% of cases before local courts in the North.

• **Equitable Government Service Delivery**: there is a two-fold challenge to government service delivery in Uganda. The first is developmental stunting in parts of the country which have been affected by conflict. The second is the perception and allegation of continued under-investment in certain parts of the country (especially those home to political opposition).

• **Demographic ‘youth bulge’**: Uganda has the largest youth population in the world (per capita), and 79% of its population is under the age of 30. This demographic represents a tremendous source of potential, but as young people voice significant grievances (including perceptions of political marginalization and manipulation, and representing 80% of Uganda’s unemployed), this population could also pose a challenge to stability.

• **Social and cultural capacities for reconciliation and peacebuilding**: while significant resources exist to support reconciliation and peacebuilding throughout Uganda, a tension remains between “traditional” and state mechanisms in this respect. These structures need not be viewed as contradictory, but instead should be harnessed in a complementary fashion to support reconciliation and conflict resolution.

• **Social norms related to violence**: recourse to violent forms of conflict resolution is pervasive in Uganda. Both at the household level as well as within schools, Ugandans are often exposed to violence from a very young age. This cycle of violence poses a significant barrier to peace in Uganda, and addressing it is central to peacebuilding at the community level.

**Drivers of Conflict at the Sub-National and Community Levels**

Field-based consultations in four sub-national regions of Uganda identified a number of drivers of conflict which resonate at the community level:

**Karamoja** is part of the ‘Teso Cluster’, the Karamajong belong to a people-group which spans Uganda, Kenya and South Sudan. Clashes along these borders continue, and are fuelled by an illegal but well-established arms trade from the Horn of Africa. The most under-developed part of Uganda, Karamoja remains extremely vulnerable to shocks (security, environmental, political and health among others). The semi-arid weather poses a unique set of challenges for Karamajong livelihoods. The unique peacebuilding challenges in this part of the country include strong inter-communal divisions and tensions, difficulty in accessing large parts of the region, and corresponding challenges to building up social service provision. The unique set of variables which characterize this part of the
country will thus require an equally unique peacebuilding approach which builds conflict and environmental resilience throughout the sub-region.

**North/Acholi sub-region** - despite notable progress toward peace, northern Uganda and the Acholi people remain deeply scarred by 20 years of war which left 1.8 million people displaced. Wounds (psychological, physical, and in terms of developmental stunting) leave this region vulnerable to conflict and in need of active recovery and peacebuilding. Many northerners point out that until Joseph Kony is captured or killed, the lingering possibility of his return makes healing and investment difficult for a traumatized population. Post-conflict challenges have resulted in a unique set of peacebuilding challenges in the Acholi sub-region including a population with unprecedented rates of domestic violence, alcoholism, and other signs of post-traumatic stress.

**West Nile** has been home to the South Sudanese/Sudanese refugees since the early 1990s, and hosted a peak population of 178,000 in 2005. Prior to the arrival of the (South) Sudanese refugees, a majority of the Ugandan population from West Nile also lived as refugees in South Sudan and the DRC (1980s-1990s). This part of the country was also heavily affected by the LRA, and due to its remoteness has received little attention compared to other LRA affected areas (at least, this is the stakeholder perspective). Simultaneously, this area remains in close proximity to the on-going instability caused by the LRA (in DRC, SS and CAR), and is still characterized by a highly transient population. The area remains volatile, and this transience makes peacebuilding challenging. A large Muslim population, and lingering tensions which can be traced back to the rule of Idi Amin, continue to divide communities. Addressing post-conflict needs, while building social cohesion and addressing challenges related to transience remain chief priority areas in this part of the country.

**Southwest and Western Uganda** - a resurgence of hostilities in eastern Congo has left over 220,000 people newly displaced in the North Kivu with over 40,000 of them fleeing to neighboring Uganda. This influx has placed an additional strain on the resources of government and host communities throughout the southwest. Ongoing tribal clashes in Kabaale continue to undermine stability and the government has been unsuccessful in permanently resolving disputes. Increased migration and resulting tension over land ownership and access remain prevalent. A regional approach to peacebuilding is needed, which increases the absorption capacity of host-communities and supports integration, while addressing community tensions through mediation and equitable resource allocation.

**Education Challenges Related to Conflict**

The impact of conflict on education in Uganda has been well documented. Children and youth were disproportionately affected by the war between the LRA and NRM. Up to 60,000 children were abducted during the conflict, sometimes recruited and trained as child combatants (becoming both victims and perpetrators of war crimes). Children throughout the Acholi sub-region were also affected by displacement and the disruption of education services, as well as the stunted development of education infrastructure due to insecurity. A 2009 study, published by the Overseas Development Institute, also found that education was a key factor in northern Uganda in influencing individuals’ resilience to conflict and their tendency toward intergenerational transmission of poverty. Despite these realizations, there has been little official recognition of the link between education and peacebuilding on a practical level. The dominant approaches to peacebuilding (such as that outlined in the PRDP and PBF) marginalize education as an area of government service provision while failing to recognize the transformative potential of education.
Conclusions

Three broad rationales have emerged concerning the role that education might play in supporting peacebuilding. These are:

i) Education as a ‘peace dividend’. This argument is that an end to violent conflict offers an opportunity to devote increased resources to social development such as education and health, partly as a result of less need for expenditure on security and repairing the damage caused by violence. Improvements in the level and quality of education provision is one way that governments can demonstrate a return to normality and ability of the state to provide services for the public good. Improvements to education services are very visible to the population and may be perceived as a benefit of peace that strengthens statebuilding. The implication is that education programming should involve working to support government commitments to extend and improve education provision – particularly where it addresses areas adversely affected by conflict.

ii) Education that is ‘conflict sensitive’. This argument is that education should be careful not to fuel inequalities or grievances or reinforce prejudices and animosities. This might mean, for example addressing inequalities of access (regionally and in terms of excluded populations), and in terms of differential outcomes between sub-regions and groups. There might be a case for review of arrangements for recruitment, training and development of teachers to enable them to be more sensitive to diversity and equality issues, or the need for reform in terms of the content and relevance of curriculum and teaching methodologies.

iii) Education that is ‘transformative’. This argument is that education can transform values, attitudes and behaviours that encourage non-violent ways of dealing with conflict, but transformation of systemic and structural injustices may be even more important. In practical terms it might mean programmes that transform people’s sense of security by addressing attitudes to violence or confidence in the justice system; transforming political conditions through education that encourages political awareness, engagement and participation; transforming economic expectations through the development of skills likely to support employment and livelihoods; and transformation in social relations through creating new dialogue between people and groups in conflict. These tend to require approaches that may be rooted in the curriculum, but often need to go beyond the classroom into non-formal education programmes within the wider community.

These arguments overlap and are highly relevant in the context of Uganda. UNICEF in Uganda already has some engagement at each of these levels and has also engaged at the policy level, supporting the revision of Uganda’s primary school curriculum and by building MoES capacity for curriculum implementation. The opportunity and the challenge presented by the Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy programme is the extent to which existing work can be strengthened from a peacebuilding perspective and whether there are also opportunities to pilot new programme areas over the next three years that have a strong peacebuilding rationale. A number of conclusions from the overall conflict analysis need to be taken into account in making those decisions.

i) The differences between national and sub-national regions are an extremely important feature of this study, suggesting that some aspects of the programming response will need to be differentiated by region.

ii) At the national level, UNICEF has a very strong partnership with government and the recently revised primary school curriculum provides an opportunity to strengthen the perception of education provision as a benefit of peace and stability. However, it is also an opportunity to address aspects of uneven development that could become sources of grievance. The high
youth unemployment rate also suggests that serious consideration should be given to the relevance of secondary education.

iii) At the sub-national level there are distinctive peacebuilding challenges and there may be a role for education in addressing these:

- Karamoja – building up sustainable livelihoods strategies for youth and strengthening community resilience against conflict and environmental changes are a unique challenge in Karamoja.
- Acholi – after decades of conflict, improvements to education represent a peace dividend in the Acholi sub-region. Closing the gap between this and other parts of the country in completion rates and enrolment will be vital to building up a conflict affected population.
- West Nile – like in Acholi, improvements to education represent a peace dividend in West Nile. In addition, it provides an opportunity to mitigate the impacts of transience and migration, and to combat the “learned helplessness” stakeholders identified as a priority.
- Western – home to some of the largest refugee settlements in the country, this part of the country could benefit from a focus on displacement and integration of refugee populations. Emphasis should be placed on the relationship between host and refugee communities, as well as on special needs presented by refugees from Congo (primarily linguistic and in terms of adapting to the curriculum).

iv) A common concern that emerged is the need to engage youth. This is a high priority because of the youth demographic, but also because they represent an untapped potential to contribute to peace and stability – the new programme needs to have a strong emphasis on this group – this is a particular concern in terms of youth livelihoods.

v) At all levels, respondents expressed concerns about attitudes to violence, in its many different contexts (interpersonal family, domestic, gender-based, school). A focus on the social norms regarding violence might be a strong focus for new programming.

vi) At the national level there was considerable awareness of the potential threat of violent conflict arising from political exclusion, especially anxieties related to elections and transitions of power. People are fearful of voicing these concerns too explicitly and this raises questions about whether it is possible to pilot programmes in this sensitive area.

vii) UNICEF Uganda has a work plan for the next few years so there is a challenge to build on existing approaches, whilst also adopting a stronger peacebuilding dimension. Findings from this conflict analysis as well as experiences implementing the Peacebuilding Education and Advocacy Programme can also be used to inform the next country programme (2015-2019). There may also be the opportunity for some new programming around peacebuilding and/or youth engagement and livelihoods.

viii) Existing staff have strong expertise aligned with commitments to EFA, but what training might they need to encourage more of a peacebuilding perspective in their work? Also, are there new areas of expertise that might need to be created, these should be identified as part of the planning for the new peacebuilding programme.

ix) Partnerships may need to be reviewed to identify which of the current partners have peacebuilding expertise, whether there are organisations with peacebuilding expertise that might become new partners, and which existing institutions would benefit from capacity development in peacebuilding.

x) There remains a need to identify areas where new knowledge and research needs to be generated.
Recommendations

The main challenge of the UNICEF Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy programme is to use the conflict analysis so that the Country Office bases education programming on ‘peacebuilding logic’. A second challenge is how much UNICEF should amend or introduce new programmes as opposed to building on existing capacities and successes. A third challenge is to decide what is realistic in terms of the current Country Office work plan and capacities.

UNICEF Uganda will also need to address the question of UN integration, and aligning with programmes such as the PBF. A question also remains about the degree to which the programme will balance ‘upstream’ or more ‘down-stream’ approaches, which will affect the programmatic priorities in peacebuilding and should be taken into consideration during the programme design phase.

The following are a number of specific recommendations, based on the findings from this analysis, but recognising that decisions about which to take forward may depend on further consultations and availability of resources:

1. **UNICEF Uganda has a strong partnership with government.** The UNICEF Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy programme provides an ideal opportunity to introduce a peacebuilding perspective within these areas. Availability of provisions such as Early Childhood Development to previously marginalised communities could present an opportunity for building social and community cohesion.

2. **At the national level** there would appear to be a case for prioritising formal and non-formal education programming with **youth** and looking at two particular areas of focus: **political inclusion** and **attitudes to violence**.

3. **Youth.** In the context of Uganda, there is a strong rationale for engaging youth as part of UNICEF’s peacebuilding work. This would represent an additional commitment to the existing programme by focusing on a modest and realistic set of pilot programmes over the next three years.

4. **Political inclusion.** Youth repeatedly stressed a desire for civic and political engagement. As a starting point, UNICEF could review current education programming (both formal and informal) related to civic and citizenship education. UNICEF could solicit additional insights through U-report and develop a programme, with a specialized partner, which addresses issues of political inclusion, concepts of citizenship, and other areas of civic engagement.

5. **Attitudes to violence.** Concerns about social norms that accept violence as a means of resolving disputes were evident at the national, sub-national and local levels. There is a strong belief amongst most stakeholders that interventions that seek to change attitudes and behaviours at multiple levels within society may have an impact on social norms and the disposition of individuals to use violence. The development of pilot programmes related to these issues may provide an opportunity to monitor and test such claims.

6. There were strong views from stakeholders that the development of programming in either of the above areas should involve both **formal and non-formal approaches**, and would benefit from strategies that make effective use of **new communication technologies**, for example the current U-report initiative by UNICEF that uses mobile phone technologies.

7. **As well as a national approach, there is a compelling case for a differentiated approach** that takes account of the dynamics of conflict **in sub-national regions**.
8. **Karamoja.** There are distinctive peacebuilding and education challenges in the Karamoja region. Part of the challenge has a cultural dimension where the highly dispersed, pastoral lifestyle does not sit well with traditional forms of settled schooling. The peacebuilding challenge may be to simultaneously address school enrolment and work with young people who are not in school to establish livelihoods that address a variety of priorities.

9. **Acholi.** The Acholi region is the most conflict-affected in the country. Approaches that increase access to high quality and conflict sensitive education as a peace dividend would be a priority in this area. In addition, working with young people to identify sustainable livelihoods strategies and reduce vulnerability to conflict by addressing any underlying social tensions could be strategic priorities.

10. **West Nile.** The confluence of repeated and wide-spread conflict with under-representation and perceived marginalization make West Nile a unique political and social context. In addition, a highly transient population places significant stresses on limited resources, and presents human security challenges. From the standpoint of peacebuilding, a priority should be addressing service delivery challenges, while using an approach which does not perpetuate “learned helplessness” in the region.

11. **Western.** From a peacebuilding perspective one of the main challenges in the Western region is the potentially destabilizing effect of displacement and the recent influx of refugees. UNICEF in close partnership with UNHCR has the ability to address not only emergency/refugee education needs, but also to work with local communities to promote the integration between host and refugee population (especially in cases where schools are comprised of both groups).

12. Irrespective of the final decisions that remain about programming areas to pursue, there will be a challenge for UNICEF Uganda to put in place monitoring systems at the outset that include **indicators of success from a peacebuilding perspective.** This will mean going beyond recording activities such as trainings etc. There are a number of technical challenges, which should be addressed at the outset of the programme and resources identified to undertake the task.

13. Apart from monitoring and evaluation the Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy programme provides an opportunity to generate new knowledge and insight into the way that education can contribute to peacebuilding. Potential areas need to be identified at the outset, and could include a range of areas where a more in-depth understanding of peacebuilding priorities can inform UNICEFs priorities both in the short and long term.

14. It was beyond the scope of this conflict analysis to do a comprehensive **mapping of relevant partner organisations.** A preliminary mapping is provided in Appendix A, but a more detailed mapping should be undertaken once further decisions have been made about the priorities of the new programme and where these will operate. This would mean identifying the strengths of potential partner organisations from a peacebuilding perspective and also highlight where **training and capacity development** might be required.

15. Meetings with **other development partners** should be convened to avoid duplication of effort, and possibly leverage additional funding. Also, discussions with other UN agencies such as PBF will be helpful to ensure there in coherence in the approach that is taken.
1. Introduction

In July 2012, UNICEF Uganda was selected to participate in the global Peacebuilding Education and Advocacy Programme, supported by the Government of the Netherlands. As Uganda has recently emerged from 20 years of civil war (which were preceded by a number of other conflicts and power struggles), this programme provides an opportunity to further consolidate peace dividends and contribute to broad social transformation. To inform program design, a nation-wide conflict assessment has been carried out, which specifically focused on the sometimes neglected area of education, to identify relevant conflict drivers at the community, sub-national and national levels. The intention is that a better understanding of underlying causes of conflict at each of these levels will help identify (formal and informal) education programming to support conflict transformation and peacebuilding. This report provides findings from that conflict analysis, and will inform future UNICEF programme design, especially the Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy Programme. The publication has also received the validation of stakeholders, who were presented with the findings at a number of stakeholder validation workshops.

Uganda is emerging from a long history of violent conflicts. A twenty-year insurgency led by Joseph Kony’s Lord’s Resistance Movement was preceded by decades of cyclical civil wars. The Government of Uganda (GoU) has made tremendous strides toward stability, but has done so without some of the processes which are taken for granted in the peacebuilding community. Neither a robust transitional justice framework, nor an in-depth needs assessment was completed in coordination with international partners. Partly because of this, donors were reluctant to set up a trust-fund to support recovery and development in the north. This lack of pooled funding, has in turn shaped the way that post-conflict recovery and development activities have been carried out.

Simultaneously, a large body of literature exists on Uganda, and a number of international development practitioners as well as academic institutions have provided research which informs this report. Both UNICEF and the Government of the Netherlands, recognize the need for an updated conflict analysis to inform the future of Uganda’s peacebuilding agenda, in particular the role of education in conflict and peacebuilding. Thus this report identifies opportunities for peacebuilding within the education sector with a particular focus on child and youth perspectives, while also providing a broader analysis and set of recommendations which will be used to inform other UN peacebuilding initiatives, development partners and stakeholders who specialize in other relevant areas.

There has been a growing recognition among international development partners that education is integral to peacebuilding. This shift is an acknowledgment of the way education may “exacerbate or ameliorate conflict,”¹ and has emphasized conflict sensitivity in education (especially in the immediate aftermath of conflict). But academics and practitioners also point out that there is a need for a stronger emphasis on education in peacebuilding initiatives. This argument rests on the thesis that education has a variety of crucial contributions to make to peacebuilding:

- Education can play a preventive role in peacebuilding before, during, and after a conflict.
- A focus on education sector reform is integral to the conflict transformation process.
- Education has a role as a contributor to broader social transformation.
- While the UN peacebuilding architecture tends to focus on peacebuilding as part of the post-conflict period, working through education in a preventive capacity presents an opportunity for complementarity and a more holistic, long-term approach.²

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¹ UNICEF (2011) The Role of Education in Peacebuilding
² Ibid.
In the context of Uganda, education has the potential to contribute to peacebuilding by acting as a ‘peace dividend’ (especially in northern Uganda and the Karamoja sub-region), as well as by contributing to social and conflict transformation and preventive peacebuilding. Recommendations on how this can be achieved are made throughout this paper, but have social, economic, political, and security sector implications.

2. Context of the Study

Uganda became an independent country in 1962. It shares borders with 5 other African countries: South Sudan (to the north), Kenya (to the east), the Democratic Republic of Congo (to the west), Rwanda (to the southwest) and Tanzania (to the south). Uganda is 161\(^{th}\) (out of 187 countries) on the Human Development Index and is estimated to have almost 34.5 million people (UNFPA, 2011). Demographically it has one of the highest population growth rates in the world (3.1%) and has both the youngest population (57% under 18 years old) and one of the highest youth unemployment rates (83%) in the world (WDR, 2008; ILO, 2011).

The country spans diverse geographic terrain from dry grasslands and savannah in the northeast, to thick jungle and forests in the southwest. Despite the recent discovery of natural resources, 70% of Ugandans rely on agriculture for their livelihoods. Development “has been most rapid in cities, resulting in a disparate economic picture between urban populations and the 87% of Ugandans who live in rural areas.”\(^3\) The nation is home to a range of Bantu, Nilotic, and Central Sudanic languages and people groups. English is widely spoken, as is the regional trade language, Swahili.

Unlike most of its neighbours, Uganda was never a full colony, but rather a protectorate ruled administratively by the British. The British empowerment of certain kingdoms has played a major role in post-colonial politics. Since gaining independence in 1962, Uganda, has grown into a country with a national identity and highly developed security and defence capabilities. It has done so despite numerous coup d’états, regional conflicts, continued tribal clashes, dictatorial and often brutal governing, and a devastating twenty-year civil war which left 1.8 million people displaced. The nation’s increasing stability has manifested itself in a significant leadership role in East African Community (EAC) through political and trade structures such as COMESA and African Union initiatives (notably AMISOM and IGAD). This high level of participation in regional initiatives has helped the relatively small nation garner significant praise from major allies—including the United States\(^4\)—and is generally credited to the strong and confident leadership of President of Yoweri Museveni and his National Resistance Movement (NRM).

Despite overcoming enormous challenges, the diverse landscape of Uganda still exhibits some of the rifts, dichotomies, and developmental disparities which have led to upheaval over the past decades. Simultaneously, the nation is modernizing rapidly, transforming the lives of rural citizens through the introduction of mobile phones, the development of major infrastructure (especially roads), and a focus on improving agricultural technology adoption. But underneath these impressive achievements of growth and development, many of the challenges to peace which have led to conflict in Uganda’s past continue to simmer. Simultaneously, a new and pronounced set of grievances have emerged with increasing disparity in wealth and resource allocation, and critics worry that while the government’s stabilization approach has yielded political dividends in the form

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\(^3\) (Mercy Corps 2012)

\(^4\) On a recent trip to Uganda, U.S. Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton was among those who praised Uganda’s efforts in Somalia while providing the military with drones and expressing her hope that they could be used in the offensive against Joseph Kony, which is managed from bases in Uganda. Form more see: (Lee 2012)
of consolidation of state power, it has failed to build up institutions (both governmental and in the form of civil society) that are sufficiently robust to smoothly weather political transition.

