Exploring the Linkages between Education Sector Governance, Inequity, Conflict, and Peacebuilding in South Sudan

Research Report Prepared for UNICEF Eastern and Southern Africa Regional Office (ESARO)

February 2016
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Research Team

Mario Novelli, University of Sussex (Project Lead)
Gabrielle Daoust, University of Sussex (Lead Researcher, South Sudan)
Jan Selby, University of Sussex
Oscar Valiente, University of Glasgow
Rosario Scandurra, Universitat de Barcelona
Luka Biong Deng Kuol, University of Juba
Emma Salter, University of Sussex

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<th>Alternative Education System</th>
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<td>ALP</td>
<td>Accelerated Learning Program</td>
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<td>BALP</td>
<td>Basic Adult Literacy Program</td>
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<td>BoG</td>
<td>Board of Governors</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEC</td>
<td>County Education Centre</td>
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<td>CHF</td>
<td>Common Humanitarian Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNHPR</td>
<td>Committee for National Healing, Peace and Reconciliation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil society organisation</td>
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<td>CGS</td>
<td>Community Girls’ Schools</td>
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<td>CTMC</td>
<td>County Transfer Monitoring Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration</td>
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<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development (UK Aid)</td>
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<td>ECD</td>
<td>Early Childhood Development</td>
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<td>EDOG</td>
<td>Education Donor Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>EFA</td>
<td>Education For All</td>
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<tr>
<td>EIE</td>
<td>Education in Emergencies</td>
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<td>EMIS</td>
<td>Education Management Information System</td>
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<td>ESARO</td>
<td>Eastern and Southern Regional Office (UNICEF)</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organisation</td>
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<td>GBV</td>
<td>Gender Based Violence</td>
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<td>GER</td>
<td>Gross enrolment rate</td>
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<td>GESP</td>
<td>General Education Strategic Plan</td>
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<td>GESS</td>
<td>Girls’ Education South Sudan</td>
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<td>GPE</td>
<td>Global Partnership for Education</td>
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<td>GRSS</td>
<td>Government of the Republic of South Sudan</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally displaced person</td>
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<td>IEC</td>
<td>Intensive English Course</td>
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<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Development</td>
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<td>IMED</td>
<td>Improved Management of Education Delivery (EU)</td>
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<td>JSR</td>
<td>Joint Sector Review</td>
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<td>LS&amp;PE</td>
<td>Life skills and peacebuilding education (PBEA)</td>
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<td>MDGs</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<td>MoCYS</td>
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<td>MoEST</td>
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<td>MoFCIEP</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
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<td>NPPR</td>
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<td>PBEA</td>
<td>Peacebuilding Education and Advocacy (UNICEF)</td>
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<td>PEG</td>
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<td>POC</td>
<td>Protection of Civilians site</td>
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<td>PTA</td>
<td>Parent Teacher Association</td>
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<td>SMC</td>
<td>School Management Committee</td>
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<td>SPLA/M</td>
<td>Sudan Peoples’ Liberation</td>
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<td>SPLM-IO</td>
<td>SPLM-In Opposition</td>
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<td>SSDP</td>
<td>South Sudan Development Plan</td>
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<td>SSEC</td>
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<td>SSP</td>
<td>South Sudan Pound</td>
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<td>SSPRC</td>
<td>South Sudan Peace and Reconciliation Commission</td>
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<td>TTI</td>
<td>Teacher Training Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>TVET</td>
<td>Technical and Vocational Education and Training</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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<td>UNMISS</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in South Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Program</td>
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This is School.
The school is souls of learn.
The school is most beautiful in the world.
It promote people of South Sudan unity.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Research context

While there is growing evidence that educational inequality can be a driver of conflict (FHI 360, 2015) and that the education system can both promote and undermine sustainable peacebuilding processes (Bush & Saltarelli, 2000; Davies, 2004b; Smith, 2005), education systems are often marginalized in both peace-making and peacebuilding processes (Novelli & Smith, 2011). This study explores the relationship between education sector management, inequality, conflict and peacebuilding in South Sudan. It examines the linkages between inequities in education, broader political economy dynamics which contribute to conflict pressures, and how education sector governance could support sustainable peace and development processes.

South Sudan gained independence in 2011, following decades of civil war. However, conflict – linked to patterns of marginalization and inequity along interrelated political, ethnic, geographic, and economic lines - has persisted in the country. These patterns of inequity and pressures for conflict have been perpetuated (and reproduced) in South Sudan's education system since the colonial period.

This research – commissioned and funded by UNICEF's Eastern and Southern Regional Office (ESARO) as part of its global Peacebuilding Education and Advocacy (PBEA) program – consisted of country studies in Kenya and South Sudan. The University of Sussex led the research in South Sudan, with the support of colleagues in the University of Juba, University of Glasgow, and Universitat de Barcelona.