As Uganda continues on the path toward building social cohesion and recovering from conflict, a number of notable challenges remain. However, identifying them and putting in place strategies for addressing social, economic, and political challenges presents a pressing and promising opportunity for peacebuilding in Uganda. Administratively, Kampala is the capital with over 1.2m people and more than 100 districts organised into 4 regions (Central, Eastern, Northern and Western). This report refers to Uganda as a whole, but the conflict analysis was organised to differentiate between i) national level conflict drivers; ii) drivers of conflict which have a sub-national or regional dimension; and iii) local or community based conflict drivers.

2.1 National Challenges

Uganda faces a series of political, economic, social and security sector challenges at the national level. The National Resistance Movement (NRM) Government, led by Yoweri Museveni, governs a diverse country with shared challenges. For example, the nation is home to the largest youth population in the world (78% of the population is under the age of 30)\(^5\), a demographic reality that will pose serious challenges to resource allocation and distribution in Uganda over the coming decades. Likewise, issues such as governance, economic development, and social service delivery have a national dimension. Uganda’s relationship with neighbouring countries is essential to lasting peace. These types of issues are explored through a national lens, although they may manifest themselves differently in each particular context.

2.2 Regional and Sub-National Dimensions

Uganda is home to a diverse range of cultures and tribes, some of which have strong cross-border ties. Uganda’s relationship with neighbouring countries is essential to lasting peace. The instability from neighbouring countries (chiefly South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Rwanda) has repeatedly spilled over into Uganda, straining relationships in the region and leaving the country vulnerable to entanglement in regional issues. Conflict in Karamoja, for example, remains closely linked to regional weapons smuggling in the Horn of Africa region. Simultaneously, the Karamajong sub-region is home to a unique set of dynamics and characteristics which are in many ways distinct from the rest of Uganda. Understanding the challenges in this part of the country thus requires an examination of both sub-national particularities and the regional dynamics which affect people’s lives. The Karamajong and their response to cattle rustling, for example, can be understood by considering their historical reliance on pastoralism, and by unpacking the threat they feel from neighbouring “Turkana” in Kenya or “Taposa” in South Sudan. This analysis explores challenges and dynamics of this nature by adopting a sub-national and regional lens for a number of Uganda’s internal conflicts. Sub-national is used to reference areas within Uganda which are characterized by unique set of dynamics or factors which distinguish it from the nation as a whole. Regional in this sense refers to being part of a greater geographic/cultural/political/linguistic area which stretches beyond the borders of Uganda.

A significant part of the study is also to highlight the differentiated nature of peacebuilding challenges at the sub-national level through fieldwork in four sub-national regions:

Karamoja is part of the “Teso Cluster,” the Karamajong belong to a people-group which spans Uganda, Kenya and South Sudan. Clashes along these borders continue, and are fuelled by an illegal but well-established arms trade from the Horn of Africa. The most under-developed part of Uganda, Karamoja remains extremely vulnerable to shocks (security, environmental, political, and health among others). The semi-arid weather poses a unique set of challenges for Karamajong livelihoods.

\(^5\) (USAID 2010)
The unique peacebuilding challenges in this part of the country include strong inter-communal divisions and tensions, difficulty in accessing large parts of the region, and corresponding challenges to building up social service provision. The unique set of variables which characterize this part of the country will thus require an equally unique peacebuilding approach which builds conflict and environmental resilience throughout the sub-region.

**North/Acholi sub-region** - despite notable progress toward peace, northern Uganda and the Acholi people remain deeply scarred by 20 years of war which left 1.8 million people displaced. Wounds (psychological, physical, and in terms of developmental stunting) leave this region vulnerable to conflict and in need of active recovery and peacebuilding. Many northerners point out that until Joseph Kony is captured or killed, the lingering possibility of his return makes healing and investment difficult for a traumatized population. Post-conflict challenges have resulted in a unique set of peacebuilding challenges in the Acholi sub-region including a population with unprecedented rates of domestic violence, alcoholism, and other signs of post-traumatic stress.

**West Nile** has been home to the South Sudanese/Sudanese refugees since the early 1990s, and hosted a peak population of 178,000 in 2005. Prior to the arrival of the (South) Sudanese refugees, a majority of the Ugandan population from West Nile also lived as refugees in South Sudan and the DRC (1980s-1990s). This part of the country was also heavily affected by the LRA, and due to its remoteness has received little attention compared to other LRA affected areas (at least, this is the stakeholder perspective). Simultaneously, this area remains in close proximity to the on-going instability caused by the LRA (in DRC, SS and CAR), and is still characterized by a highly transient population. The area remains volatile, and this transience makes peacebuilding challenging. A high Muslim population, and lingering tensions which can be traced back to the rule of Idi Amin, continue to divide communities. Addressing post-conflict needs, while building social cohesion and addressing challenges related to transience remain chief priority areas in this part of the country.

**Southwest and Western Uganda** - a resurgence of hostilities in eastern Congo has left over 220,000 people newly displaced in the North Kivu with over 40,000 of them fleeing to neighboring Uganda. This influx has placed an additional strain on the resources of government and host communities throughout the southwest. Ongoing tribal clashes in Kabaale continue to undermine stability and the government has been unsuccessful in permanently resolving disputes. Increased migration and resulting tension over land ownership and access remain prevalent. A regional approach to peacebuilding is needed, which increases the absorption capacity of host-communities, and supports integration, while addressing community tensions through mediation and equitable resource allocation.
2.3 Local Communities

The 85% of Ugandans who live in rural (and often remote) areas face localized conflicts within their households and communities every day. These vary from one context to another, but shed an important light on the struggles which characterize the daily lives of most Ugandans. Local issues often serve as a microcosm for national concerns, and conflicts that have roots in communities may play out on a larger stage. It is therefore important to examine and understand both the micro and macrocosms of conflict in Uganda. Far from the national capital, farmers are faced with disputes over land, women struggle to support husbands with substance abuse issues, and children fear a future in which Uganda’s most valuable resources will have been squandered by their parents’ generation. These fears and struggles form a third, and essential area explored in this report, community perspectives on the conflicts affecting them.

Research and stakeholder consultations were carried out in Karamoja, the Acholi sub-region, West Nile, and the South & Midwest (Mbarara, Kamwenge, and Fort Portal) with a wide selection of stakeholders (see Methodology section). This report is structured to reflect that, and addresses some of the national-level issues, followed by an account of findings from each of the sub-national
consultations. The individual, sub-national sections address both regional and community based conflict drivers, while issues with a “national” dimension are addressed separately.

3. Methodology

Increasingly donors and international development organisations are mainstreaming conflict analysis as part of their assistance for conflict affected countries (ADE, 2010). A variety of approaches and assessment tools have been developed. At the UN level most agencies use the Conflict Analysis for Prioritization Tool as part of Post-Conflict Needs Assessment (PCNA)6. This shares many of the features of earlier assessment frameworks that build on the concept of ‘drivers of change’, such as the US Government’s Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (INCAF)7, the Netherlands Strategic Governance and Corruption Analysis (SGACA) framework8, SIDA’s Power Analysis approach9 and DFID’s approach to Strategic Conflict Analysis (SCA)10. International NGOs such as International Alert and Search for Common Ground have also been at the forefront of developing conflict analysis tools and resources as a basis for training. The literature warns against generic approaches to conflict analysis and recommends that methodologies be adapted to the local context.

Most tools share a common approach involving the need to identify underlying causes of conflict (drivers). These are normally identified in terms of security, political, economic and social factors. This is the approach that was used in this conflict analysis, although in the context of Uganda it is important to note that a number of drivers of conflict could also be grouped under the heading of ‘environment and management of natural resources’. The purpose is to develop programmatic responses based on better insight into the institutional structures and motivations of various actors, and a deeper understanding the conflict in each particular context.

This study followed this basic approach to identify drivers of conflict in Uganda, but also drew on a framework identified in an OECD (2009) report on ‘Statebuilding and Peacebuilding Priorities and Challenges’ which involved consultations in seven countries to assist governments in setting broad-level goals for peacebuilding. The categories are:

(1) Inclusive political settlements and processes;

(2) Basic safety and security;

(3) Justice and peaceful resolution of conflict;

(4) Capacity to raise revenues and meet expectations through service delivery;

(5) Effective management of resources and sustainable economic development;

(6) Societal capacities for reconciliation and peace; and

(7) Capacity to maintain constructive relations with neighbours and the region.11

These priority areas are highly relevant in Uganda and were used in identifying drivers of conflict at the national level. The macro level analysis drew extensively on a number of existing documents including, a PBF conflict analysis (2009), PRDP 2009-2012, Bottleneck analysis of SRAs (2011), PRDP evaluation (2012) and the Uganda draft MTR (2012) as the starting point for an in-depth desk study

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6 Conflict Analysis for Prioritization Tool http://www.unssc.org/home/themes/peace-and-security/e-learning-0
7 Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework www.state.gov/documents/organization/187786.pdf
8 See Unsworth and Conflict Research Unit (2007)
of the existing literature from international development practitioners as well as academic sources (see bibliography).

Over the past decade international organisations have also adapted approaches to conflict analysis at the sector level. Part of the motivation is the recognition that education may exacerbate as well as ameliorate conflict (Bush and Saltarelli, 2000), for example, by reinforcing grievances through unequal access to education, or policies and practices that are insensitive to linguistic and cultural diversity. Agencies such as USAID and INEE have developed tools to examine education from a conflict perspective. The second stage of the study therefore involved consultations in four different parts of Uganda to identify drivers of conflict, but also to gather inputs from various stakeholders on practical contributions that education might make to conflict transformation and peacebuilding in each region. At the sub-national and local levels the objectives of the conflict analysis were threefold:

- To gain stakeholder’s perspectives on conflict drivers around the country, placing a particular focus on complementing existing literature with the perspectives of children and youth, and educators;
- To map stakeholders, identify opportunities to engage existing peacebuilding architecture and programs, and understand if/how a future UNICEF program might interact with existing activities.
- To gather information and establish a well-founded rationale, which will inform UNICEFs Peacebuilding and Education Program to address the particular challenges of Uganda (both at the national and regional levels).

In practical terms, the conflict analysis was carried out over a three-month period, involving four (one-week field visits) and consultations with the GoU as well as other key stakeholders. 12 focus group discussions were conducted with primary and secondary school students, students at teachers colleges, and youth not in school, as well as more than 30 interviews with key informants, and four stakeholder validation workshops (see Appendix B for guiding questions).

4. A Note on Terminology

The term ‘peacebuilding’ as defined by Galtung (1975) makes a distinction between ‘negative peace’ (cessation or absence of violence) and ‘positive peace’ (eliminating underlying causes of violence such as social injustice). This definition emphasises the need for peacebuilding to transform the political, economic and social conditions that generate violent conflict – sometimes referred to as the drivers of conflict.

The UN Secretary-General’s (2007) Policy Committee provided a ‘conceptual basis for peacebuilding to inform UN practice’, defining peacebuilding as follows:

Peacebuilding involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development. Peacebuilding strategies must be coherent and tailored to specific needs of the country concerned, based on national ownership, and should

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12 USAID (2006) Education and Fragility Assessment Tool
comprise a carefully prioritized, sequenced, and therefore relatively narrow set of activities aimed at achieving the above objectives.

This is a somewhat pragmatic definition which places an emphasis on post-conflict peacebuilding to prevent relapses into violence. Some argue that the UN approach to peacebuilding places too much emphasis on ‘conflict management’ through security, political and economic programmes that address the needs of elites, rather than ‘conflict transformation’ initiatives to address inequalities and social injustices that have an impact on the daily lives of people affected by conflict. Further discussion of this can be found in earlier reports of the UNICEF Education and Peacebuilding study.¹⁴

When we use the term ‘conflict driver’ we are referring to issues and processes that fuel violence, generally in the long term. While these factors are dynamic and evolve over time, they are areas which stakeholders identify as playing a role in contributing to division and/or fueling resentments which might build up over time. In this report we refer to “conflict drivers” or “possible conflict drivers” somewhat interchangeably. In general, we use the latter to qualify possible areas of disagreement which are not presently causing violent conflict, but could possibly erupt in the future. The primary aim of this paper is not to focus on whether or not conflict drivers will result in violent conflict, but rather to identify, analyse and unpack conflict drivers and propose ways in which UNICEF can engage in peacebuilding.

The term ‘youth’ is employed somewhat indiscriminately throughout this paper, partly because there are a number of differing definitions of youth. UNICEF defines youth as those between 15 and 24, while the GoU defines youth as anyone between 12 and 30 years of age.¹⁵ The authors generally used the GoU definition, but at times used the terms in reference to statistics which employ another measure. Citations are thus present throughout and can be consulted for clarification.

‘Elders’ is a term generally employed to refer to leaders identified by the community (often through established cultural rules or norms) to serve as leaders, political heads, or to fulfil judicial and arbitration roles within that group. Practices on how elders are selected and the functions they fulfil vary throughout the country. Ethnic and/or tribal are used interchangeably in this report. Both are terms surrounded by substantial scholarly debate which is beyond the scope of this report to explore.¹⁶ Since both terms are common in Uganda (although tribe/tribal is arguably more common), they have both been used here in reference to self-identified affiliations validated by stakeholder communities. These ties generally have an ethnic or family dimension.

The Conflict with the LRA, is also commonly referred to as an “insurgency” a “civil war” or simply “war.” This report is less concerned with exploring this distinction and more interested in the lasting effects of 20 year conflict on Ugandan society and the underlying causes which led to the Acholi opposition movements. As such, the authors do not employ terminology with the aim of endorsing one interpretation of the conflict over another.

Finally, this report uses geographic terms to divide Uganda into Northern, Eastern, Central and Western Uganda. The previous map shows how these areas are demarcated. In addition, the authors sometimes refer to the “southwest” which is the region which borders Rwanda, Tanzania, and DRC (generally below Lake Edward). “West Nile” and “Karamoja, are used as sub-divisions of the greater north as they represent very important differences in culture, history, and conflict dynamics.

¹⁵ (Government of Uganda Ministry of Gender Labor and Social Development 2001)
¹⁶ See (Cohen 1978) and (Fried 1966) for background on the debate.
5. UN Peacebuilding in Uganda

After twenty years of conflict in the North of the country (which affected West Nile, the Acholi sub-region, and Karamoja), the Government of Uganda has taken a proactive role in restoring peace and promoting development in the north of the country. Through the Peace Recovery and Development Plan (PRDP), which was launched in 2009, the government articulated its strategy and intention to invest in reconstruction, firm up a peace dividend for the northern region, and fill the development gap left by years of insecurity. The underlying rationale behind the PRDP was to provide a government-led roadmap toward closing the economic and service-delivery gap between northern Uganda and the rest of the country after 20 years of civil war. The four strategic objectives of the PRDP are: 1) Consolidation of State Authority, 2) Rebuilding and Empowering Communities, 3) Revitalization of the Economy, and 4) Peace Building and Reconciliation.\(^\text{17}\)

In June 2012, the PRDP entered a second phase (termed PRDP 2), which will continue through 2015. Building on successes of the PRDP, PRDP2 is built on six guiding principles to: 1) provide an additional source of funding 2) enhance the functionality of PRDP investments, 3) Ensure a greater focus on economic revitalisation 4) Mitigate potential conflict drivers 5) Provide a greater sub-regional focus and 6) Enhance PRPD 2 coordination.

Responding to strong government leadership in the development of northern Uganda, humanitarian agencies focused on life-saving, emergency interventions have closed down, and development actors have transitioned to a recovery agenda. The objectives and activities of international partners have been increasingly aligned with the government framework (which also enjoys strong donor support). Simultaneously, international agencies, and the UN in particular, have been able to play a constructively critical role in flagging potential drivers of conflict, and working to support transitional justice issues.

In January 2011, the United Nations launched a joint-agency peacebuilding program, funded by the UN Peace Building Fund (PBF). The program has been implemented in seven war-affected districts of the Acholi sub-region. The principal objectives of the program are to consolidate peace dividends after twenty years of conflict which was marked by large-scale displacement and followed by a rapid (and mandatory) return. To further these goals, a sub-set of activities focused on human rights, access to justice, enhancing protection mechanisms and economic recovery and livelihoods. The program employs a “Delivering as One” approach to streamline joint implementation among the eight agencies involved. It has also been well received by the GoU for supporting the Peace Recovery and Development Plan (PRDP which then transitioned to the PRDP 2). Although the two-year program is coming to an end in December 2012, a follow-on program is currently being designed, and UNICEF has an opportunity to work closely with the UN Country Team to identify areas of complementarity with the new program.

The UN Peacebuilding Program was also designed to complement PRDP activities and objectives. One of its major accomplishments has been to harness aggregate advocacy power of UN agencies, and to successfully flag potential threats to peace that could have undermined the recovery process. In close coordination with the GoU, these issues have been addressed, even as conflict drivers have evolved over time. A number of so-called “bottlenecks” have increasingly become priorities for the PBF program, focusing on large-scale development and recovery challenges like economic growth (and trade), unemployment, extreme poverty, and the effects of conflict on the social fabric of northern Uganda. In LRA affected areas, UNICEF may consider coordinating closely with the PBF on issues such as community reconciliation, youth engagement, livelihoods and other issues outlined in the PRDP. Despite the success of the PBF program, it failed to sufficiently incorporate education as a

\(^{17}\) (Office of the Prime Minister 2012)
priority area. UNICEF’s Peacebuilding Advocacy and Education Programme will address this gap, as well as advocate for inclusion of education in future PBF programmes and in the GoU peacebuilding agenda.

Another important document which has guided UN programmes in Uganda, is the National Development Plan (NDP). With the vision of “A Transformed Ugandan from a Peasant to a Modern and Prosperous Society in 30 years,” the NDP is wide-ranging and ambitious. Aimed at improving a broad range of socio-economic indicators, the plan lays out a comprehensive road-map for development in Uganda. Aligned with both the NDP and the PRDP, the United Nations Development Action Plan (UNDAP 2010-2014), focuses on supporting the GoU to strengthen its provision of governance and human rights, to improve livelihood opportunities and strategies for vulnerable individuals, and increased access to social services for vulnerable populations (especially in northern Uganda).

While a variety of frameworks have been put in place to address pressing challenges and reduce developmental disparities from years of conflict in Uganda, there are fewer frameworks in place to proactively identify on-going vulnerabilities. Similarly, while existing initiatives understandably focus on peace-dividends and reconciliation, there have been fewer efforts to identify opportunities for longer-term social transformation through a more holistic approach to peacebuilding. Existing approaches have also overlooked the important role of education in social transformation and long-term peacebuilding in Uganda. The potential for education to shape reconciliation and promote social cohesion is significant.

UNICEF’s work in Uganda has focused on partnering with the GoU to work toward fulfilling the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), through both tested approaches and pilot innovations. In the education sector, the country program has focused on supporting the GoU goal of securing universal primary education (UPE), supported Early Childhood Development (ECD), improved the quality of teaching, and worked to reduce barriers to school enrolment to reduce dropout and increase school completion rates. In addition to supporting formal education, UNICEF is supporting education initiatives through youth-centres, and information access points. Simultaneously, there is a growing recognition that youth engagement in the political process is a chief peacebuilding priority, and youth unemployment poses a serious economic and political obstacle in the country’s future. To respond to this, UNICEF is supporting programs like U-report, which allow youth to receive and send information and opinions about major issues which are then shared with key stakeholders (such as Ministers). Likewise UNICEF is engaging in youth livelihoods and entrepreneurship training through youth and ICT centres throughout the country.

Drawing on seven dimensions of peacebuilding and statebuilding, this analysis seeks to identify ways in which education can be utilized for peacebuilding, and how UNICEF might complement existing government efforts through its peacebuilding work. While the program is funded separately from existing peacebuilding initiatives, it is being developed in close collaboration with the UNCT, and draws both analytically and experientially from the collective experience implementing the UN Peacebuilding program in northern Uganda.

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18 For more see: United Nations Development Assistance Framework for Uganda.
19 (1) inclusive political settlements and processes; (2) basic safety and security; (3) justice and peaceful resolution of conflict; (4) capacity to raise revenues and meet expectations through service delivery; (5) effective management of resources and sustainable economic development; (6) societal capacities for reconciliation and peace; and (7) capacity to maintain constructive relations with neighbours and the region.
6. Drivers of Conflict at the National (macro) Level

There are a number of conflict drivers which may be identified from the literature at the national level. They currently operate within an overall context where President Museveni was re-elected by popular mandate in 2010, in a victory which notably—for the first time—included a majority among Acholi voters. Simultaneously, critics point out that that the NRM has overseen a period in which the space for political opposition has dwindled. Likewise, they draw attention to the fact that the ability of civil society to engage meaningfully on social or political issues has been increasingly compromised.

These criticisms are worrying in light of recent unexpected political transitions in other sub-Saharan countries (notably Ghana and Ethiopia). How prepared Uganda is for political transition may directly affect the nation’s chances for political stability over the next decade. In robust democratic systems, a balance of power, established and competent political opposition, and civil society normally work together to facilitate a smooth transfer of power. If these structures are weak, a transition could be significantly more complicated.

UNICEF’s desk review suggested that a number of challenges could compromise Uganda’s impressive recent track record toward stability. Part of the stakeholder consultation process was exploring and validating these findings, as well as gaining a solid understanding of the regional nuances and disparities. Overall they represent a mixture of security, political, economic and social challenges, but are presented here under a number of thematic headings.

6.1 Regional and national security

*Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Priorities* define basic safety and security as the state’s “capability to manage the legitimate use of force in order to protect the population and territorial integrity from international or external threat.” Since the end of the war with the LRA, the GoU has consolidated its position and overseen significant security sector reform.

Increasingly, Uganda has also taken on a significant leadership role in the East African Community (EAC), and in African Union initiatives (notably AMISOM). Uganda is widely considered to have one of the strongest militaries in the region, thanks in part to extensive investment and training for the UPDF around their intervention in Somalia. Likewise, the Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF) plays a leading role in the on-going effort to capture Joseph Kony. This military and security sector leadership has helped the country garner significant praise from major allies, most recently from one of its closest, the United States.

However, critics accuse the president of focusing on war to divert attention away from his own leadership, and to ward off any possible coup attempts. The UPDF has also been accused but never formally held to account for abuses during the LRA war, disarmament in Karamoja, and pacification in West Nile. Recently, the UPDF has once again been linked to ivory and other illegal resource extraction from eastern Congo. After decades of instability, Ugandans may value stability more than transparency and accountability in the security sector. Impunity, however, could have long-term consequences for the legitimacy of police and military leaders, and allow underlying grievances and perceptions of injustice to simmer.

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20 (Human Rights Watch 2012)  
21 (Statebuilding 2010) 30.  
22 On a recent trip to Uganda, U.S. Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton was among those who praised Uganda’s efforts in Somalia as well as in the fight against the LRA: (Lee 2012)  
23 (Izama 2011)  
24 (Rone and Galletti 2005)  
25 (Gettleman 2012)
6.2 Tension between political and cultural authority

Before the colonial administration demarcated the protectorate which would later come to be known as the Republic of Uganda, the region was made up of a number of kingdoms. The largest of these kingdoms is the Baganda, with which Museveni formed an alliance during his fight against Obote. After gaining power, the president restored the king as a “cultural king without executive powers.” Museveni also allowed other kings to become cultural or traditional leaders throughout Uganda. These kings were supposed to have a limited authority “within territories that had official administrative boundaries.” What Museveni did not anticipate, was the difficulty in distinguishing between political and cultural authority.

While it was in some ways a political win in Museveni’s short-term experiment with federalism it has had long-term implications by reawakening a discussion about authority structures and allegiance in Uganda. This has been particularly pronounced when relations between the kingdoms and the government deteriorated. The reinstatement of monarchy power, “created explosive political issues for many who had not thought about kingdoms for almost 30 years.”

Since then, Museveni has struggled to maintain a political alliance with the Baganda, while continuing to push the Kibaka (king) into a role of cultural rather than political authority. This has resulted in continuous accusations of attempts to undermine his power. Some examples include the land act of 2007, the introduction of regional governments in the lead-up to the 2011 election, arguably to “deflect Buganda’s federalism demand.” The unfortunate fire which destroyed the Kisubi tombs in 2010, further fuelled tensions and ignited competing loyalties, as people choose between opposing narratives of the events.

The parallel authority structures have left constituents divided “between king and president.” The president clearly won political support among Buganda constituents in 2001, but underlying questions around legitimacy and authority remain.

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30 For more on this see: (Crisis Group Africa Report No. 187 2012)
6.3 Concerns about political inclusion

Much like its neighboring countries, Uganda’s political history has been marked by a conflation of political parties and tribal affiliation. Because parties have often evolved from military movements that were founded on a regional or tribal set of interests, their leadership draws from a tribal majority. These parties typically recognize a need to expand, but have achieved diversification with a mixed degree of success.\(^\text{32}\) In its early days, the NRM recognized a need to transition from a military structure to a more inclusive representative structure, but the narrative of political victory was built around the war-time achievements of one group. Deep ties were formed during the war against Milton Obote, both among Ugandans (primarily Banyankole and Buganda), and Rwandan Tutsis—mainly refugees—who joined the NRM. The emerging political structure somewhat naturally reflected these ties. But even two decades later, the movement is accused of failing to include a significant number of Acholi or Karamajong (among other groups). Even at the local level in the north, the government has appointed a number of leaders from central or southwestern Uganda to serve in leadership positions. Such appointments can have the effect of perpetuating a trust-deficit among constituents. It also fails to invest in human leadership capacity in these regions, which could have a longer-term effect on governance. Actively promoting and investing in leaders from under-represented groups could present an opportunity for the GoU to firm up its commitment to national unity, and make small human capacity investments which could play an important role in peacebuilding.

6.4 Shrinking space for civil society

Uganda’s constitution includes provisions “on freedom of expression and association, and further guarantees the right to engage in peaceful activities to influence government policies through civic organization.”\(^\text{33}\) In practice, criticisms of government performance or policies are not always well received. Civil Society groups, particularly those focused on contentious issues such as transparency, governance or LGBTI issues have had decreasing room to organize assemble and express their views on government policy. In 2012, Human Rights Watch published a report criticizing the NRM for “deploy[ing] an array of tactics to intimidate and obstruct the work of NGOs in certain sectors.”\(^\text{34}\) The report provides numerous examples of NGOs being intimidated, threatened, and attacked.

This approach toward civil society may have silenced critical voices in the short-term, but critics suggest it will result in mounting dissent and a lack of healthy engagement by opposition parties in the long term. NGOs and CSOs play a crucial role in mobilizing citizens around civic priorities and mobilizing communities to respond to issues at the local level (including areas where the central government has limited reach). They therefore represent a potential asset, even if they disagree with some elements of government policy. The research these organizations undertake can also be instructive to national dialogue and accountability instead of presenting a threat to government, and can provide an opportunity for engagement and learning.

6.5 Uneven infrastructure development

Uganda is a relatively small and easily navigable country (compared to many of its neighbours like South Sudan and DRC). Infrastructure investments have been a top priority of the government, and the evidence of this can be seen throughout the country.\(^\text{35}\) However questions have been raised

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\(^\text{32}\) For more on this see: (McDonough 2008) 366-367.


\(^\text{35}\) Criticism about the speed of road construction and other infrastructure projects remains common - however it is beyond the scope of this paper to explore these issues in depth.
about the extent to which infrastructure has been developed equitably. The government has the challenging task of balancing domestic development priorities with its commitments under the EAC, as well as the many long-term benefits of developing infrastructure that supports regional trade. All of these are important and present competing priorities for investment. But even when these factors are accounted for, there has been a notable gap in developing infrastructure to and from the most impoverished parts of Uganda. Karamoja, eastern parts of the Acholi sub-region and West Nile, remain isolated from markets and virtually inaccessible by road during the rainy season and this has been identified as a source of grievance.  

6.6 Economic development

While Uganda has seen remarkable growth and development over recent years, it is also home to one of the largest population growth rates in the world (3.2 %). As such, even laudable growth rates are insufficient to meet the demand from a bulging population. While poverty as a percentage of population has declined from 56% in 1992 to 24.5% in 2009, the total number of poor people has gone up over the same period. Likewise, development has disproportionately benefitted urban populations (even though 87% of Ugandans live in rural areas).

At the same time, Uganda has one of the fastest-growing economies in the region. Industry, manufacturing, and natural resource extraction will be areas of economic growth over the coming decades, but agriculture remains the bedrock of the Ugandan economy and is irreplaceable for long-term growth. 70% of Ugandans depend on agriculture for employment, but adoption of improved technologies has been slow, and educators point to a lack of targeted vocational skills training in the school curriculum as one possible reason. Simultaneously, many young Ugandans aspire to highly skilled jobs like engineering, IT, and medicine. As such, they express little interest in vocational training, but rather emphasize their hope that the government will create employment opportunities for them.

The slow trickle down of economic dividends, as well as resentment over growing wealth disparities, could present significant challenges to peace in Uganda. The way in which natural resource extraction is administered, for example, could have significant implications for political stability. While resources were discovered five years ago, a legal framework has only recently been put in place. If these resources (and resulting contracts, jobs, income, and investments) are perceived to benefit one group over another, existing resentment could be fuelled, further underscoring perceptions of preferential resource allocation in Ugandan politics. Simultaneously, if constituents perceive the administration and resource allocation as transparent and equitable, it presents a tremendous opportunity to prove that ethno-political resource allocation is an out-dated narrative.

In addition to its challenges of equitable resource allocation, the GoU faces a number of challenges in meeting expectations through service delivery. This is particularly true in parts of the country

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36 (Mercy Corps 2012)
37 World Bank. ibid.
39 International Foundation for Agricultural Development. Ibid.
41 (Crisis Group Africa Report No. 187 2012)
where efforts are inhibited by poor infrastructure. An example of this would be the provision of vaccines or medication in a context like Karamoja, where poor roads make access to remote areas extremely difficult. Simultaneously, those remote areas should remain a top priority in Uganda as the country continues to pursue its NDP objective of modernization and growth. The recent strategy of prioritizing infrastructure development is not uncontroversial, but it is consistent with an attempt to bridge some of these service delivery gaps.

6.7 Natural Resource Management

Oil was discovered in the Lake Albert region as early as 1920, but exploratory drilling did not commence until 2006. Since then, the government has been working on a set of policies to guide the extraction and processing of the estimated 2.5 billion barrels. Critics point out that the process has been slow, suggesting that this lag-time has allowed individuals with influence to frame the policies and position themselves in a beneficial position vis-à-vis the resources (exploitative land-grabbing, nepotism, and corruption are all criticisms which have been leveraged against government officials in this respect). President Museveni has come under criticisms for his “autocratic handling of the oil issue, and the secrecy with which he and his inner circle have surrounded their dealings.”

Concerns associated with the discovery of oil go beyond these critiques of the regulatory process however. In 2007, “a series of cross-border skirmishes broke out between Ugandan and Congolese troops in and around Lake Albert. The clashes reflect the fact that the two countries have never agreed on the exact position of the border running through the lake.” This latent dispute which dates back to colonial times could further infuse complications into the already difficult relationship between Uganda and the DRC.

In addition to oil, Uganda has tremendous natural resources including significant mineral wealth and gold which have been discovered in Karamoja. Much like with the oil, concerns remain about the administration and extraction of these resources, and allegations abound of corrupt (and at times illegal) mining in this part of the country where access and oversight are challenging.

Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Priorities define effective management of resources and sustainable economic development as “the state’s capacity to create an enabling framework for economic growth, for the management of natural resources, and for employment.” Developing Uganda’s natural resources such that they are used for the benefit of the people, provide employment and

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42 (Vokes 2012) 303.
43 (Vokes 2012) 308.
44 (Statebuilding 2010) 36.
business opportunities to Ugandans and contribute to strategic infrastructure investments will be crucial for Uganda’s long term economic growth and social stability.

6.8 Land disputes
Inheriting, owning, and cultivating land is central to the lives, livelihoods, and cultural identities of many Ugandans. In every part of the country, land-issues present one of the most important day to day conflicts between family members, communities, and tribes. At the height of the conflict in northern Uganda, nearly two million Acholi were living in IDP camps. A lack of formal land-titles before the conflict, followed by two decades of displacement, has resulted in a particularly complicated set of disputes. Some families have lost their head of household, obscuring the inheritance process. In other cases, the long absence from the land has either led to legitimate disputes over where the boundaries were before the conflict, or to opportunism in which some individuals (5% of reported cases) seek to capitalize on the transition by cutting down trees which previously demarcated the properties. And in still other cases, long-term squatting has led to disputed claims over ownership. Resolving these disputes is expensive, time-consuming, and bureaucratic, currently making up roughly 94% of cases before Local Council Courts.46

While there are particular challenges associated with land-tenure issues in northern Uganda, the issues remains a nation-wide conflict driver. Dramatic recent rises in land-prices have only fuelled existing tensions in this respect. While many cases are dealt with in the Local Council Courts, community elders have also taken an active role in addressing and resolving issues at the local level. Where these approaches have been successful, lessons can be drawn about how to harness elders in the mediation and negotiation of conflict. Simultaneously, the government’s success in formalizing and implementing just and peaceful methods of land-dispute resolution will be crucial to defining how the government is perceived at the household level.

6.9 Equitable Government Service Delivery
There is a notable correlation between parts of the country which have been affected by conflict and those which have under-developed infrastructure and social services. Correspondingly low development indicators ranging from health, education, and access to justice to levels of agricultural productivity are particularly notable in the Acholi, West Nile, and Karamoja sub-regions respectively. The insecurity of conflict has made government investments in these areas challenging. An important element of firming up the peace-dividend is to invest significantly in these areas and help them recover from developmental stunting.

45 (Burke and Egaru 2011) iii.
46 (Burke and Egaru 2011) 5.
"In my vision, I see that the resources are reducing, so when I grow up they will be used up."
— Youth in Acholi

"Economic Development is not balanced. Compare northern Uganda with the West and you will see."
— Youth in Acholi

This table, taken from (Higgins and Bird 2009), shows relevant welfare and education indicators for Uganda by region - the west of the country scores below the national average on a variety of indicators.

Stakeholders repeatedly voiced concerns that the government showed favouritism in its development priorities toward the west of the country. When examined, these claims do not necessarily hold up to statistical scrutiny (see above). While there is a notable discrepancy between the west and other northern areas, this part of the country still falls below the national average on a number of important indicators (including education). Higher indicators can also not simply be attributed to favouritism, as a lower population growth rate, and the absence of violent conflict have sped up development and service delivery in this part of the country.

Perceptions of government favouritism by prioritizing investments in central and southwestern Uganda are unlikely to be completely assuaged even if the GoU focuses exclusively on development in the North. At least in part these perceptions can be understood as a cultural and tribal narrative on Ugandan politics, rather than as a researched analysis of government service provision and corresponding development indicators. In terms of presenting a possible conflict driver, the perception of inequality may be as important as the reality. Bringing to light the existing investments, communicating about future development plans and then following through on those promises (especially in historically underserved areas) may go some way to addressing these perceptions and building northern confidence in the central government.

### 6.10 Demographic ‘youth bulge’

Uganda has the world’s youngest population with 79% of its population below the age of 30. As this generation transitions into adulthood, their needs, values, and perspectives will transform Ugandan society. The political and social ramifications of this shift will be significant, and affect the prospects of continued pacification or renewed conflict in a country which only recently emerged from civil war. In northern Uganda and Karamoja, many young people have experience in armed conflict, making the

47 YouthMap Uganda. 2.
continued disarmament and peaceful engagement of this demographic a priority. Simultaneously, understanding and reaching out to this demographic on political and social issues may help to assuage fears of marginalization.

The young people UNICEF interviewed for this study consistently voiced fears about natural resource allocation. Instead of focusing on the ethnic dimensions of politics, youth tended to frame their fears in generational terms. Many worried, for example, that their parents’ generation will squander Uganda’s natural resources. Some voiced fears that their father’s land would not be sufficient for the number of children he has—implying that each of the sons will not inherit sufficient land to raise their own families. This is part of a larger problem where youth are forced to rely on inheritance rather than acquisition. In reflecting on Uganda’s recent discovery of large quantities of oil, young people expressed a fear that the resources might not be managed sustainably, or that profits would not be reinvested in ways that benefit them (such as investments in social services, infrastructure, and education).

Youth also repeatedly mentioned feeling politically marginalized and disengaged. Decision making is perceived to take place in Kampala without recourse to perspectives from rural areas—much less rural areas where there is a strong political opposition. In the 2011 election, youth represented “over half of the nation’s voters.” By the time the next election takes place, in 2016, that percentage will be even larger. In other contexts—most notably the countries of the Arab Spring—the combination of large youth populations, high unemployment, and feelings of political marginalization were arguably central to the resulting instability and violence. This suggests that engaging youth constructively in the political process, to address feelings of political marginalization should remain a priority and could prove vital to Uganda’s long-term stability.

6.11 Social and cultural capacities for reconciliation and peacebuilding

Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Priorities define societal capacities for reconciliation and peace as “the need for peacebuilding and statebuilding processes to take account of existing divides within and among communities and to support processes of social reconciliation.” In the case of Uganda, different groups and tribes have varying methods and customs for conflict resolution. For example, the Karamajong have a well-established set of tools and norms which are used to resolve disputes at the communal level. Likewise, the GoU has invested in building up the justice system and implementing a variety of mechanisms to address conflicts in the sub-region. The key question, however, is not only about the existence of such mechanisms, but their effectiveness in the peaceful resolution of conflicts.

Across Uganda, there seems to be a tension between traditional and state mechanisms for resolving disputes. While the state has and must continue to take a proactive role in mediating disputes and bringing clarity to laws and policies around contentious issues, building upon local elder or community authority structures, (when they prove to be efficient and abide by human rights standards), can be a strategic way to accomplish that objective. Harnessing these community-based mechanisms can also increase the reach of the state into parts of the country where service provision has proven difficult. Instead of presenting a competition to the state justice system, “these

48 It is customary in Acholi culture for male children to inherit land from their fathers. Exactly how the land is divided depends upon the specific family, and how many wives and children the father has.
49 (International Youth Foundation 2011) 16.
50 (Statebuilding 2010) 38.
51 See: (Jabs, “You Can’t Kill a Louse with One Finger”: A Case Study of Interpersonal Conflict in Karmoja, Uganda 2010) and (Jabs, Collectivism and Conflict: Conflict Response Styles in Karamoja, Uganda 2005) for details.
mechanisms can work alongside and complement the formal apparatus of the state; as such the state should support them and find ways of promoting this complementarity.”

Social reconciliation in Uganda goes beyond the need for effective dispute resolution mechanisms. There is a continued need to address the dimensions of transitional justice, political representation, reintegration of former combatants and insurgents, and large-scale reconciliation based on the formulation of a pluralistic but cohesive national identity. The GoU has a variety of measures in place to address these challenges, and they are discussed in greater detail in the corresponding sub-sections.

6.12 Social norms related to violence

Recourse to violent forms of dispute resolution is common throughout Uganda. At the household level this manifests itself in domestic violence, sexual and gender-based violence, and violence against children (VAC). A 2006 study conducted in Uganda revealed that 98.3% of children interviewed reported having experienced physical violence. Of this number, 28.6% indicated that the abuse had taken place mainly at school, and 31.8% indicated that they had been victims of violence both at home and at school. Violence against children takes a number of forms including caning, slapping, pinching, locking up, or burning, and seems to affect both girls and boys with comparable frequency.

In addition to corporal punishment, 24% of children in this study indicated that they had been sexually abused. These findings are corroborated by a UNICEF supported 2009 national MoE study on school standards, which found that 91% of P3, and 88% of P6 pupils reported that they are beaten at school. Likewise, 6% of P3 pupils and 7% of P6 pupils reported that sexual abuse (rape) happens in their school, and 9% (P3) and 13% (P6) of pupils report defilement as a type of violence which takes place in their school.