Research methodology

This research draws on a conceptual framework that captures the economic, cultural, political, and social dimensions of education governance and inequality and their relation to conflict and peace. The framework combines dimensions of redistribution (equality and inclusion in education access, resources, and outcomes), recognition (affirmation of diversity in education structures, processes, and content), representation (participation in decision-making related to resource allocation and use), and reconciliation (dealing with the past and relations of horizontal and vertical trust).

This mixed-methods research involved quantitative and qualitative approaches. Quantitative analysis of education, census, and conflict data examined educational inequalities at the national and subnational levels. Qualitative interviews and focus group discussions were conducted with 217 government officials, education and peacebuilding partners, teachers, and students in seven sites in five states in South Sudan.

Key findings

Examining educational inequalities in South Sudan

Quantitative analysis of education, census, and conflict data revealed clear patterns of inequality in educational access, resources, and outcomes in South Sudan. Inequalities were particularly clear across different states and across counties within states. For example, states in the Greater Upper Nile region experienced low access to school facilities and resources as well as low enrolment in upper primary grades, while southern counties were generally characterized by more adequate school resources and outcomes compared to central and northern counties. An analysis of EMIS and conflict data reveals that states with the highest occurrence of conflict events since 2011 (Unity, Upper Nile, Jonglei) have the lowest provision of educational resources and the lowest percentage of students in upper primary, reflecting the relationship between the occurrence of conflict and inequalities in educational resources and outcomes. These concerns were reflected in qualitative interviews during which participants described the effects of geographic location, rural communities, socio-economic status, livelihoods activities (e.g. cattle-keeping), and older youth on education access, resources, and outcomes of inequalities. These were perceived as contributing to pressures for conflict.
Redistribution: Responses to inequities in education

In South Sudan, a range of policy initiatives and programs have been aimed at addressing different dimensions of educational inequity. However, specific policy strategies reflect the influence of global education agendas, with less attention to context-specific dimensions of inequity linked to conflict in South Sudan, including ‘pastoralist’ communities and older youth. These include policy strategies which focus on girls’ education and students with disabilities. While some key dimensions of inequity linked to conflict are considered in programs such as the Alternative Education System (AES) and vocational training, implementation in practice is limited. Gaps between policy and practice are linked to under-resourcing of the education sector, which received 5 per cent of the national budget in 2014-15, compared to nearly 50 per cent for rule of law and security sectors. The under-resourcing of the education sector is reflected in per-student spending, which was as low as SSP 143.5 (USD 48.5) at the primary level in 2014-15, as well as in poor teacher salaries. This is of particular concern given the current economic climate and global oil prices.

Budget allocations and expenditures also limit redistribution efforts to equity priorities within MoEST, which is reflected in the gap between stated policy priorities and budget allocations and outturns. For example, in 2014-15, AES received 1 per cent of the education budget and Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) received 0.5 per cent, although in 2013-14 only 21 per cent of AES allocations and no TVET allocations were disbursed. In this sense, approaches to the (re)distribution of opportunities and resources (including increasing support for private education services) on the part of both government and donors may be reproducing certain dimensions of inequity linked to conflict, along geographic, socio-economic, ethnic, and other lines. Resource allocation to subnational (state and county) levels, such as government budget transfers, reflects an equal but not necessarily equitable approach, with no systematic policy to redress existing and historically driven disparities across geographic areas. While school-based resource allocation by donors may be based on ‘conflict sensitive’ criteria, more attention should be paid to the potential role of allocation approaches in further entrenching patterns of marginalization and exclusion for particular communities.

Following the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), the expansion of education services was described as a key ‘peace dividend’ with little attention paid to how various approaches to the (re)distribution of opportunities and resources might reproduce inequity and contribute to future conflict. Failure to deliver these ‘dividends’ and meet community expectations has affected perceptions of government legitimacy and trust. This, in turn, has significant implications for confidence in political representation and vertical dimensions of cohesion (and reconciliation) between communities and authorities. (Re)distribution of education opportunities and resources in South Sudan has been hugely affected by the outbreak of violent conflict and associated humanitarian responses. This has raised concerns about (government) representation in education service provision, the emergence of a ‘parallel’ system of education in conflict-affected contexts, and geographic inequities in humanitarian-development resource allocation as well as perceptions of ‘conflict dividends’.

Recognition: Integration and social cohesion in education

The role of schools in bringing together members of diverse communities is often identified as a key contribution of the education sector. However, education services promoting unity and cohesion may not necessarily be equitable, and may in fact actually contribute to further inequity and exclusion. For example, there are geographic and socio-economic inequities in access to national secondary schools intended to bring together students from diverse communities. While responses to diversity and conflict represent opportunities to address the legacies of violence and contribute to (re)building both horizontal and vertical relations of trust, the ways in which policies and practices affirm or exclude diverse identities or forms of violence can reinforce patterns of inequity and contribute to pressures for continued conflict.

In South Sudan, education system policies and content have the potential to (re)produce patterns of cultural violence, linked to languages of instruction (including the selection of national languages), the validation of particular versions of history and citizenship, ministry narratives that dismiss or disrespect ‘bad’ or ‘backward’ communities or cultures, and the development of formal curricula that focus on ‘productive’ economic activities and are not aligned with the economic and cultural priorities of diverse communities. The cultural and economic irrelevance of education programs is of particular importance for cattle-keeping
communities, as over 85 per cent of South Sudan's population is engaged in livestock care (FAO, 2012). These patterns of inequity contribute to pressures for violence linked to political, economic, and cultural marginalization in terms of representation in decision-making, recognition of identities and livelihoods, and access to relevant education opportunities.

Teachers as well as students experience horizontal and vertical inequities that hinder recognition and cohesion. Fragmented recruitment and management approaches, 'localized' deployment in remote counties or payams, recruitment and promotion based on patronage networks, salary disparities between sectors (e.g. security versus education) and within education (e.g. national and state teachers, permanent and contract teachers), and language capacity differences (English versus Arabic) all contribute to inequities along geographic, ethnic, and socio-economic lines. These reflect broader political and economic dynamics contributing to pressures for conflict, including allocation of opportunities and resources to mobilize and reward connections, aside from the negative effects on vertical relations of trust in government.

**Representation: Education sector governance and management**

South Sudan's Local Government Act refers to a system of decentralized governance based on the devolution of power and authority to state and local governments. However, participant descriptions of sector management reflected a deconcentrated form of decentralization based on centralized policy decisions with limited political authority at the sub-national level and little space for representation of local education officials. Participants at the school and payam level felt that their voices and concerns are not clearly heard, and that they are often undermined by higher government levels and donors (for example, by bypassing payams when approaching schools). While school governing bodies play a key role in school-level management, teachers and youth suffer lack of representation in decision-making processes, which can increase their risk for involvement in violence when combined with inequalities in access to professional and economic opportunities.

Local opportunities for representation in administration and management of the education sector reflect wider structures and dynamics of political authority at sub-national levels, including appointments based on ethnic, military, or political connections. Apart from limiting trust in higher levels of government, these processes contribute to the reproduction of factional political systems, competition over access to political opportunities and resources, and grievances over exclusion from decision-making opportunities. Discussions with central and sub-national government officials reflected tensions between the perceived need for centralized policy development and management systems (contributing to state and nation-building processes), and the perceived importance of locally-responsive service delivery.

**Contributing to processes of reconciliation**

The elements of redistribution, recognition, and representation indicate that broader processes of reconciliation, which involves addressing the past and the effects of conflict as well as horizontal and vertical trust, take place through inter-personal exchange and engagement. In addition, processes of reconciliation should address the structural and historical grievances that underpin tensions and pressures for conflict, which are connected to relations between communities and between communities and authorities. While relations between groups may be facilitated by recognizing identity and diversity in education structures and content, vertical trust between communities or schools and government, and between levels of government, is negatively affected by inadequate redistribution of education opportunities and resources. Limited attention to vertical aspects of recognition, and limited opportunities for representation in decision-making also hinder the development of this trust. These elements of reconciliation are of critical importance when considering the connections between education governance, inequity, and peacebuilding. Limited vertical trust along with a perceived lack of power and representation in decision-making has significant implications for perceived government legitimacy on the part of communities as well as perceived marginalization based on demographics and geography. This potentially weakens state-society relations and perceived state legitimacy, and contributes to pressures for conflict.
Recommendations

The research findings outlined in this report illustrate the importance of addressing multiple dimensions of inequity and promoting peacebuilding objectives prior to, during, and after situations of violent conflict. The findings inform the following recommendations:

**Promoting equity in education through redistribution**

- Examine the potential for school management and student admissions approaches to address entrenched patterns of marginalization.
- Implement strategies to address existing imbalances and ensure equitable access to education opportunities.
- Adopt, or continue to use, conflict-sensitive criteria or guidelines to inform allocation of resources.
- Ensure that reasons for resource allocation decisions are clearly explained to key actors particularly schools, payam offices, and county departments.
- Adopt strategies such as quotas to address existing imbalances and ensure equitable access to education opportunities.
- Align salary reforms and advancement policies across and within sectors.
- Consider revising decentralized resource allocation policies, such as budget transfers, to promote equitable allocation.
- Continue strengthening local government capacity in budgeting, monitoring, transparency, and accountability.
- Support efforts to bridge humanitarian and development efforts in education.
- Increase the proportion of government and donor resources allocated to the education sector.