In addition to violence against children at school, domestic and sexual violence and abuse is widespread, affecting both men and women, including women who are pregnant:

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52 (Chapman and Kagaha 2009) 1.
53 “Violence against children: The voices of Ugandan children and adults” DipakNaker, 2005. (Raising Voices and Save the Children in Uganda)
54 Both girls and boys experienced with comparable frequency common forms of physical violence, such as caning and slapping. However, girls tended to experience more of the subtle forms of physical violence, such as pinching or twisting of the ears, while boys (especially older boys) experienced more of the extreme forms of physical violence, such as burning, tying up, or severe beatings. For more on this see: “Violence against children: The voices of Ugandan children and adults” DipakNaker, 2005. (Raising Voices and Save the Children in Uganda)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>% women (15-19) who have had a live birth</th>
<th>% (15-49) who have experienced physical violence during pregnancy</th>
<th>% (15-49) who have ever experienced sexual violence</th>
<th>% ever-married women (15-49) who have experienced emotional, physical, or sexual violence by their husband/partner</th>
<th>% of ever-married men who have experienced physical or sexual violence by any wife/partner in the past 12 months</th>
<th>% of ever-married women who have experienced physical or sexual violence by husband/partner in the past 12 months</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Karamoja</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
<td>17.1%</td>
<td>35.8%</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
<td>28.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acholi</td>
<td>17.5%</td>
<td>18.7%</td>
<td>41.9%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>18.8%</td>
<td>51.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Nile</td>
<td>19.7%</td>
<td>23.3%</td>
<td>15.5%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>15.3%</td>
<td>30.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southwest</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
<td>15.8%</td>
<td>21.0%</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
<td>16.0%</td>
<td>27.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>17.3%</td>
<td>12.2%</td>
<td>20.4%</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
<td>41.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>18.1%</td>
<td>16.3%</td>
<td>22.4%</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These findings underscore an acceptance of violence at the household level. Research from other contexts suggests that children or young people who have been physically or sexually abused are significantly more likely to engage in abusive or maladaptive behaviours as adults. This cycle of violence also affects the way children understand and approach conflicts throughout their lifetimes. In absence of non-violent dispute resolution methods, young people are likely to resort to violence, unless they are equipped with alternative tools and approaches at a formative age. Addressing the root-causes of violence at the household level, as well as providing training to teachers, caregivers, and community members on non-violent methods and approaches to dispute resolution could provide an opportunity to break the cycle of violence, and empower the younger generation with effective tools for non-violent mediation.

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55 (Uganda Bureau of Statistics 2011)
56 (Craig and Sprang 2007)
7. Regional and Community-level Issues Identified by Area

In *Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Priorities*, OECD identified “capacity to maintain constructive relations with neighbours and the region” as a key priority. In the report, this is defined as “the capacity of the state to maintain constructive relations with its neighbours and the wider region, and to contribute to regional stability and co-operation.” For the Government of Uganda, this raises a number of related issues, including the permanent resolution of territorial claims (including disputes over borders with DRC and Kenya), the protection of natural resources, “the development of cross-border infrastructure to support trade,” and cooperation on regional security challenges. Additional detail on these challenges and opportunities are discussed by individual sub-region.

7.1 KARAMOJA sub-region

Key Stakeholders

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Regional Dynamics

Karamoja is located in the northeast corner of Uganda, on a plateau geographically, climactically, and culturally distinct from the rest of the country. Home to a variety of tribes and clans that are part of the Teso cluster, this region is dramatically under-developed compared to other areas in Uganda. Karamoja has the lowest development indicators in almost every category across the board: health, education, access to social services, governance, and basic safety and security. The uni-modal weather leaves the region vulnerable to drought and dependent on livelihoods strategies sufficiently adapted to weather shocks. While it is often suggested that the Karamajong should focus on agricultural production, FAO and other agencies point out that pastoralism is arguably better suited to the climate context. For this and a variety of socio-cultural reasons, some peacebuilding advocates have argued for the government to “embrace pastoralism as part of the foundation for

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57 (Statebuilding 2010) 39.
58 (Statebuilding 2010) 39.
60 (Powell 2010) 5.
peace and development in Karamoja."\textsuperscript{61} However, the government continues to push a strategy of settled agriculture as the solution to the problems in the region.

The region has been severely affected by conflicts over the past decades. In addition to the conflict between the LRA and UPDF, an increase in arms has resulted in increasingly violent cattle raiding. “While raids were previously controlled by elders and used for the benefit of the community to build alliances, acquire bride price, and redistribute food and wealth in times of scarcity, raids are increasingly carried out by young men for their own personal gain.”\textsuperscript{62} Partly for this reason, there is increasingly a recognition that addressing security challenges in Karamoja is inextricably linked with economic growth and promoting livelihoods support. Peacebuilding programs in this area thus have a two-fold opportunity: to build the foundation for long-term peace by increasing access to conflict-sensitive education, and to engage with youth to address the market for violent raiding by working toward vocational alternatives.

\textit{History of Disarmament in Karamoja}

Disarmament of Karamoja has taken place with mixed results. On the one hand, the GoU’s Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and Development Program (KIDDP), has sought to disarm and pacify Karamoja, and has experienced a reasonable level of success. However, the regional proliferation of arms, as well as a pipeline for smuggling small arms and light weapons (SALW) from Somalia, Ethiopia, South Sudan and Kenya, has presented a continued obstacle to permanent disarmament in Karamoja. Simultaneously, the Karamajong face a legitimate security threat from armed groups in Kenya and South Sudan who periodically carry out raids within Uganda, generally for cattle. A regional abolition of the arms trade and an integrated disarmament approach are the only solutions likely to achieve long-term peace.

Stakeholders UNICEF interviewed generally reflected positively upon the government’s disarmament efforts, and commended the absorption of armed groups into the UPDF. Simultaneously, it appeared that disarmament has not always been proportionate throughout Karamoja, leaving certain groups without weapons to defend themselves when raiders from other regions come to take their cattle. Youth and individuals in the more remote parts of Karamoja are said to continue actively trading in arms, indicating both a certain trust-deficit in the disarmament program and the regional dimension at hand.

Armed clashes with Kidepo National Park Rangers also continue to present a challenge. Pastoralists wanting to graze their cattle in this area have clashed with the Uganda Wildlife Authority (UWA). However, the UWA has made progress in security the borders of the park, and it is hoped that as these boundaries are firmed up, armed clashes will subside. This is an example of competing national versus sub-national priorities. Kidepo National Park is gazetted as a reserve, and is seen as an important part of the national tourism portfolio. Local cattle-grazers, not seeing the immediate effect of tourist money, view the land as squandered range for their herds.

\textit{Relationship between the State and Karamoja}

The marginalization of Karamoja dates back to British colonialism. The British rulers are accused of simultaneously doing too little to develop Karamoja, and of implementing policies with a dire long-term effect on livelihoods and relationships between clans. But virtually every subsequent Ugandan government has adopted a similar policy of exclusion toward the region, leading the Museveni Government in 2004 to acknowledge “Karamoja’s exclusion from past development processes in Uganda and state its commitment to improve people’s livelihood in the region.”\textsuperscript{63} The relationship between the Museveni government and the Karamajong has been improving, but the approach is

\textsuperscript{61} (Saferworld 2010) 7.
\textsuperscript{62} (Mercy Corps 2011) 4.
\textsuperscript{63} (Gutwein, Kelemen and Oesterle 2010) 8.
widely criticized for creating parallel authority structures, while disregarding customary structures that are already in place.  

Some also fear that the government is intentionally executing a policy of containment for Karamoja, seeking to deal with the Karamajong in the sub-region while making it difficult for them to reach Kampala (or at least intentionally neglecting road-construction and other infrastructure developments which would improve access). This view was underscored by the government’s policies of rounding up Karamajong street-children in Kampala and their policy of sending them back to their district. In some cases, the migration is transactional, and parents are actually paid to give their children up to beg in Kampala. To address the myriad of factors at play, the government will need to focus holistically on addressing the reasons why children have left their homes to beg on urban streets.

Partly to prove his commitment to Karamoja, the President appointed First Lady, Janet Museveni, as the Minister for Karamoja Affairs in 2006. Since then, she has earned significant praise for her approach to developing the sub-region. Simultaneously, the government policy of moving the Karamajong away from migrant pastoralism toward land-bound agricultural practices is controversial due to the increasing prevalence of land-disputes, and the region’s drought-prone climate. The first lady has also taken a very proactive role investing in education in Karamoja. A large need remains, but existing efforts are an admirable step in the right direction.

**Conflict Drivers Identified by Constituents**

Stakeholders in Karamoja identified the following as key drivers of conflict in the region:

- **Environmental (resource) related conflicts**: Karamoja’s uni-modal rainfall along with increasing drought over the past decades has placed strains on existing natural resources. In the absence of reliable alternative livelihoods, pastoralists continue to clash over access to grazing lands and water points.
- **Poverty**: compared to other parts of Uganda, Karamoja is dramatically underdeveloped, and underserviced both by the public and private sectors. Market access remains extremely challenging and economic growth is stunted by a myriad of related development challenges.
- **Poor government service provision**: a number of factors complicate government service provision in Karamoja. Poor access is one challenge, as is the associated difficulty in recruiting qualified professionals (including teachers), to work in this area. The below-standard service provision is a touchy issue among Karamajong, who view it as indicative of a larger marginalization of the region.
- **Youth unemployment**: With few economic prospects, young people (in particular) turn to cattle rustling and other forms of theft to bring short-term economic gain to their families. The resulting violence cyclically undermines progress toward peace. When discussing this issue with youth who are not in school, 100% said that they had lost a family member or very close friend to raids.
- **Marital/Family issues**: alcoholism, domestic violence, and polygamous marriages present a set of related challenges to families. While rampant alcoholism and domestic violence perpetuate harmful relationships within the nuclear family, widespread polygamy is the cause of broader communal disputes over land, resources, and inheritance.
- **Violence against children**: violent dispute resolution is extremely common in Karamoja, and both parents, siblings, and other care-takers (including educators) often resort to violence as a means to resolve disputes or in an attempt to instil discipline. This cyclical violence needs

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64 (Gutwein, Kelemen and Oesterle 2010) 9.
65 (Gackle, Lolem and Kabanda n.d.) 33-35.
66 (New Vision 2012)
We come to the youth centre because it gives us structure.”

—Karamajong youth not in school

to be addressed through the incorporation of peaceful dispute resolution mechanisms, some of which are already enshrined in the Karamajong tradition. Building upon these traditional dispute resolution methods (both at a community and household level) provide the most promising opportunity to address widespread violence.

- **Land**: related closely to polygamy (and the consequent lack of clarity about inheritance) and resource scarcity, land disputes are fuelled by the absence of formal land titles in the region.

**Conflict and Education**

The context for education development in Karamoja is extremely challenging. Infrastructure makes construction and maintenance a challenge, and the rural and dispersed population patterns, leave too many children out of reach of formal education. With some of the lowest completion rates in the country, Karamoja also struggles from a range of challenging in implementing and developing its education programmes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOURCE: UGANDA EDUCATION STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 2011</th>
<th>UDHS 2011</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>UDHS 2011 Region</strong></td>
<td><strong>Net Intake Ratio</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>M</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karamoja</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acholi</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Nile</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southwest</td>
<td>76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATIONAL</td>
<td>63%</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Continued economic instability, inter-tribal conflict, and cattle rustling have contributed to one of the lowest school enrolment levels in Uganda. In addition to low school completion rates, teacher recruitment and retention remains challenging as evidenced by the high pupil teacher ratios (ranging from 66:1 in Moroto and 100:1 in Kotido). Access to sanitation facilities is also very low in Karamoja, with pupil stance ratios between 47:1 in Moroto, and 72:1 in Kaabong. Increasing access to sanitation could help boost enrolment, especially among girls.

In addition to access and quality challenges, a cycle of poverty and economic stagnation perpetuate perceptions among some communities that education is not an investment which pays off (in the form of jobs). Secondary school drop-out rates are extremely high due to a related set of factors: youth pregnancy, early/forced marriages, lack of sanitary pads for girls, inability of families to afford school fees or expenses related to education, and the prioritization of income generating activities such as cattle rearing or agriculture.

Years of conflicts have also stunted the development of a solid education sector, and have disincentivised teachers from investing professionally in the sub-region. But the transformative potential of education is particularly notable in Karamoja. For communities which have minimal positive contact with one another, schools present an opportunity for children to grow up side by side with members of neighbouring communities. Building social cohesion by uniting communities which have a history of conflict around the common goal of educating their children presents a key opportunity for peacebuilding.
In addition to engaging through the formal education sector, Karamoja presents a unique context in which to work with children and youth who are not in school. UNICEF is already working through a number of youth centres which engage young people who have dropped out of school in cultural activities such as dance and drama, as well as recreational sports, community dialogues and vocational training. Youth consulted at these centres stressed that they came to the centre because it provided them with structure, and they wanted to avoid the “idleness” which led them to destructive behaviour. Engaging youth (including those who identify as “reformed” or “previous” cattle rustlers), could empower them to become change agents within their communities. Young people in Karamoja repeatedly expressed their fatigue with the cycle of violence which they have experienced. The challenge which remains is how to harness this frustration to empower youth to become agents of social transformation.

**Progress toward Peace**

When asked about the success of existing efforts toward peacebuilding, stakeholders and interviewees generally responded positively about the government’s disarmament efforts, recruitment of former combatants into the UPDF, and progress toward improving security in large parts of Karamoja. However, challenges remain as areas closer to the border continue to have access to arms, and periodic cross-border conflict between clans/families/tribes on either side of the Kenya and South Sudan borders clash periodically.

When UNICEF engaged stakeholders on possible approaches to peacebuilding, the research team received some interesting responses. Three priorities were identified as core values which should inform programme design: 1) sustainability, 2) coordination, and 3) policy-level changes which create an enabling environment for peacebuilding. Citing the short lifespan of previous peacebuilding activities, UNICEF was requested to make sure that its efforts employ a systemic approach which will create lasting change beyond the life of the programme.

In terms of identifying topical or sectoral approaches to peacebuilding, stakeholders unanimously pointed toward education as one of the most promising opportunities for social transformation. Citing the capacity for education to raise youth out of poverty and embed the value of peace, stakeholders recommended that UNICEF focus on increasing school enrolment, work at the national level to promote peacebuilding in the educational curriculum (for both primary and secondary school), and by encouraging school-based exchanges in Karamoja. In addition to working through the formal education sector which reaches approximately 60% of Karamajong children, UNICEF was advised to increase its focus on the informal sector, through a variety of possible approaches to engaging youth. Suggestions included:

- **Vocational training/Building economic opportunities**—key to breaking the cycle of poverty which underlies the cycle of theft and “raiding.”
- **Consensus building and dialogue** through cultural programs such as dance, drama, and poetry.
- **Engaging “reformed” youth as agents for change** in their communities.
- **Re-empowering traditional elders** within the community. According to stakeholders, these elders have the potential to play a significant role in re-building community-based justice, reconciliation, and peace.

**Conflict Management and Peacebuilding Opportunities**

Using the broad framework of the OECD areas, there are a range of conflict management and peacebuilding challenges. These have implications on the broader peacebuilding priorities. The table also highlights potential opportunities for education initiatives. A similar table is developed for each sub-regional analysis.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority Dimensions</th>
<th>Conflict Management (negative peace)</th>
<th>Peacebuilding (positive peacebuilding)</th>
<th>Opportunities for Peacebuilding through Education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Solicit and incorporate Karamajong perspectives on development strategies (especially those with livelihoods &amp; socio-cultural implications)</td>
<td>Increasing Karamajong representation in Government, build local governance structures that build upon traditional authority structures, and ensure Karamoja is represented in politics at the national level.</td>
<td>Engage youth in political decision making and in local political processes. Provide peaceful and constructive opportunities for young people to voice political opinions and grievances. Incorporate elements of peacebuilding into the education curriculum to foster long-term social cohesion. Equip and empower teachers to become agents of peacebuilding and to discuss current events in the classroom.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safety &amp; Security</td>
<td>Continued disarmament efforts, demobilization of armed fighters</td>
<td>Recruit and absorb reformed fighters into the UPDF. Build up a robust, localized, and respected core of UPDF who work with communities to identify and resolve security challenges</td>
<td>Disincentivize criminal activity by building economic alternatives for people (esp. youth) engaging in criminal activities, gangs, or survival sex. Make sure schools are child friendly safe spaces—this may include building community ownership of schools to provide protection and respect for school property.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice &amp; Peaceful Conflict Resolution</td>
<td>Engaging elders and community leaders to negotiate resolutions to existing conflicts</td>
<td>Train community elders to become conflict mediators, and use their social capital to prevent conflict.</td>
<td>Engage in district dialogues which bring together national political leaders and community members. Build up the capacity of educators and teachers to become community mediators. Work with communities to resolve any lingering land disputes over schools. Empower youth and youth groups (such as GEMs and scouts) with mediation skills, and information about access to justice and case referral.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacities to raise revenues and meet expectations through service delivery</td>
<td>Stop any illegal resource extraction</td>
<td>Build industries around resource extraction which invest in communities and produce a tangible social benefit to communities in the area. Build up private sector capacities and encourage youth entrepreneurship.</td>
<td>Build up an education sector which meets the needs around technical industries (including the value-chain creation around these industries). Equip youth with entrepreneurial skills so they can innovate and start businesses to meet new needs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social capacities for reconciliation and peace</td>
<td>Identify and consider the tribal/clan dynamics at play in the conflict—mediate the impact of these dynamics as much as possible</td>
<td>Build social capacity for reconciliation and peacebuilding through training and building up traditional negotiation and mediation facilities/structures. Identify and support traditional leadership structures to resolve and</td>
<td>Use community ECD centres to bring together communities around common goals. Address violence against children, and domestic violence both at the household and community levels. Engage religious leaders in mediation and conflict resolution, and as change-agents who mobilize</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Capacity to maintain constructive relations with neighbors and the region</strong></td>
<td><strong>Control border and build basic safety and security along border regions with South Sudan and Kenya. Prevent raids from coming across these boundaries</strong></td>
<td><strong>Develop mutually beneficial economic development and trade linkages with neighboring countries. Increase exchanges and cooperation through exposure, and by reducing barriers and competition over resources</strong></td>
<td><strong>Empower teachers through an improved peacebuilding curriculum to address current events and issues around national identities. Reduce the susceptibility to cross-border violence from the Uganda side through community engagement and mobilization around peacebuilding and peaceful dispute resolution. Help pastoralists gain access to economic alternatives to cattle rustling through livelihoods support.</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7.2 ACHOLI sub-region

Key Stakeholders

Regional Stability and Relations with South Sudan

Much like Karamoja’s border with Kenya, the border between northern Uganda and South Sudan is straddled by tribes and even families with shared histories, cultures, and ties. In addition to sharing cultural, linguistic and geographic commonalities, South Sudan and Uganda have a complicated and inter-woven history. Uganda actively supported the SPLA’s fight against the government in Khartoum during Sudan’s civil war. This support led the Khartoum government to retaliate by providing supplies and a safe haven to the LRA.\textsuperscript{67} Despite a subsequent truce, mutual suspicion and an entrenched mistrust pose a continued challenge. In 2012, a Ugandan general announced that the GoU would be prepared to provide military assistance to the SPLA in their fight with Khartoum over the three disputed areas if hostilities erupted into a full-scale war. While the government subsequently distanced itself from these remarks, they are widely assumed to be a true expression of a significant segment of the population’s opinions.

South Sudan and Uganda have also exchanged refugees on a number of occasions, each hosting and sending significant refugee communities into one another’s territories at various times. Sudanese refugees who spent much of their lives in Uganda continue to have strong ties to the country, often sending their children to school across the border even though they have returned to South Sudan. The two countries remain strong allies in the search for Joseph Kony, and UPDF forces are present in South Sudan searching for the LRA under the authority of an African Union mission.\textsuperscript{68}

\textsuperscript{67} (Borzello, The challenge of DDR in Northern Uganda 2009) 147.
\textsuperscript{68} (BBC 2012).
Partly due to these long and established ties, migration across the border remains extremely common, and is vital for Uganda’s economic growth which places trade with its northern neighbour on top of the national development priorities. Farmers and business people in northern Uganda are well positioned to capitalize on this growing trade relationship, especially if barriers are eased under the East African Community regulations.

But the long conflict between North and South Sudan nurtured and entrenched a system of corruption, trade monopolies and cartels, enabled by an absence of oversight, which have yet to be successfully replaced. In June 2012, a group of Ugandan traders went on strike to call attention to the hazards involved in trading between Gulu (or Kampala) and Juba. Above and beyond the serious risks associated with doing business (particularly as a Ugandan) in South Sudan, a set of high formal and informal tariffs disincentivize entrepreneurship and trade.

**LRA War**

When Yoweri Museveni and his National Resistance Movement (NRM) came to power in 1986, they did so by rescinding upon a peace agreement signed just a month earlier with the Acholi General Tito Okello Lutwa. The NRM was a movement dominated by Banyakole (traditionally from southwestern Uganda) and Baganda (traditionally from central Uganda) leadership, which moved in to replace the regime of Milton Obote, the latest in a string of northern political and military rulers who had led Uganda since independence. Threatened by this transition and a fear of retaliation by the new government against the Acholi, a number of insurgencies took shape in northern Uganda with the resolve to oppose the central government.

The Uganda People’s Democratic Army (UPDA) was made up mostly of former members of the government military who resented Museveni’s takeover and vowed to regain power. Among the rising groups was also the Holy Spirit Movement led by Alice Lakwena. Initially, the groups competed for power over the Acholi areas (mainly Gulu, Kitgum and Pader), allowing the central government to adopt a relatively hands off posture toward the Acholi insurgents. While the UPDA “negotiated a settlement with the government at the end of 1988,” the HSM continued to gain influence, and “reached within 100 kilometres of Kampala before finally being defeated.” Meanwhile, Alice’s cousin, Joseph Kony built upon “Acholi mistrust of the Museveni government,” and quickly garnered broad support.

As this support dwindled, Kony resorted to increasingly violent tactics, abducting children and training them to fight in his ill-equipped guerrilla war against the central government. Kony “kidnapped tens of thousands to be used as fighters, labourers, and concubines.” While Kony built his movement around the idea of fighting for the Acholi, he resorted to preying on the population to support his military endeavours. At the height of the conflict, 1.8 million northerners (mainly Acholi) were living in IDP camps run by the government. “Meanwhile the Ugandan army [was] also accused of atrocities including raps and killing of civilians, and many Northerners blame the Ugandan government for forcing them into inhumane camps and for failing to protect them from the

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69 See: Uganda National Trade Sector Development Plan, and the National Trade Policy.
70 Museveni himself is Banyakole, but he also recruited Baganda into the military and political leadership.
72 These “were a feature of Uganda’s post-independence history. Longstanding divisions and suspicion between the north and south, fostered by British colonial policies, played into this concern.” (Borzello, The challenge of DDR in Northern Uganda 2009) 146.
74 (Allen 1991) 374.
75 (Borzello, The challenge of DDR in Northern Uganda 2009) 146.
76 (Borzello, The challenge of DDR in Northern Uganda 2009) 146.
77 (Worden 2008) 2.
marauding LRA." A first round of failed peace negotiations took place in 1993 which ended in the failure of the LRA to "respond to a negotiation ultimatum in 1994." In 2008, the Government of Uganda almost signed a peace agreement with Joseph Kony. After two years of negotiations aimed at permanently ending the insurgency, the “Juba talks,” culminated in the failure of Joseph Kony to appear in Nabanga to sign the treaty. Soon thereafter, the LRA attacked communities in southern Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and forcefully recruited significant numbers of new members to its ranks. Since this time, the LRA has resumed unlawful activities in DRC, newly independent South Sudan, Darfur and the Central African Republic, leading to the authorization of a special United States Military support operation (now supported by an AU mission) aimed at capturing or killing the rebel leader.

Aftermath of the Conflict:
Part of Kony’s strategy seems to involve maintaining an aura of mystery. His elusive existence and brutal tactics perpetuate fear among both followers and those who live in the areas where he is active. The belief that he has spiritual powers seems to also extend beyond his followers. As such, permanent healing may be difficult until he has been captured or killed, and those whom he has terrorized know that he is incapacitated.

The LRA war has left deep social, economic, and mental-health wounds in the Acholi sub-region. Children who were abducted are now youth. Family structures and coping mechanisms were severely affected by decades of insecurity, and the entire region has been developmentally stunted by the war. In addition, recent studies of the mental health needs in the Acholi sub-region, have found “a drastic increase in all states of mental distress, especially increased prevalence of suicide, spirit possession, ‘over-thinking,’ and ‘over-drinking,’ and a significant increase in ‘madness’. In addition to broad cases of PTSD and other mental ramifications of war, studies in northern Uganda have shown that “a long-lasting war that is accompanied by the proliferation of spiritual and magical beliefs and propaganda can lead to high levels of harmful spirit possession,” which in this context is considered a trauma-related psychological disorder. Throughout this conflict-affected region, between 54% and 74.3% of people meet the diagnostic criteria for mental health disorders. In addition to those who could be formally diagnosed, the study also shows “an increase in psychological distress, and states of mental ill health that may not meet the criteria for disorder but have a marked impact on the Acholi community, notable in a

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78 (Worden 2008) 2.
79 (Worden 2008) 3.
82 Find Study Vinck Roberts, Bolton
severe decline in social capital and individual and communal recovery, functioning and resilience, and thus affecting development and peacebuilding.”

In 2004, the World Health Program (WHO) listed Uganda as “the number one country in terms of alcohol consumption, at 19.47 litres of pure alcohol consumed per capita.” Youth interviewed about their challenges in securing employment, listed the “impact of alcohol abuse on maintaining employment” as a chief challenge in a recent USAID survey. Children, youth and women interviewed by UNICEF in the Acholi sub-region repeatedly addressed this as a major source of conflict at the community level. Although the Ugandan government is in the process of developing a policy on alcohol (which will regulate both the production and availability), localized, informal production will make enforcement of such a policy challenging.

Linked to both mental health and substance abuse, community stakeholders report a rise in domestic violence, and changes in family structures due to death, migration, or a transition between urban and rural contexts. Some parents who were previously in IDP camps near Gulu have left their children with relatives in the district capital while going back to re-establish life in their homelands. Children are then raised by a relative or care-giver, but sometimes lack the structure and support-network of nuclear family.

Transitional justice for northern Uganda

One of the issues which has complicated a transitional justice framework in the aftermath of the LRA war has been the blurred line between perpetrators and victims. Many of the LRAs fighters were abducted as children and then trained in combat, ordered to commit crimes, and sometimes given stimulants or drugs. The GoU sought to facilitate a transitional justice process which disincentivized fighting and encouraged combatants to come out from the bush. In the end, they achieved this by granting a comprehensive amnesty which stated that “any Ugandan who has...engaged in war or armed rebellion against the government by either participating in combat, engaging in any other criminal activity connected with the conflict, or aiding or abetting insurgents shall not be prosecuted or subjected to any form of punishment.” The UN condemned the amnesty stating that it guaranteed wholesale impunity. Specific criticisms surrounded the reintegration of LRA commanders, some of whom were swiftly reintegrated, even provided with profitable employment and positions of authority. Despite the controversy, the bill did facilitate a quick and relatively smooth return and reintegration process for former fighters. It “facilitated the return of over 10,000 formerly abducted children in northern Uganda, and 16,000 insurgents from about 29 other rebel groups.” Simultaneously, as the victor, the government was in a position to define and impose the terms of transitional justice, which has allowed them to overlook abuses committed by the state—

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85 (International Youth Foundation 2011) 10.
86 While brewing can have a positive economic byproduct, communities pointed out that men in the Acholi sub-region consume about 2000 Ugandan Shillings worth of brew (enough money to pay for the daily school fees for a child), suggesting that the economic gain is generally nullified by household consumption.
87 (Worden 2008) 5.
88 An example of this is Brigadir Banya who was “initially put in charge of Labora Farm—800 acres of land, 14 kilometres outside Gulu—set up as a project to help returnees feed themselves and funded by the World Bank’s Northern Uganda Social Action Fund (NUSAFAF) and the Ugandan Government.” (Borzello, The Challenge of DDR in Northern Uganda: The Lord’s Resistance Army 2009) 159.
89 (Refugee Law Project 2012) 1.
an accusation not helped by the ICCs limited mandate in indicting UPDF military officials while issuing warrants for Joseph Kony and LRA commanders.90

In 2012, the Amnesty Act expired, leaving questions about what will happen for defecting or returning fighters in the future. Stakeholders interviewed by an NGO based in Uganda expressed fears that it would make it more difficult for the remaining fighters to return home. Concerns were also voiced about the lapse forcing fighters to continue the rebellion, possibly drawing out or even rekindling conflict in the region.

From the standpoint of reconciliation and peacebuilding, some other important questions remain. Until all parties reach a point where they can speak openly about the war, it will be difficult to permanently lay the conflict to rest. Likewise, the way in which teachers and educators discuss the history of Acholi will shape the perspectives of the next generation. If this historical narrative includes a perception of Acholi oppression, it could continue to undermine national unity. If the narrative overlooks the complexities of the war, it risks being untruthful to the hardship and atrocities many people endured. Thus, while transitional justice remains important in its own right, the effect it will have on firming up a social and historical narrative may be equally significant.

**Progress toward Recovery**

In general, the consensus remains that northern Uganda is on a positive trajectory toward recovery from conflict. Simultaneously, the government has yet to fully meet its obligations under various post-conflict agreements (notably this includes paying compensation to individuals affected by the conflict). Fully meeting these commitments remains important to cementing the peace-dividend for the region. Equally paramount is the continued need for transitional justice. While the Amnesty Act was criticised for guaranteeing impunity, it did allow the return of many former combatants—including children. Following up on the lapse of this agreement, additional dialogue and frameworks for reparation are needed to bring the dialogue about transitional justice into the open, and to ensure communities continue to move toward dialogue and reconciliation.

Stakeholders likewise reflected positively about the progress and stabilization in northern Uganda since 2008. But a new set of challenges have also emerged as people seek to recover from the effects of conflict, reintegrate into their communities, and adopt livelihoods strategies that have become foreign after years of camp-life. While some NGOs have implemented basic conflict mediation trainings and attempted to train youth in livelihoods skills, stakeholders raised a need for more systematic, and wide-scale approach to reconciliation and peacebuilding. Thoughtful and systematic approaches to improving vocational opportunities are also needed, as stakeholders critiqued the sometimes short-sighted approach to this type of work.91

Some lingering questions also remain around the historical narrative, which will emerge in the aftermath of the LRA war. The government is now actively pursuing Kony in CAR, but northerners have not forgotten that during the early days of the insurgency “a policy seemed to have been adopted by the NRM of leaving the Acholi to fight among themselves.”92 Likewise the government’s policy of mandatory IDP camps drew significant criticism from Acholi and international humanitarian

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90 (Worden 2008) 5.
91 An example that repeatedly came up was of NGOs who train people in specialized skills (eg: to become tailors) when this vocation is ill-adapted to the market. Thus, a more market-integrated approach to livelihoods support was requested.
and development partners alike.\(^93\) How this historical narrative takes shape over the coming decades will have a significant effect on reconciliation and long term peacebuilding in northern Uganda.

**Conflict and Education**

The conflict not only disrupted school attendance, stakeholders report that it has led to a disintegration of the traditional family structure. Male absence (whether because of death, substance abuse issues, or for economic reasons) has changed the make-up of many nuclear families. Simultaneously, parents point to the poor behaviour of their children and attribute it to the patterns learned during camp life. All of these transitions contribute to a change and sometimes disintegration of the nuclear family, and have left women and children particularly vulnerable.

After the conflict, the effects of instability and under-investment in education are evidenced by significantly lower school education indicators across the board.\(^94\) The high net enrolment rate in Acholi can be understood in terms of a large number of students who are enrolled in a grade-level below the one associated with their age. In other words, if P2 enrolment is at 100%, and there is an additional 12 year old student enrolled in P2, s/he would register as above and beyond the total for that grade.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOURCE: UGANDA EDUCATION STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 2011</th>
<th>UDHS 2011</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UDHS 2011 Region</td>
<td>NIR</td>
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<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karamoja</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acholi</td>
<td>57%</td>
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<tr>
<td>West Nile</td>
<td>57%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Southwest</td>
<td>76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>54%</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATIONAL</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This stunting underscores not only the relationship between education and peacebuilding, but also the need for strategic investments to increase the resilience of northerners to conflict in the future. It also points to the role education can play in firming up a peace dividend over the coming years. As the Acholi sub-Region continues to recover from conflict, increasing access to conflict sensitive education should be a top priority. Simultaneously, equipping youth to start businesses and take on vocational jobs may be one of the most promising ways of addressing underlying economic and social challenges among the bulging youth population.

**Drivers of Conflict in Northern Uganda**

In addition to some of the national-level issues identified by stakeholders in Acholi, there were a range of issues specific to the historical and social context of Acholi. The most common drivers of conflict identified by stakeholders included:

- **Land disputes** Land-disputes which have been exacerbated by wide scale displacement and rapid subsequent return (beginning in 2008), will continue to destabilize the Acholi sub-region unless the tenure-system is formalized. Land disputes place a tremendous strain the executive court committees as well as local leaders, representing 94% and 70% of the total

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\(^93\) (Ugandan Governance Monitoring Project 2004) 32-35  
\(^94\) (Higgins and Bird 2009) p2.
cases respectively. These conflicts arise both because of disputes over ownership and boundary demarcation, but also because of intra-family tensions as families grew in the camp, family members were lost in the conflict, and polygamous marriages cast confusion on inheritance. In most cases, the absence of formal land deeds makes this issue challenging to resolve. Tensions also continue to exist between government run schools and communities who claim the land was taken wrongfully from them. In some cases reparations must be paid, but in all cases resolution of the conflict is essential to building up community participation and ownership of the school.

- **Youth unemployment**: economic growth in northern Uganda has significantly lagged behind Uganda’s national average (in no small part due to the disruptions from conflict). This in combination with a swelling youth population has led to a troubling unemployment rate among young people. Cyclically, this sometimes fuels a view among parents that education is not worth the investment if there are few jobs available to graduates. Likewise, educators unanimously emphasized the need for an integrated vocational approach to education which does not stifle the ambitions of those who wish to become lawyers or doctors, but compliments these skills with practical skills training which will benefit students throughout life. Finally, stakeholders advised that young people also exhibit an attitude of entitlement toward the government, expecting jobs to be created for them, rather than approaching the job-market with an entrepreneurial mind-set.

- **Rise in gender-based violence (GBV)**: unequal power dynamics in sexual relationships, as well as a rise in gender based violence continue to face girls and women in northern Uganda. The related issues of early marriages and teen pregnancies place significant strain on the communities in question.

- **Violence against children (VAC)**: violence against children remains all too prevalent, both within schools and within homes and communities. This violence is present in some of the most developmentally significant relationships—including teacher student, parent-child relationships—hindering the development of role-models and perpetuating the inter-generational transfer of violent conflict resolution methods.

- **Post-traumatic stress and mental health /substance abuse**: Rates of alcohol consumption and substance abuse are extremely high in northern Uganda. According to one study, PTSD rates are between 54% and 74.3%, while depression rates are between 44% and 67%. These issues need to be addressed through formal channels, providing psychosocial support to those affected by conflict.

- **Natural resource administration**: Stakeholders have critiqued the central government for its secretive approach to oil exploration in Acholi.

- **Tribal/ethnic/clan identity**: both politically and socially, tribal and clan difference remain an important social dynamic in this region. Young people listed these issues as important in choosing a spouse and said they did not feel represented by the central government (in that few Acholi or Lugbara hold positions in government—especially at the national level)

- **Religious/denominational differences**: between the practices of Catholics, Anglicans, “Born Again” Christians, and Muslims vary significantly, and can lead to tensions at the community and school level. The processing and consumption of alcohol is one such difference, as is the consumption of pork (and raising of pigs). In general, young people did not identify this as an acute source of tensions, but did point out that there would be challenges in marrying someone from another religion or denomination. Notably, teachers said that their denomination has an effect on their ability to gain a teaching position, as Catholic schools would favour Catholic teachers (for example), and a baptism certificate was often required.

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97 (Refugee Law Project 2012) 2.
“You cannot straighten a bent stick, but the young ones... they are still growing.”

—Teacher in Acholi on how trauma & violence is transferred between generations, and the need to address it at the ECD level

during the hiring process.

- **Marital/family issues:** alcoholism, domestic violence, and polygamous marriages present a set of related challenges to families. While rampant alcoholism and domestic violence perpetuate harmful relationships within the nuclear family, widespread polygamy is the cause of broader communal disputes over land, resources, and inheritance.

- **Political representation and tensions:** the Acholi are significantly under-represented in both local and national government, causing resentment among younger and older constituents alike. This grievance has a long and pronounced history, and in many ways has been at the core of opposition movements in Acholi since the NRM came into power. Addressing this political marginalization should be a top priority in overcoming a known conflict driver in northern Uganda. If the central government falls further behind on meeting its reparations commitments, resolving land issues, or providing transitional justice, these resentments are likely to become even more pronounced.

**Progress Towards Peace**

When asked about the success of existing efforts toward peacebuilding, stakeholders and interviewees were generally positive, noting progress since 2008. Simultaneously, a new set of challenges have emerged as people seek to recover from the effects of conflict, reintegrate into their communities, and adopt livelihoods strategies that have become foreign after years of camp-life. Respondents point to the efforts of NGOs to provide some basic training in conflict mediation, or vocational training for youth affected by conflict. At the same time, they emphasized the insufficient nature of these efforts in addressing the underlying causes of conflict within their communities (for example NGOs who train people to become tailors when there is no market for tailors in the community s/he comes from).

**Possible Peacebuilding Focus**

Stakeholders suggest that UNICEF play a role in addressing the root causes of conflict at the most basic levels (beginning with Early Childhood Development). An emphasis should also be placed on increasing institutional capacities to supply conflict sensitive education to children. Families and duty bearers (sometimes brothers or sisters) could also be supported in recognizing sources of conflict and adopting coping mechanisms which reduce tensions and build peace at the household level.

Communities also recommended working through community barazas to identify, mediate and prevent communal conflict affecting children. Providing psychosocial support and supporting youth with special needs or disabilities (especially through vocational training) was also listed as a priority. Ensuring that children return to school, and continue enrolment through secondary school was also identified as a priority. To this end, adopting a more vocation approach to secondary school, and supporting youth transition into entrepreneurship, apprenticeship or vocational training, was also identified as a priority. Community members and educators underscored that this would provide an opportunity to build much-needed practical skills relevant to the economic realities of Acholi.

In general, teachers and educators recommended that UNICEF focus on keeping children in school (or integrating them back into schools) rather than reaching them through informal channels. Hygiene in schools was listed as an intervention which would support keeping girls in school for example, another possible emphasis could be on boosting enrolment through “go to school, back to school, stay in school” (GBS). Supporting artistic expression as a form of community outreach was listed repeatedly as a priority to stakeholders. Specifically they recommended the use of drama,
poetry and art to reach communities with a dialogue about peace. Sports as a way of building healthy competition and team-work could provide an opportunity for positive community and school engagements and exchange. Children in particular emphasized a need to reduce violence against children, and promote child rights as an important priority in achieving peace at the community level. Supporting youth with special needs or disabilities is also essential.

Engaging with youth in a market-oriented approach to entrepreneurship could be particularly promising in this part of the country, which holds significant growth and market development potential. Generally, supporting youth in obtaining jobs which are productive, and which disincentivize criminal activity (such as gangs, petty crime and survival sex) are essential. Helping youth take on a productive and respected role in their society and communities can be vital in building up self-esteem and positively reinforcing their contribution. Engaging youth through an affirming approach is also essential politically. By giving them ways to voice their opinions and engage constructively with their political leadership, this demographic can become powerful change-agents and assets in the democratic process. Left unengaged and marginalized, they could prove to be a significant liability.

**Conflict Management and Peacebuilding Opportunities**

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<td>Political</td>
<td>Solicit and incorporate Acholi perspectives into post PRDP agenda, ensure Acholi representation at the local government level. Firm up, implement, and communicate a clear strategy on dealing with land disputes (more see Justice section). Allow space for peaceful manifestations of northern political opposition.</td>
<td>Increasing Acholi representation in government (both local and central), build local governance structures that incorporate traditional authority structures. Work to develop political, civil society, and youth groups which constructively engage in the political process.</td>
<td>Engage youth in political decision making and in local political processes. Provide peaceful and constructive opportunities for young people to voice political opinions and grievances. Incorporate elements of peacebuilding into the education curriculum to foster long-term social cohesion. Equip and empower teachers to become agents of peacebuilding and to discuss current events in the classroom.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safety &amp; Security</td>
<td>Firm up rule of law (especially in urban areas), protect citizens against killing and conflicts around land (possibly through community-based early warning or something similar)</td>
<td>Continue to absorb former combatants into the UPDF, train up a security force capable of dealing with the particular security challenges in Acholi. Disincentivize criminal activity by building economic alternatives for people (esp. youth) engaging in criminal activities, gangs, or survival sex.</td>
<td>Disincentivize criminal activity by building economic alternatives for people (esp. youth) engaging in criminal activities, gangs, or survival sex. Make sure schools are child friendly safe spaces—this may include building community ownership of schools to provide protection and respect for school property.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice &amp; Peaceful Conflict Resolution</td>
<td>Firm-up, communicate, and implement the revised land policy. Consider ways in which traditional authority structures can be incorporated and/or built upon.</td>
<td>Build up a robust judicial system which is perceived as fair, and efficient in resolving land disputes. Establish counter-corruption measures, and incorporate traditional leaders &amp; authorities into the judicial structure. Firm up and implement a system for prosecuting</td>
<td>Engage in district dialogues which bring together national political leaders and community members. Build up the capacity of educators and teachers to become community mediators. Work with communities to resolve any lingering land disputes over schools. Work through existing peacebuilding</td>
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<td>Capacities to raise revenues and meet expectations through service delivery</td>
<td>Stop any illegal resource extraction; communicate clear plans regarding the exploration and mining of natural resources, as well as how those resources will be used to benefit the local population. Provide referral mechanisms which connect rural populations with social services in urban centers (such as Gulu).</td>
<td>Build industries around resource extraction which invest in communities and build local capacities to operate and manage the industry. Make strategic community investments in infrastructure, health and other areas to promote “corporate shared value.” Promote equitable service delivery in health, education, social services, and access to justice across the Acholi sub-region.</td>
<td>Meet the needs of technical industries (including the value-chain creation around these industries). Equip youth with entrepreneurial skills so they can innovate and start businesses to meet new needs.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Social capacities for reconciliation and peace</td>
<td>Recognize legitimate Acholi grievances with respect to political representation and find ways to improve their participation and representation in decision-making. Devise a post-Amnesty transitional justice framework. Live up to the committed reparations and resolve delays in payment.</td>
<td>Build social capacity for reconciliation and peacebuilding through training, building up traditional community and government negotiation and mediation facilities/structures. Identify and support traditional leadership structures to resolve and mediate conflicts and disputes at a local level.</td>
<td>Use community ECD centres to bring together communities around common goals. Address violence against children, and domestic violence both at the household and community levels. Engage religious leaders in mediation and conflict resolution, and as change-agents who mobilize communities around common goals—such as children’s education. Address gender disparities, and empower girls and boys to be agents of peace in schools and in their communities. Build upon the strong emphasis and value in sports to bring youth together and engage communities in constructive recreational competition. Increase access to high quality education which promotes peacebuilding and reconciliation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity to maintain constructive relations with neighbors and the region</td>
<td>Control border and build basic safety and security along border regions with South Sudan.</td>
<td>Develop mutually beneficial economic development and trade linkages with South Sudan. Put an economic growth and trade infrastructure in place which supports growth (especially for youth), and makes it safer.</td>
<td>Empower teachers through an improved peacebuilding curriculum to address current events and issues around national identities. Support young Acholi in building the skills to maximize on trade and businesses opportunities in South Sudan (or trading with South Sudan).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7.3 WEST NILE sub-region

Key Stakeholders

Regional Stability and Conflict—LRA, DRC, South Sudan

Located in the northwest corner of Uganda, West Nile shares borders with both South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. During the early part of the “twentieth century, this area changed hands three times: it was part of King Leopold’s Congo territories; then of British controlled Sudan; and finally of the Uganda Protectorate.” In more recent times, West Nile produced a large number of soldiers for both the British and Ugandan military forces, including one notable commander, Idi Amin Dada, who became president of Uganda in a 1971 coup. Following his seizure of power, Uganda experienced a decade and a half of political turmoil, repression and conflict which have been well documented. When Tanzania invaded Uganda in 1979, bringing an end to the Amin rule, they pushed his troops “back through West Nile into southern Sudan.” Subsequent retaliation by Ugandan military forces against West Nilers writ large sent the majority into southern Sudan and neighbouring Zaire. Life in exile was often traumatic, as the community witnessed disappearances and brutal repression and retaliation under the Obote II government. This population was repatriated in 1985, but not after facing a significant amount of pressure to distance itself from the rule of Idi Amin—a litmus test leaving many West Nilers (especially Kakwa and Nubians) bitter about collective association.

Above all, this region has been characterized by transience. Not long after the repatriation of Ugandan refugees to West Nile, refugees flooded in from Zaire and Sudan, and the region was soon terrorized by the Sudanese supported West Nile Bank Front (WNBF). The WNBF was made up in part

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98 (Leopold 2006) 180.
99 (Moghal 2012)
100 (Leopold 2006) 193.
101 (Leopold 2006) 194.
of former Amin soldiers who vowed to fight against Obote’s Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) to stop and revenge extrajudicial killing, rape, looting and other perceived injustices.

In addition to hosting refugees (reaching a peak population of 178,000 in 2005) West Nile was severely affected by the LRA insurgency, who much like the WNBF terrorized villages, abducted child combatants, burned homesteads, ambushed police transport, committed rape and other war crimes. To date, hundreds of persons abducted from West Nile have not returned to the region, further complicating reconciliation, reintegration and transitional justice. Even after the LRA moved into CAR and DRC, the population in West Nile remains in close proximity to on-going LRA activity, making permanent recovery particularly challenging. West Nilers have also developed a narrative of neglect which (whether valid or not) is important to understanding the sub-region’s perceptions of national politics and historical developments. This narrative suggests that part of their region’s under-development can still be attributed to the perceived affiliation with Idi Amin.

**Drivers of Conflict in the West Nile sub-region**

Despite the many historical and cultural particularities of West Nile, a number of the conflict drivers identified by stakeholders were the same as those in the Acholi sub-region. One notable difference, was the previously mentioned perception of crippling from the LRA (and other) conflicts. Subsequent development and rehabilitation programmes left few tangible impacts which could be felt by local communities. The perception is that the region is even more crippled than other parts of the country and has correspondingly poor education and social service delivery. Likewise, respondents listed a “learned helplessness” as one of the legacies of the conflict. They feel that NGO assistance and government policies have sometimes undermined community ownership of persons with disabilities, orphans, or other victims of conflict. Instead some see these individuals as the government’s responsibility. Similar to correspondents in the Acholi sub-region, the following issues were identified as drivers of conflict:

- **Land disputes** exacerbated by displacements, land-disputes pose a serious and ever-present challenge to families and communities as well as administrative and legal institutions.

- **Youth unemployment**: economic growth in West Nile is slowed by poor infrastructure, low educational standards, and crippled economic and trade structures after years of conflict. Young people are particularly affected as they seek employment, and desire to engage in entrepreneurship, but have few tangible options available to them in a stagnant economic climate. Simultaneously, tremendous opportunities exist to formalize the existing trade with DRC and South Sudan, an effort which young people could capitalize on in the future. Like other parts of the country, West Nile has a swelling youth population with a very high unemployment rate. Stakeholders repeatedly highlighted the trouble youth face as they seek employment and political engagement. Youth feel that they are marginalized, and lack economic opportunity.

- **Rise in gender-based violence (GBV)**: unequal power dynamics in sexual relationships, as well as a rise in gender based violence face girls and women in West Nile. The related issues of early marriages and teen pregnancies place significant strain on communities as well. Violence against Children both in homes and at schools remains extremely high, indicating the need for a large-scale reform in school management, reporting mechanisms, and prevention efforts throughout the region.

- **Post-traumatic stress and mental health /substance abuse**: Studies have shown high rates of PTSD among residents of West Nile. Much like in Acholi, alcohol is both popular and prevalent, which can lead to substance abuse issues and self-medication. As previously mentioned, alcohol and substance abuse is associated with increased levels of domestic

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102 (Leopold 2006) 195.
violence and violence against children.

- **Natural resource administration**: The close proximity of West Nile to Lake Albert, make the approach to resource extraction in that area an important variable. Ideally, the population in West Nile could be engaged in the extraction process, and corresponding development would benefit the population there. Feasibility studies are, however, still underway.

- **Tribal/ethnic/clan identity**: tribal identity in West Nile is complicated, and has evolved over the past decades, but these identities continue to be a rift between communities in the region.104

- **Religious/denominational**: much like in Acholi, the conflicts over religious /denominational issues between various Christian groups are generally localized, and may have more to do with individual religious leaders than with a broad-based clashing. In addition, West Nile had a large Muslim population, which benefitted more under the rule of Idi Amin, and is still historically associated with his rule. On a daily basis this does not manifest itself in violent conflicts, but to the extent that religious practices reflect cultural differences, localized conflicts over “religious” issues do exist. Tensions between Muslims and Christians are more pronounced in this part of the country.

- **Marital/Family Issues**: alcoholism, domestic violence, and polygamous marriages present a set of related challenges to families (see Acholi section for more details).

- **Political Representation**: Partly because of their association with the Amin regime, only a small number of individuals from West Nile have managed to work their way into the ranks of government and international institutions. This under-representation is evidenced both at the local and national government levels. Likewise, few young people are engaged in the political process.

**Conflict and Education**

Conflict and protracted displacement, has left significant scars on the development of West Nile. This is evidenced in a number of areas, including the education sector. Stakeholders in this part of the country pointed to education as an indication of ways in which West Nile has been repeatedly under-resourced. Education indicators are correspondingly low, showcased by the fact that West Nile’s school completion rate is only half the national average:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOURCE:</th>
<th>UGANDA EDUCATION STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 2011</th>
<th>UDHS 2011</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UDHS 2011 Region</td>
<td>NIR</td>
<td>COMPLETION RATE</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karamoja</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acholi</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Nile</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southwest</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATIONAL</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Stakeholders also had some encouraging observations to share on the role of education. A number of individuals underscored the way education has helped different tribes come together in peace. Religious tensions have also been reduced as more Muslims have enrolled and schools provide a forum for exchange and constructive engagement. Still stakeholders identified a number of areas

104 For more on this see: (Leopold 2006)
where education can and should be improved upon. Notably, parental involvement was listed as a top priority. “Parents should be encouraged to remain involved in their child’s education even past nursery school” one stakeholder said. Another emphasized the role ECD has in improving performance in later education and encouraging parental involvement in education. Stakeholders also pointed out the positive role that community dialogues and teacher parent meetings have in underscoring the importance of education.

The issue of “learned helplessness” was repeatedly emphasized by stakeholders in West Nile. Interviewees reflected on the impact of camp life on the people in West Nile and said that they had become accustomed to hand-outs. This has manifested itself in a challenge for the education sector, as parents became accustomed to receiving support (especially those with disabled children), and now are unwilling to make sacrifices to continue enrolling their children in school or providing relevant support. This may relate to the sentiments that UPE was politicized and people were under the impression that provisions would be all-inclusive (whereas in reality families do have fees and other costs associated with UPE—for more on this see Acholi section).

Much like in the Acholi sub-region, increased access to peace-sensitive education, and an emphasis on areas of education which promote reconciliation and peacebuilding (such as recreational dance drama and sports) is essential in West Nile. Stakeholders made a range of suggestions including implementing school-wide dialogues and writing a peacebuilding training manual. Using media for peacebuilding education was also listed as a possible idea. Given the particular history of religious tensions, training teachers in how to address inter-religious or tribal conflict in the classroom should be a priority area. Increasing availability and enrolment in community run ECD centres could also provide a powerful opportunity to improve school performance and education indicators, but also to bring together communities around the common goal of children’s education.

Conflicts and Peacebuilding Opportunities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority Dimensions</th>
<th>Conflict Management (negative peace)</th>
<th>Peacebuilding (positive peacebuilding)</th>
<th>Opportunities for Peacebuilding through Education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Ensure West Nile representation at the local government level. Firm up, implement, and communicate a clear strategy on dealing with land disputes (more see Justice section). Allow space for peaceful manifestations of local political opposition.</td>
<td>Increasing West Nile representation in government (both local and central), build local governance structures that incorporate traditional authority structures. Work to develop political, civil society, and youth groups which constructively engage in the political process.</td>
<td>Engage youth in political decision making and in local political processes. Combat “learned helplessness” by encouraging West Nile youth to take initiative to address political and community challenges constructively and peacefully. Incorporate elements of peacebuilding into the education curriculum to foster long-term social cohesion—especially around religious and denominational issues. Equip and empower teachers to become agents of peacebuilding and to discuss current events in the classroom.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safety &amp; Security</td>
<td>Firm up rule of law (especially in urban areas), protect citizens against killing and conflicts around land</td>
<td>Continue to absorb former combatants into the UPDF, train up a security force capable of dealing with the particular security challenges</td>
<td>Disincentivize criminal activity by building economic alternatives for people (esp. youth) engaging in criminal activities, gangs, or survival sex.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Justice &amp; Peaceful Conflict Resolution</td>
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<td>----------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>(possibly through community-based early warning or something similar)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Capture Joseph Kony or permanently secure the borders making his return impossible.</td>
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<tr>
<td>in West Nile. Address border challenges and transience through regulation and implementation of safe migration policies.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Make sure schools are child friendly safe spaces—this may include building community ownership of schools to provide protection and respect for school property.</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capacities to raise revenues and meet expectations through service delivery</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Firm-up, communicate, and implement the revised land policy. Consider ways in which traditional authority structures can be incorporated and/or built upon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Build up a robust judicial system which is perceived as fair, and efficient in resolving land disputes. Establish counter-corruption measures, and incorporate traditional leaders &amp; authorities into the judicial structure. Firm up and implement a system for prosecuting domestic violence cases, and providing protection to those vulnerable individuals who need it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engage in district dialogues which bring together national political leaders and community members. Build up the capacity of educators and teachers to become community mediators. Work with communities to resolve any lingering land disputes over schools. Work through existing peacebuilding and conflict mediation groups to advocate for education as a vehicle for peacebuilding. Empower youth and youth groups (such as GEMs and scouts) with mediation skills, and information about access to justice and case referral.</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social capacities for reconciliation and peace</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recognize legitimate West Nile grievances around political representation and find ways to improve their participation and representation in decision-making. Devise a post-Amnesty transitional justice framework which includes former combatants from West Nile. Follow-through on any remaining reparations</td>
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<td>Build social capacity for reconciliation and peacebuilding through training, building up traditional community and government negotiation and mediation facilities/structures</td>
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<td>Use community ECD centres to bring together communities around common goals. Address violence against children, and domestic violence both at the household and community levels. Engage religious leaders in mediation and conflict resolution, and as change-agents who mobilize communities around common goals—such as children’s education. Address gender disparities, and empower girls and boys to be agents of peace in schools and in their communities. Build upon the strong emphasis and</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Communications</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Communicate clear plans regarding the exploration and mining of natural resources, as well as how those resources will be used to benefit the local population. Provide referral mechanisms which connect rural populations with social services in urban centers (such as Arua).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Build industries around resource extraction which invest in communities and build local capacities to operate and manage the industry. Make strategic community investments in infrastructure, health and other areas to promote “corporate shared value.” Promote equitable service delivery in health, education, social services, and access to justice across West Nile.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meet the needs of technical industries (including the value-chain creation around these industries). Equip youth with entrepreneurial skills so they can innovate and start businesses to meet new needs.</td>
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<td>Capacity to maintain constructive relations with neighbors and the region</td>
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</table>
7.4 SOUTH/WESTERN UGANDA

Key Stakeholders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Security Sector</th>
<th>Community</th>
<th>Regional</th>
<th>Environmental</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Courts</td>
<td>UPDF</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>Farmers/ Agriculturists</td>
<td>Teachers</td>
<td>NGOs &amp; Development Partners</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Children</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Healthcare providers</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Youth</td>
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<td>Political Parties</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Disabled (including youth with special needs)</td>
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<td>Media</td>
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<td>Elders</td>
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<td>Care-givers (not always parents)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Police</td>
<td></td>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Pastoralists</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Local Leaders</td>
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Overview of Regional Challenges

The West of Uganda is made up of a large swath of territory stretching from the tip of Lake Albert (Bulisa, Masindi and Kiryandongo Districts) all the way down to the borders with Rwanda, Tanzania, and DRC (Ksoro, Kabale, Ntungamo, and Inzingiro Districts). Like other parts of Uganda, the region is marked by significant cultural, ethnic, and economic diversity. Because President Museveni is from Rwakitura, there is a popular perception that people in this part of the country have benefitted from disproportionate investments in infrastructure and service provision (stakeholders throughout the north articulated this perception). But development indicators tell another story, shedding light on broad under-development in the region. Simultaneously, land-holding remains inequitable, and predominantly controlled by individuals with political connections. This is most pronounced “in Buganda, with 85 per cent of all freehold land, [is] owned not by Baganda but by those with official connections whose wealth comes from questionable sources.”\(^{105}\)

Before colonialism, this part of Uganda was comprised of the Baganda, Bunyoro, Toro, Ankole and Kigezi kingdoms. Dating back to British administration, land disputes are among the most sensitive issues in the region. In Kibale District, land disputes date back to 1980, when “the British granted the territory to the neighbouring kingdom of Buganda as part of their subjugation of Bonyoro.”\(^{106}\) Subsequent efforts at resolving the dispute (including a 1964 referendum, and Idi Amin’s attempt at nationalizing the territory in 1975), have failed to put the issues to rest. In addition to the long-standing disputes, the region has seen "a large amount of in-migration from other parts of Uganda,\

\(^{105}\) (Crisis Group Africa Report No. 187 2012) 16.
\(^{106}\) (Green 2007) 721.
especially of ethnic Bakiga from the region of Kigezi in south-west Uganda.”

Over the past few decades, tensions between native Banyoro and immigrant Bakiga have turned into violent clashes, culminating in the displacement of 200 families in 2002.

In addition to tensions over land, both Rwanda and DRC have sent large refugee populations into this part of Uganda, placing additional strain on local resources and service provisions. The recent resurgence of hostilities in eastern DRC has led to a renewed influx of refugees into the region. The government of Uganda, through its progressive settlement policy for refugees, has dealt admirably with the influx. But there is an increasing sensitivity among Ugandans about their resource-scarce country hosting refugee populations. There is also a more sinister side to the border regions, and relationships with both DRC and Rwanda. The ties between Uganda and Rwanda are particularly strong as many top leaders of the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) fought with the NRA to overthrow Idi Amin in the late 1970s. Both governments have recently been accused of providing material support to rebel groups in eastern Congo. A recent report suggests that in a cross-border operation, “the Ugandan military […] killed 22 elephants from a helicopter and spirited away more than a million dollars’ worth of ivory.”

In terms of researching community-level vulnerabilities to conflict, the West of Uganda seems more cohesive than other regions. Land issues remain of paramount importance, and conflict is likely to continue around issues related to this (especially in Kibaale) until a permanent settlement can be reached. However, compared to other parts of the country, this region appears comparatively more stable. The GoU and international partners should continue to monitor the effect of the refugee influx on stability in the region. Relationships between host and refugee communities are often prone to tensions, as the two communities rival over resources and government (and humanitarian) services. Like other parts of the country, strategic investments in government service provision are greatly needed.

Conflict and Education

In the southwest and west of the country, a different set of challenges prevail. Literacy rates are 66% compared to a national average of 69%. Likewise, 26% of secondary age children do not have access to schools. As communities seek to integrate a transient refugee population, they face additional challenges. Many of the refugees have been traumatized by events in eastern Congo, so psychosocial and supplementary learning support is needed to accommodate any special needs. French and Swahili speaking refugee children face the challenge of integrating into the existing classroom and adapt from the French/Congolese educational curriculum to the British/Ugandan system. While linguistic and cultural differences, sometimes make integration challenging for refugees, the degree to which they are able to integrate also depends on the openness of their Ugandan peers.
## Education can provide a powerful opportunity to engage on questions around citizenship, identity, and current affairs in a way that could promote peaceful relations between refugee and host communities, and also with neighbouring countries.

### Conflict Management and Peacebuilding Opportunities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority Dimensions</th>
<th>Conflict Management (negative peace)</th>
<th>Peacebuilding (positive peacebuilding)</th>
<th>Opportunities for Peacebuilding through Education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political</strong></td>
<td>Firm up, implement, and communicate a clear strategy on dealing with land disputes (more see Justice section). Allow space for peaceful manifestations of local political opposition (including from the kingdoms).</td>
<td>Permanently resolve power-tensions with the kingdoms (especially Buganda). Work to develop political, civil society, and youth groups which constructively engage in the political process. Engage youth in political decision making and in local political processes. Provide peaceful and constructive opportunities for young people to voice political opinions and grievances.</td>
<td>Engage youth in political decision making and in local political processes. Incorporate elements of peacebuilding into the education curriculum to foster long-term social cohesion—especially around questions around citizenship, refugees, and national identity. Equip and empower teachers to become agents of peacebuilding and to discuss current events in the classroom.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Safety &amp; Security</strong></td>
<td>Address rises in petty crime around urban centers (Mbarare) Secure the borders with Rwanda and DRC to prevent smuggling of illegal equipment or resources from eastern Congo</td>
<td>Disincentivize criminal activity by building economic alternatives for people (esp. youth) engaging in criminal activities, gangs, or survival sex. Make sure schools are child friendly safe spaces—this may include building community ownership of schools to provide protection and respect for school property.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Justice &amp; Peaceful Conflict Resolution</strong></td>
<td>Firm-up, communicate, and implement the revised land policy. Consider ways in which traditional authority structures can be incorporated and/or built upon.</td>
<td>Build up a robust judicial system which is perceived as fair, and efficient in resolving land disputes. Establish counter-corruption measures, and incorporate traditional leaders &amp; authorities into</td>
<td>Engage in district dialogues which bring together national political leaders and community members. Build up the capacity of educators and teachers to become community mediators. Work through existing</td>
</tr>
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| Capacities to raise revenues and meet expectations through service delivery | Communicate clear plans regarding the exploration and mining of natural resources, as well as how those resources will be used to benefit the local population. | Build industries around resource extraction which invest in communities and build local capacities to operate and manage the industry. Make strategic community investments in infrastructure, health and other areas to promote "corporate shared value." | Meet the needs of technical industries (including the value-chain creation around these industries).
Equipping youth with entrepreneurial skills so they can innovate and start businesses to meet new needs. |
|---|---|---|---|
| Social capacities for reconciliation and peace | Recognize legitimate conflict of loyalty between the government and the kingdoms. | Build social capacity for reconciliation and peacebuilding through training, building up traditional community and government negotiation and mediation facilities/structures. Permanent reconciliation with the Buganda | Use community ECD centres to bring together communities around common goals.
Address violence against children, and domestic violence both at the household and community levels.
Engage religious leaders in mediation and conflict resolution, and as change-agents who mobilize communities around common goals—such as children's education.
Address gender disparities, and empower girls and boys to be agents of peace in schools and in their communities.
Build upon the strong emphasis and value in sports to bring youth together and engage communities in constructive recreational competition.
Increase access to high quality education which promotes peacebuilding and reconciliation. |
| Capacity to maintain constructive relations with neighbors and the region | Control border and build basic safety and security along border regions mainly with DRC (and also Rwanda). | Develop mutually beneficial economic development and trade linkages with neighboring countries. Bring trade into the open so it can flourish transparently Put in place an infrastructure that facilitates growth and economic opportunity—especially for youth. | Empower teachers through an improved peacebuilding curriculum to address current events and issues around national identities.
Support young people in building the skills to maximize on trade and businesses opportunities with Rwanda, Tanzania, and DRC, and to innovate around market opportunities in the region.
Support integration of refugee populations into the national education system, and ensure equitable education service delivery to refugee and host communities. |
8. Education Challenges Related to Conflict

The impact of conflict on education in Uganda has been well documented. Children and youth were disproportionately affected by the war between the LRA and NRM. Up to 60,000 children were abducted during the conflict, sometimes recruited and trained as child combatants (becoming both victims and perpetrators of war crimes). Children throughout the Acholi sub-region were also affected by displacement and the disruption of education services, as well as the stunted development of education infrastructure due to insecurity. Children also bear the brunt of the social ramifications of conflict. Parents, Educators, and leaders with PTSD are less able to provide the care and mentoring children require, and may be inhibited in their ability to care for children.

A 2009 study, published by the Overseas Development Institute, also found that education was a key factor in northern Uganda in influencing individuals’ resilience to conflict and their tendency toward intergenerational transmission of poverty. Respondents in the study reported that “their lives were ‘easier’ than for those without education, [...] and they were also more able to draw on social networks; diversify their livelihood strategies; and travel, trade (using their numeracy) and take on leadership roles.”

Despite these realizations, there has been little official recognition of the link between education and peacebuilding on a practical level. The dominant approaches to peacebuilding (such as that outlined in the PRDP and PBF) marginalize education as an area of government service provision while failing to recognize the transformative potential of education. As outlined in greater detail in UNICEF’s December 2011 publication *The Role of Education in Peacebuilding*, “education can play a crucial role in peacebuilding in all phases of conflict.” During the conflict in Uganda, UNICEF was engaged in providing essential emergency education support to IDPs and conflict affected children. Since the end of hostilities, UNICEF Uganda has worked closely with the Government of Uganda to support Universal Primary Education, and to provide curriculum development and reform support to the Ministry of Education.

The partnerships and expertise built over the years have positioned UNICEF to take the next step in advocating for the inclusion of education in Uganda’s broader peacebuilding agenda, and advising the GoU on how to prioritize peacebuilding through its education provision. Taking this step toward a more proactive and preventive peacebuilding agenda is timely and important as Uganda continues to firm up its institutions, and puts permanent frameworks in place to support national unity. UNICEF can provide technical assistance and advisory support throughout this process, with a broad reach that targets partners at the local, district, and national levels.

In 1997, the government began its initiative to implement universal primary education (UPE) in Uganda. Since then, school enrolment rates have risen dramatically, from 85.5% in 2000 to 96.7% in 2011. Despite these gains, a number of major challenges remain. Dropout rates are very high, averaging at 64% (65% boys; 63% girls). Much like in other social service sectors in Uganda, there are significant disparities between regions, as well as between different districts throughout the country. In the remote Kotido district in Karamoja, for example, school completion rates are below 10%. Likewise, while enrolment rates are laudable, the quality of UPE is still poor. The student per classroom ratio is 76:1, and teacher absenteeism is a major issue, varying between 20% and 80% on any given day. In the twelve worst performing districts the absenteeism rate was estimated at 30%, and pupil absenteeism rate was 22%. Simultaneously, school inspection remains a major challenge,
despite concerted efforts by stakeholders (including UNICEF) to support the MoES efforts to ensure regular inspection, reporting, and follow-up on pressing issues.

A number of related water and sanitation issues further discourage school attendance. Girls, in particular lack access to latrines and sanitary materials, as the pupil stance ratio is 66:1, and sanitary napkins are expensive, and difficult to find in rural area. The percentage of schools with a safe water supplies increased by 14.6% in 2010, but gathering reliable data on safe water in schools remains challenging. The challenges to girls’ education extend beyond sanitation concerns. There are a low number of female teachers (35% on average, but with some rural schools having no female teachers at all), and high teenage pregnancy rates exacerbate drop-out. In a 2009 study, the MoES found that 12% of girls (ages 15-19) in the survey area were pregnant and 19% had given birth to a child.

There is also shortage of high-quality instructional materials in schools. The primary school curriculum for teachers colleges has recently undergone a comprehensive review process, and the new curriculum and materials will be introduced in 2013. Peace Education is embedded in the new curriculum, but questions remain about teachers’ preparedness and willingness to incorporate a discussion about current events, and to address challenging and sometimes divisive issues in the classroom.

High drop-out rates have left a large number of children and youth who are not enrolled in formal education. Some have joined alternative education programmes (such as vocational training or apprenticeship programs), some have entered the workforce, and a significant number of these young people have resorted to alternative income generating activities, including petty theft, organized criminal activity, and survival sex. Finding ways to reintegrate this demographic, or support them through alternative education/vocational training programmes will be important for stability in parts of the country which have seen an increase in criminal activity.

Uganda’s conflicts have exacerbated both drop-out rates and quality issues, so the strong recent track record toward stability may provide an opportunity to make progress in these areas. Since making these strides in primary education, the government has expanded to implement universal secondary education (USE) in 2009. One very positive outcome of USE has been the dramatic increase in girl enrolment.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Indicators in 2011</th>
<th>National</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NER Total</td>
<td>96.7%</td>
<td>96.3%</td>
<td>96.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIR</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary school completion rate Total</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pupils to teacher ratio (PTR)</td>
<td>49:1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pupils to classroom ratio (PCR)</td>
<td>58:1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P3 Literacy Overall</td>
<td>57.6%</td>
<td>58.5%</td>
<td>56.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P6 Literacy Overall</td>
<td>50.2%</td>
<td>49.7%</td>
<td>50.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P3 Numeracy Overall</td>
<td>72.8%</td>
<td>74.1%</td>
<td>71.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P6 Numeracy Overall</td>
<td>54.8%</td>
<td>57.9%</td>
<td>52.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECD Gross Enrolment Rate</td>
<td>6.60%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net enrolment ratio in secondary education</td>
<td>24.20%</td>
<td>25.80%</td>
<td>22.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Completion rate at S4</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECD Gross Enrolment Rate</td>
<td>6.60%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Research has demonstrated that early childhood years can have a critical impact on long-term development. According to the World Bank, “[a] number of ECD investments have been shown to have significant and long-lasting benefits in three broad categories of interrelated outcomes.” Those categories are: 1) enhancing school readiness and related educational outcomes, 2) Improving physical and mental health and reducing reliance on the health care system, and 3) Reducing engagement in high-risk behaviour.\textsuperscript{113} In addition, research suggests that ECD can “bridge the gap between poor and otherwise disadvantaged children and those from more privileged backgrounds.”\textsuperscript{114} In Uganda, the provisions for early childhood development are limited, with only about 3200 ECD centres in the country, of which the majority are located the central region. The national enrolment rate (NER) is at 6.2%.

Developing community based ECD centres has been a chief policy and advocacy focus for UNICEF, which works with 672 community based ECD centres which provide access to the most disadvantaged children. From a peacebuilding perspective, ECD provides an opportunity to unite communities which may be in dispute around the common goal of improving education prospects for their children. This can have a powerful multiplying effect. Investments in ECD could also promote a platform of social equality in a country which suffers from dramatic developmental disparities.

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{primary_school_completion_rate.png}
\caption{Primary School Completion rate (%) for the five best and worst performing Districts}
\end{figure}

Source: UNICEF Uganda Education Section

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{number_type_ecd_centres.png}
\caption{Number & Type of ECD Centres per Region}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{113} (Naudeau, et al. 2011) 18.
\textsuperscript{114} (Naudeau, et al. 2011) 38.
9. Conclusions

The purpose of this conflict analysis has been to identify drivers of conflict in Uganda and their implications for education programming by UNICEF. The way in which UNICEF approached this conflict analysis allowed for a helpful combination of background research, and stakeholder validations. Conducting a conflict analysis with a specific view on education also yielded the potential for greater integration of programmes. The approach also bridged the education and peacebuilding communities and took both beyond their traditional comfort zones. Engaging educators on matters of peacebuilding provided an opportunity for them to think beyond the traditional focus on schooling and focus on a larger framework for education. Simultaneously, engaging peacebuilding specialists on the transformative potential of education allowed UNICEF to advocate for the inclusion of education issues in peacebuilding agendas.

The analysis has drawn on existing literature to help understand drivers of conflict at the national level in terms of security, political, economic and social development. The analysis was further developed through consultations with a range of stakeholders, including in-depth field visits to four sub-national regions (Karamoja, Acholi, West Nile and Western Uganda). The most challenging aspect of the analysis is to then identify how formal and non-formal education programming might support peacebuilding through transformation of the conditions that generate conflict. This is a complex challenge that needs to resolve a number of competing demands. This section attempts to address these in the following way. Firstly, we identify three main rationales for the contribution that education might make to peacebuilding, based partly on previous UNICEF reports. Secondly, we identify a number of conclusions based on the findings from this study and these also represent a range of competing factors that need to be resolved in deciding programming priorities as part of the Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy programme. Thirdly, a number of areas are identified arising from this analysis that UNICEF may wish to consider as possible programming areas.

9.1 Rationales for the role of education in peacebuilding

From recent literature three broad rationales have emerged concerning the role that education might play in supporting peacebuilding. These are:

i) Education as a ‘peace dividend’. This argument is that an end to violent conflict offers an opportunity to devote increased resources to social development such as education and health, partly as a result of less need for expenditure on security and repairing the damage caused by violence. Improvements in the level and quality of education provision is one way that governments can demonstrate a return to normality and ability of the state to provide services for the public good. Improvements to education services are very visible to the population and may be perceived as a benefit of peace that strengthens statebuilding. The implication is that education programming should involve working to support government commitments to extend and improve education provision – particularly where it addresses areas adversely affected by conflict.

ii) Education that is ‘conflict sensitive’. This argument is that education should be careful not to fuel inequalities or grievances or reinforce prejudices and animosities. This might mean, for example addressing inequalities of access (regionally and in terms of excluded populations), and in terms of differential outcomes between sub-regions and groups. There might be a case for review of arrangements for recruitment, training and development of teachers to enable them to be more sensitive to diversity and equality issues, or the need for reform in terms of the content and relevance of curriculum and teaching methodologies.
iii) Education that is ‘transformative’. This argument is that education can transform values, attitudes and behaviours that encourage non-violent ways of dealing with conflict, but transformation of systemic and structural injustices may be even more important. In practical terms it might mean programmes that transform people’s sense of security by addressing attitudes to violence or confidence in the justice system; transforming political conditions through education that encourages political awareness, engagement and participation; transforming economic expectations through the development of skills likely to support employment and livelihoods; and transformation in social relations through creating new dialogue between people and groups in conflict. These tend to require approaches that may be rooted in the curriculum, but often need to go beyond the classroom into non-formal education programmes within the wider community.

These arguments overlap and are highly relevant in the context of Uganda. UNICEF in Uganda already has some engagement at each of these levels, for example, through working with government to improve access to education and extend early childhood education, supporting back to school campaigns which promote return and retention of students (GEM & GBS for example). UNICEF has also engaged at the policy level, supporting the revision of Uganda’s primary school curriculum and in by building MoES capacity for curriculum implementation.

The opportunity and the challenge presented by the Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy programme is the extent to which existing work can be strengthened from a peacebuilding perspective and whether there are also opportunities to pilot new programme areas over the next three years that have a strong peacebuilding rationale. The following section identifies a number of conclusions from the overall conflict analysis that need to be taken into account in making those decisions.

9.2 Conclusions from the conflict analysis

Based on the conflict analysis and consultations with stakeholders, it has been possible to identify a number of conclusions:

i) The differences between national and sub-national regions is an extremely important feature of this study and highlights how the dynamics and drivers of conflict are not uniform throughout the country – this suggests that some aspects of the programming response will need to be differentiated by region.

ii) At the national level, UNICEF has a very strong partnership with government reflected in collaboration around education planning (for example on the Education Sector Plan 2007-2015). The recently revised primary school curriculum provides an opportunity to strengthen the perception of education provision as a benefit of peace and stability (a peace dividend). However, it is also an opportunity to address aspects of uneven development that could become sources of grievance, for example, low enrolment and completion rates in the north, or partnership to expand early childhood development in ways that also bring together parents from different communities to promote new dialogue around a common goals. The high youth unemployment rate also suggests that serious consideration should be given to the relevance of secondary education from a peacebuilding perspective.

iii) At the level of sub-national regions there are distinctive peacebuilding challenges and there may be a role for education in addressing these:
• Karamoja – building up sustainable livelihoods strategies for youth and strengthening community resilience against conflict and environmental changes are a unique challenge in Karamoja.

• Acholi – after decades of conflict, improvements to education represent a peace dividend in the Acholi sub-region. Closing the gap between this and other parts of the country in completion rates and enrolment will be vital to building up a conflict affected population.

• West Nile – like in Acholi, improvements to education represent a peace dividend in West Nile. In addition, it provides an opportunity to mitigate the impacts of transience and migration, and to combat the “learned helplessness” stakeholders identified as a priority.

• Western – home to some of the largest refugee settlements in the country, this part of the country could benefit from a focus on displacement and integration of refugee populations. Emphasis should be placed on the relationship between host and refugee communities, as well as on special needs presented by refugees from Congo (primarily linguistic and in terms of adapting to the curriculum).

iv) A common concern that emerged in all sub-regions as well as the national level is the need to engage youth, this is a high priority because of the youth demographic, but also because they represent an untapped potential to contribute to peace and stability – the new programme needs to have a strong emphasis on this group – this is a particular concern in terms of youth livelihoods.

v) At all levels national, sub-national and local, respondents expressed concerns about attitudes to violence, how it is accepted as part of social norms, and how it manifests in many different contexts (interpersonal family, domestic, gender-based, school). This suggests that a focus on the social norms regarding violence might be a strong focus for new programming (perhaps differentiated by region or context).

vi) At the national level there was considerable awareness of the potential threat of violent conflict arising from political exclusion, especially anxieties related to elections and transitions of power. People are fearful of voicing these concerns too explicitly and this raises questions about whether it is possible to pilot programmes in this sensitive area.

vii) UNICEF Uganda has an existing work plan so there is a challenge to build on existing approaches, whilst also adopting a stronger peacebuilding dimension. UNICEF will also begin planning for the next country programme (2015-2019), so the findings from this conflict analysis can be used to inform this. There may also be the opportunity for some new programming around peacebuilding and/or youth engagement and livelihoods.

viii) Existing staff have strong expertise aligned with commitments to EFA, but what training might they need to encourage more of a peacebuilding perspective in their work? Also, are there new areas of expertise that might need to be created as part of the new peacebuilding programme, for example, expertise in working at secondary level, with youth, or non-formal education programmes – these should be identified as part of the planning for the new programme.

ix) Partnerships may need to be reviewed to identify which of the current partners have peacebuilding expertise, and whether there are organisations with peacebuilding expertise that might become partners as part of the new programme. The programme team may also identify existing institutions that would benefit from capacity development in peacebuilding.

x) There remains a need to identify areas where new knowledge and research needs to be generated. These need to be identified at the outset once the priority areas for the new programme have been agreed.
9.3 Possible areas for programming

Based on stakeholder consultations, and an analysis of conflict drivers, UNICEF Uganda has a range of options in how to proceed in developing its Peacebuilding Education and Advocacy Programme. Taking into account, the national, sub-national and community conflict drivers, the programme could prioritize a systemic approach to supporting implementation of the newly revised curriculum at the national level (with a specific focus on the implementation of life skills, peace education and psychosocial education), a focus on equipping schools and teachers to deal with current events, or a need to combat accepted norms in violent conflict resolution at the household level. The following are suggestions for possible programme areas. In each case the challenge is to demonstrate the ‘peacebuilding logic’ or rationale that links the programming response to the conflict analysis.

**Supporting Curriculum Implementation at the National Level**

The benefits of supporting national educational curriculum implementation are numerous. First, it is a form of assistance with systemic and nation-wide impact. It also is of a preventive nature, addressing underlying socio-cultural drivers of conflict, and replacing them with values and skills in peaceful conflict mediation and negotiation at a critical age. If well done, the curriculum will then be adapted to the individual needs and particularities of local communities. Possible limitations include the need to very clearly define the needs. Such support also requires a sufficient level of funding to support a thorough level of engagement. The level of skills among teachers remains a variable as well. Even the most thoughtful and progressive educational curriculum relies on skilled, motivated, and hard-working teachers for implementation. As such, the impact of this type of assistance may vary with the capacities of teachers in different parts of the country.

One element of supporting the implementation of the national curriculum could be through teacher training, specifically on peace education, as well as other relevant skills. Addressing related education quality issues (such as teacher absenteeism, WASH and access challenges, and quality issues) are equally vital.

**Building Community Resilience to Mitigate and Prevent Violence**

This might take the form of working through community barazas, or other youth-oriented groups (for example GEMs or the Scouts) to engage young people and community decision makers and build their skills in non-violent conflict mediation and negotiation. One of the benefits to taking a community-level approach is that doing so engages household decision makers, and those who typically have a greater level of influence on conflict and dispute resolution at the community level. It is a holistic approach, and deals with the challenges facing youth in the most disadvantaged parts of the country. Assistance in this area has the potential to be genuinely transformative in equipping young people with alternatives to violent dispute resolution (especially in a context like Karamoja where youth are key drivers of conflict). Simultaneously, this is a more difficult model to operationalize, especially in remote parts of the country which are difficult to access. The approach also stretches the definitions of traditional “education” in looking beyond the walls of the schools and identifying opportunities for social transformation at the community level.

**Uniting Communities around a Common Goal**

Implementing effective education systems requires community participation and buy-in. In conflict affected parts of Uganda this presents an opportunity to bring together communities which might be in conflict, or have a history of conflict, around the common goal of providing their children with quality peace-sensitive education. An example could be investments in ECD centres, which are community run and organized, and present an interesting forum for cooperation. Investing in the nation’s children through ECD is a natural focus area for UNICEF, and also provides a promising opportunity for building up community cooperation and cohesion. Likewise, promoting recreational engagement such as sports, mobile theatre, dance and drama, present opportunities to foster
healthy competition and to build community awareness through cultural mediums. Such programmatic priorities could be significant in addressing underlying issues through positive, community level engagement.

**Reintegration and Reconciliation:**

Consolidating peace in northern Uganda should remain a top priority for the GoU and UN alike. This includes a recovery agenda, but also must emphasize building resilience against relapse into conflict, and dealing practically with the legacies of conflict. Such support should be trans-generational, and engage with both formal and informal (or “official” and “traditional” as they are sometimes called) power structures. One way UNICEF can do this is through its relationships with traditional elders, and community barazas—a powerful traditional forum for dispute resolution and local arbitration. Education also has the ability to act as a medium for social reconciliation and peacebuilding as children from different communities come together to go to school. Likewise, schools present a forum for reintegration, as child and former child combatants return from the bush. Increasing access to basic education throughout conflict affected areas could also have an equalizing effect on children, youth and communities with different political, developmental, and economic histories.

**Support for Refugee Education**

Working with partners (including UNHCR) to support refugee education is a priority. The issue is immediate, and responds to urgent requests for assistance in integrating new and existing refugee populations into the Ugandan education system. Assisting in this way has the potential to be protective and preventive, especially in respect to promoting smooth integration with host communities. Simultaneously, the need may be taking a broader, national level look at issues around citizenship, identity, integration, and popular perceptions about refugees in Uganda. Refugee education falls into the mandate of UNHCR\(^{115}\), but in the context of Uganda, the settlement policy in dealing with refugees has expedited integration thus making the population of concern to UNICEF on a local, sub-national and national level.

**Youth Programme**

Moving beyond UNICEF’s recent emphasis on primary-aged children, implementing a pilot youth programme could place the institution on the vanguard of much-needed engagement with this young demographic. Typically, youth programmes take on a specific sub-focus. Building on the existing internal capacities (especially in Technology for Development), UNICEF might consider a two-pronged approach involving: i) Youth and political engagement and ii) Youth and livelihoods/vocational training.

Some of the issues facing youth also have specific sub-regional dimensions. For example, the pacification of youth cattle-rustlers in Karamoja has an economic and vocational training component, but will likely have a different emphasis than vocational training programs in the southwest of the country. As such, a region-specific prioritization is recommended, as UNICEF proceeds in designing a programme.

**Engaging Children and Youth through Non-Formal Education**

With high drop-out rates around the country, a comprehensive approach to engaging children and youth in peacebuilding must account for those who are not part of the formal education sector. As such, working through youth centres, and non-formal education programmes provides a promising opportunity for engagement and peacebuilding in each of the target areas of the programme. Depending on the geographic and age particularities, programmes may have an education or livelihoods emphasis, but all should emphasize engaging young people in constructive activities which promote peacebuilding and economic growth.

\(^{115}\) (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 2012) 3.
Professional Development of Teachers

Teacher absenteeism remains a major challenge throughout Uganda. The quality of education is inextricably linked to the quality of teachers, so investments in this area are an intuitive way to proceed in supporting high-quality implementation of the national education curriculum. The question that remains is about how to ensure that it is an efficient investment. Addressing teachers’ attitudes and sensitivity to conflict drivers can be done through the national curriculum reform process, but it should also have a teacher training component, especially on peace education and psycho-social education. Streamlining these investments is the key.

Addressing Violence against Children in Schools

In addition to building community resilience against conflict (which will address issues like GBV, VAC, and Domestic Violence), addressing the prevalence of violence against children in schools (VACiS) should be a top priority for UNICEF. This may be achieved by working closely with teachers and administrators to secure a protective environment at schools. Likewise, a VACiS infrastructure must include supportive functions in the justice sector who can step in when school authorities fail to protect children adequately. Thus, working with local law-enforcement structures, and setting up response and treatment facilities and structures is important.

10. Recommendations

As the research team drew up a set of recommendations, they remained cognizant of a number of considerations which UNICEF Uganda will need to factor into the programme design. The first is how to relate the programming to the peacebuilding logic. The second is how much UNICEF should amend or introduce new programmes as opposed to building on existing capacities and successes; and the third is what is realistic in terms of the current country office work plan and capacities.

In addition to these questions, UNICEF Uganda will need to address the question of UN integration, and aligning with programmes such as the PBF. A question also remains about the degree to which the UN and UNICEF specifically, are increasingly asked to work “upstream” in supporting government counterparts to facilitate systemic change. The balance between working “upstream” or more “down-stream” or both, will affect the programmatic priorities in peacebuilding and should be taken into consideration during the programme design phase.

The following are a number of specific recommendations, based on the findings from this analysis, but recognising that decisions about which to take forward may depend on further consultations and availability of resources:

10.1 **UNICEF Uganda has a strong partnership with government** (notably through collaboration on curriculum revision and expansion of early childhood development). The UNICEF Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy programme provides an ideal opportunity to introduce a peacebuilding perspective within these areas. For example, supporting the implementation of newly revised teachers training curriculum provides an opportunity to include and reinforce aspects of peace and human rights education at the national level. The expansion of Early Childhood Development may not seem an obvious entry point for peacebuilding, but its availability to previously marginalised communities could present an opportunity for building social and community cohesion. This could include pilot work to see if community based provision of ECD may also have a peacebuilding dimension by creating dialogue between different groups. It may also include training and capacity development for Ministry personnel.
10.2 **At the national level** there would appear to be a case for prioritising formal and non-formal education programming with youth and looking at two particular areas of focus: **political inclusion** and **attitudes to violence**. The former may involve using the next three years of the Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy programme to formulate a strategy in partnership with other agencies, develop capacity and begin implementation of pilot programmes. With regard to the latter, it is also recommended that the initial approach might be to open up these areas as a potential focus for new country office programming.

10.3 **Youth.** In the context of Uganda, there is a strong rationale for engaging youth as part of UNICEF’s peacebuilding work. This would represent an additional commitment to the existing work programme that could be facilitated through the UNICEF Peacebuilding Education and Advocacy programme by focusing on a modest and realistic set of pilot programmes over the next three years. It would make sense to begin with a more detailed consultation and analysis of the situation facing youth, as well as gathering input from young people themselves on what could be possible strategies for engagement and programming. This could include soliciting the input of rural youth who are not always represented in conflict assessments. In terms of partner capacities, UNICEF will need to engage with youth organizations involved in peacebuilding and also assess their respective strengths in the fields of livelihoods, political engagement and vocational training (among others).

10.4 **Political inclusion.** Youth repeatedly stressed a desire for civic and political engagement. As a starting point, UNICEF could review current education programming (both formal and informal) related to civic and citizenship education. It would be extremely important to establish a base line regarding youth perspectives on the current state of opportunities for political engagement and where there are unmet expectations. Expectations and anxieties related to future elections and reactions to possible transitions in power were considered to be challenging and sensitive areas to address, so it is crucial that government and cross party support be secured for any proposed initiatives. UNICEF could solicit additional insights through U-report. From this knowledge base, a programme could be developed with a specialized partner to address issues of political inclusion, concepts of citizenship, and other areas of civic engagement that are currently neglected.

10.5 **Attitudes to violence.** Concerns about social norms that accept violence as a means of resolving disputes were evident at the national, sub-national and local levels. There is a strong belief amongst most stakeholders that interventions that seek to change attitudes and behaviours at multiple levels within society (interpersonal, intergenerational within families, at school, between ethnic groups in certain regions) may have an impact on social norms and the disposition of individuals to use violence. The development of pilot programmes related to these issues may also provide an opportunity to monitor and test such claims.

10.6 There were strong views from stakeholders that the development of programming in the above areas should involve both formal and non-formal approaches, and would benefit from strategies that make effective use of new communication technologies, for example the current U-report initiative by UNICEF that uses mobile phone technologies.

10.7 As well as a national approach, there is a compelling case for a differentiated approach that takes account of the dynamics of conflict in sub-national regions. Pilot programmes might be developed to address the distinctive drivers of conflict in each of the following sub-national regions. It is also recommended that some degree of devolution of responsibility
for design and implementation be considered. This would demonstrate a commitment to empowerment of communities to develop and be accountable for their own solutions to peacebuilding challenges. It also opens up opportunities for UNICEF to strengthen partnerships that have local credibility and some capacity for peacebuilding.

10.8 **Karamoja.** There are distinctive peacebuilding challenges in the Karamoja region. These include the lowest school enrolment and retention rates in the country and large numbers of unemployed youth in a region with porous borders and flow of arms. Part of the challenge has a cultural dimension where the highly dispersed, pastoral lifestyle does not sit well with traditional forms of settled schooling. The peacebuilding challenge may therefore be to simultaneously address school enrolment and work with young people who are not in school to establish livelihoods that address a variety of priorities (economic realities, resilience to climate change, dynamics of local conflicts over land and livestock).

10.9 **Acholi.** The Acholi region is the most conflict-affected in the country. Whilst levels of violence have reduced, the ferocity of the fighting and its impact on individuals and communities has left significant development and peacebuilding challenges. Approaches that increase access to high quality and conflict sensitive education as a peace dividend would be a priority in this area. In addition, working with young people to identify sustainable livelihoods strategies and reduce vulnerability to conflict by addressing any underlying social tensions (for example tensions over political representation) could be strategic priorities.

10.10 **West Nile.** The confluence of repeated and wide-spread conflict with under-representation and perceived marginalization make West Nile a unique political and social context. In addition, a highly transient population places significant stresses on limited resources, and presents human security challenges. From the standpoint of peacebuilding, a priority should be addressing service delivery challenges, while using an approach which does not perpetuate “learned helplessness” in the region.

10.11 **Western.** From a peacebuilding perspective one of the main challenges in the Western region is the potentially destabilizing effect of displacement and the recent influx of refugees. UNICEF in close partnership with UNHCR has the ability to address not only emergency/refugee education needs, but also to work with local communities to promote the integration between host and refugee population (especially in cases where schools are comprised of both groups).

10.12 Irrespective of the final decisions that remain about programming areas to pursue, there will be a challenge for UNICEF Uganda to put in place monitoring systems at the outset that include *indicators of success from a peacebuilding perspective*. This will be an extremely challenging task for the overall programme and means going beyond recording activities such as trainings etc. However, one advantage for the country offices is that the question of indicators of success can be addressed at the level of concrete programmes. For example, a programme that seeks to influence violent attitudes and behaviours might identify a baseline within a particular community and monitor levels of violence over successive years as the programme is introduced. There are technical challenges, and it is recognised that effects may only become visible over a protracted period, but the main recommendation is that this challenge should be addressed at the outset of the programme and resources identified to undertake the task.
Apart from monitoring and evaluation the Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy programme provides an opportunity to generate new knowledge and insight into the way that education can contribute to peacebuilding. This is an expectation under Outcome 5 of the programme, so it will be important to identify **potential areas of research** that should be completed over the next three years. Again these may provide opportunities for partnership and capacity development in-country, but also contribute to **knowledge generation** alongside other countries in the region and through involvement in HQ research strategy. Potential areas need to be identified at the outset, and could include gathering a more in-depth understanding of youth livelihoods challenges, building up a body of knowledge around opportunities for political engagement of youth, or probing further into the nuances of livelihoods strategies currently being adopted by young people. Gaining a better understanding of GoU approaches and priorities in respect to peacebuilding would help UNICEF devise a strategy to engage with government counterparts. Probing further into the effectiveness of peace clubs and peace education could provide equally important opportunities for institutional learning.

It was beyond the scope of this conflict analysis to do a comprehensive **mapping of potential partner organisations** relevant to the Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy programme. A preliminary mapping is provided in Appendix A, but it is recommended that a more detailed mapping be undertaken once further decisions have been made about the priorities of the new programme and where these will operate. This would mean identifying the strengths of potential partner organisations from a peacebuilding perspective and also highlight where **training and capacity development** might be required.

Meetings with **other development partners** should be convened to avoid duplication of effort, and possibly leverage additional funding. Also, discussions with other UN agencies such as PBF to ensure there in coherence in the approach that is taken.
Bibliography


### APPENDIX A: Peacebuilding and Education Partner Mapping

In addition to the various government institutions tasked with education and peacebuilding functions around the country, the following are some of the partners UNICEF identified during its field research:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Programmatic Focus</th>
<th>Area(s):</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Advocates Coalition for Development and Environment</td>
<td>Think-tank involved in PRDP development and other legislative/policy support for peacebuilding</td>
<td>National</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arbeiter Samariter Bund (ASB)-Uganda</td>
<td>Child Protection</td>
<td>Acholi sub-region and Karamoja</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arua Public Service Sector</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>West Nile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVSI</td>
<td>Education &amp; Child Protection</td>
<td>Nationwide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caritas Gulu</td>
<td>Relief &amp; Rehabilitation, Social Services Provision, and Livelihoods Development</td>
<td>Gulu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center for Conflict Resolution (CECORE)</td>
<td>Create and promote alternative dispute resolution methods and empowers communities to transform conflict</td>
<td>National</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center for Justice Studies and Innovation</td>
<td>Justice for Children</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society Fund</td>
<td>HIV/AIDS and OVC</td>
<td>National</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition of Civil Society for Peace in Northern Uganda</td>
<td>86 organizations working for “just and lasting peace” in northern Uganda</td>
<td>Greater North</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concerned Parents Association</td>
<td>Child advocacy, livelihoods, peacebuilding, and parent support groups</td>
<td>National</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department for International Development (DFID)</td>
<td>Funding NGO consortium for conflict analysis sensitivity</td>
<td>National (conflict sensitivity work focuses on PRDP areas including Karamoja)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gulu Municipal Council</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>PRDP region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gulu NGO Forum</td>
<td>“Youth Leadership Project”</td>
<td>Gulu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gulu Support the Children Organization (GUSCO)</td>
<td>Rehabilitation &amp; Reintegration of former child soldiers</td>
<td>Gulu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gulu University Institute for Peace and Strategic Studies</td>
<td>Conflict Mediation, Access to Legal Services, Peacebuilding</td>
<td>Acholi sub-region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HURINET</td>
<td>Group of human rights groups who work on transitional justice and peacebuilding</td>
<td>National</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ker Kwaro Acholi (KKK)</td>
<td>Acholi cultural institution addressing IDP challenges (and return), peacebuilding, land disputes, rehabilitation and reintegration, and challenges facing youth</td>
<td>Acholi sub-region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mennonite Central Committee (MCC)</td>
<td>Peacebuilding and Conflict Resolution</td>
<td>National</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mercy Corps</td>
<td>Conflict Management and Mediation, Livelihoods &amp; Market Development</td>
<td>Acholi sub-region (esp. Lamwo), and Karamoja</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Uganda Youth Development Center</td>
<td>Youth Development, Vocational Training</td>
<td>Greater North</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paralegal Advisory Council</td>
<td>Legal (court) procedures and Legal Aid clinics</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President’s Office</td>
<td>National Security</td>
<td>National</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restless Development</td>
<td>Youth engagement and empowerment</td>
<td>Karamoja</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saferworld</td>
<td>Conflict-sensitivity, conflict prevention, PRDP area including</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Focus Area</td>
<td>Location</td>
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<td>--------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Save the Children</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>National</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Straight Talk Foundation</td>
<td>Education (Communications &amp; Advocacy)</td>
<td>Central/National</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda Joint Christian Council (UJCC)</td>
<td>Ecumenical organization which brings together religious leaders around issues like peacebuilding, health and education</td>
<td>National</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda Land Alliance (ULA)</td>
<td>Consortium of local and international NGOs advocating for just land policies and dispute resolution</td>
<td>National with emphasis on PRDP areas and Karamoja</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda Women’s Network (UWONET)</td>
<td>Advocacy and lobbying network of women’s NGOs</td>
<td>National</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States Agency for International Development (USAID)</td>
<td>Land Disputes</td>
<td>National</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VSF-Belgium</td>
<td>Conflict Mitigation</td>
<td>National</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Vision</td>
<td>Former child soldier rehabilitation</td>
<td>Gulu</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX B: Focus Group Discussion Questions

FGD Guiding Questions (Secondary School and Teachers in Acholi)

Introduction:

UNICEF Uganda is carrying out a conflict analysis to inform a possible future program on Peacebuilding, Advocacy, and Education in Conflict Affected Contexts. The aim of the analysis is to study the profile, causes, actors and dynamics of conflict, as well as to identify progress made toward addressing these issues and laying the foundation for lasting peace in Uganda. By gaining an understanding of both of these pieces, UNICEF will identify areas where peacebuilding activities—specifically in the education sector—could help to support long-term peace by empowering children toward reconciliation, the rebuilding of social relationships, and the search for protection and rights.

Research to inform the conflict analysis will consist of a number of individual interviews, focus group discussions, and stakeholder workshops around the country (Arua, Gulu, Moroto, and the southwest). Today’s focus group is entirely optional and voluntary. Identities will be kept anonymous. The purpose of today’s discussion is also not about building consensus per se. It is about understanding a variety of viewpoints which paint a collective picture of the many (sometimes different) perspectives, experiences, and dynamics that make up Uganda.

Exercise—Mapping Conflicts in the Community (for more see Appendix B):

Peace-Line Exercise: Five points of peace—>conflict on the floor and ask students to stand in the area which they feel best represents the state of Uganda today. Then have a conversation about why. Repeat the exercise specifically for northern Uganda (Gulu/Moroto/Arua) and again have a discussion about why?

Understanding and Profiling General Source of Conflict (National & Regional)

1) What positive changes have you observed in Uganda over the past three years?
2) How have your life and your community changed as a result of the return of IDPs?
3) What sources of tension or conflicts have you observed in your community? Are they new? Have the two sides ever coexisted peacefully?
4) How do people typically resolve these conflicts?
5) How are your group/family ideas brought to the attention of the leaders in your community/district?
6) Does your group/family feel represented at the local council and district level (why or why not?)
7) Does your group/family feel its ideas represented in governments’ program? (why or why not?)
8) Do you know what the “Peace Recovery and Development Plan” is? (if so, please describe)

9) What are the main problems young people are facing in your community today?

10) What are the biggest fears among young people in your community today?

11) Do you feel safe in your community? If not, why not?

Understanding issues relevant to youth and the role of education:

1) What are the main problems young people are facing in your community today?

2) Are there any centers that are just for adolescents/youth? Have you ever visited a center that is specifically targeted for youth? If yes, what attracts you to the center?

3) Do you feel that youth concerns and needs are understood and represented within the local and national government?

4) What is the most important thing you need from your government? (and are you getting it?)

5) Would you consider marrying someone from another tribe? Why or why not?

6) Would you consider joining the military? Why or why not?

7) (May be for the youth – Has your youth group helped to solve any conflict (what was the conflict?) and how? What can you do as youth to solve conflict?

8) What can development partners do to support conflict resolution in your community.

9) Does your community see education as a way of solving problems/conflict or a way education has caused more conflict

10) How could education be used to promote peace in your community?

Questions about the Past:

1) How is your community coping with the aftermath of conflict? How does it still affect you? (mental health issues, alcoholism, post-traumatic stress etc.)

2) What have been the major problems for people after returning “home”? What adjustments have been required?

3) What have been the problems for children since the conflict ended?

Closing Comments:
Thank you very much for taking the time to speak with us today. Your input is crucial to garnering a better understanding of how UNICEF can respond to the ongoing challenges faced in communities around Uganda.
APPENDIX C: Assignment (FGD alternative) for Primary School Children

This assignment will be distributed to primary school teachers in each of the research areas. The teachers will then ask their classroom to carry out the exercise below in preparation of the arrival of the researchers/consultant.

Introduction:

UNICEF Uganda is carrying out a conflict analysis to inform a possible future program on Peacebuilding, Advocacy, and Education in Conflict Affected Contexts. The aim of the analysis is to study the profile, causes, actors and dynamics of conflict, as well as to identify progress made toward addressing these issues and laying the foundation for lasting peace in Uganda. By gaining an understanding of both of these pieces, UNICEF will identify areas where peacebuilding activities—specifically in the education sector—could help to support long-term peace by empowering children toward reconciliation, the rebuilding of social relationships, and the search for protection and rights.

Research to inform the conflict analysis will consist of a number of individual interviews, focus group discussions, and stakeholder workshops around the country. To ensure we also receive input from primary school students, UNICEF has designed an alternative exercise which will be carried out by teachers and then presented to UNICEF staff when they come to the program area to conduct research.

Exercise—for primary school students (ages 6-10):

Using poetry, drawing or theatre (or some combination), ask primary school children to express their reflections on the theme of ‘conflict in your community’.