**Promoting equity in education through recognition**

- Support the establishment of local border schools (including boarding schools) between counties and payams.
- Ensure that curricula are relevant to the cultural and livelihoods systems of diverse communities.
- Respect and value diverse communities and their livelihoods, particularly for cattle-keeping communities.
- Involve members of marginalized communities, including cattle-keeping and rural communities, in education policy and curriculum development.
- Ensure clarity and transparency in the selection of national languages for instruction.
- Consider recognizing diverse experiences, narratives, and identities in history and citizenship education.
- Strengthen psychosocial support services in learning spaces at all levels.


**Promoting equity in education through representation**

- Consider county and payam representation in curriculum revision or development processes.
- Consider questions of voice and power when supporting decentralization efforts, moving beyond a purely technical focus.
- Strengthen community participation in education management and decision-making processes.
- Ensure that assessment findings or reports are communicated to stakeholders, particularly school managers, teachers, and students.
- Identify and implement strategies to target marginalized communities for teacher training, including women and rural and cattle-keeping communities.
- Design and implement initiatives to enhance teachers’ professional status and recognition from society and the wider government.
- Facilitate access to English language and literacy training for teachers.
- Identify and implement strategies to promote equitable youth representation in decision-making.
- Consider vertical dimensions of cohesion and reconciliation as well as horizontal inter-group relations.
- Strengthen the coordination of the Peacebuilding Reference Committee.

Beyond the specific policy recommendations outlined above, this study also points out that inequities perpetuated via education contribute to conflict. This goes beyond the more common concern that conflict merely disrupts education, as is often argued in Education in Emergencies (EiE) discourse. Addressing inequalities and structural issues around the management of education service delivery can work on broader political economy factors in conflict settings that contribute to conflict, and thus have an important preventative role. These inequalities take different forms, including the quality and relevance of education, and are often ignored by dominant global paradigms for inclusion and equity. Crucially, this study suggests that addressing inequalities and the factors which give rise to conflict is rooted in development programming, rather than responsive emergency programming. This speaks to the importance of mainstreaming conflict-sensitive and peacebuilding approaches to the entire portfolio of education programming, rather than restricting peacebuilding and education work to emergency and post-conflict settings.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction to the research

This study explores the relationship between education sector management, inequality, conflict and peacebuilding in South Sudan, and examines the linkages between inequities in education and broader political economy dynamics that contribute to conflict pressures. South Sudan gained independence in 2011, following decades of civil war. However, conflict has persisted in the country reflecting political economy dynamics which give rise to marginalization and inequality along interrelated political, ethnic, geographic, and economic lines. These dynamics are also reflected in recent outbreaks of violence, most notably ongoing fighting and associated violence against civilians that broke out between government and opposition forces in 2013. Patterns of political, economic, geographical, and cultural inequality have been perpetuated (and reproduced) in the education system in South Sudan since the colonial period, contributing to feelings of resentment, alienation, and exclusion, which act as drivers of conflict. While national and international actors have developed a range of peacebuilding strategies to promote ‘governance reform’ to respond to prior and current violence, linkages of such reforms to the education sector are weak, despite the historical connections between education and inequality, the political economy, and violence.

In this context, this study seeks to understand how and in what ways education sector management, and the education system itself, is a contributing or mitigating factor in conflict and how better education sector management might facilitate ‘governance reform’ to support sustainable peace and development processes in South Sudan. While the education system is often marginalized in both peace-making and peacebuilding processes (Novelli & Smith, 2011), there is growing evidence that educational inequality can be a driver of conflict (FHI 360, 2015) and should therefore be taken more seriously. The education system itself, as a key social service, can both promote and undermine sustainable peacebuilding processes (Bush & Saltarelli, 2000; Davies, 2004b; Smith, 2005), and access to quality education both as a basic human right and a means to fulfilling other rights (Sen, 1999). While education can be a powerful driver of economic growth and social mobility (Becker 1964; Schultz, 1961), it can also be a driver of social stratification and a vehicle for social reproduction and elite closure, and can undermine social cohesion and reconciliation (Smith, 2005). The key issue at stake is not merely how much in terms of resources is spent on education (although this is important) but where, on what, and with what effects.

While a strong body of literature has examined relationships between education and conflict, little attention has been given to the linkages between governance, political economy, and education sector management. This study seeks to fill this gap by exploring questions on the coordination and management of the education sector including policies and priorities, funding, implementation, and its effects. In an increasingly globalized and interconnected world, this study also recognises that research on education governance cannot begin and end within the borders of the nation state but must also explore the complex roles of regional and global actors in shaping national educational agendas. This study’s mixed method approach combines quantitative analysis of available education data with qualitative interviews and focus groups amongst key constituencies. The study builds on these insights by exploring education sector management and its relationship to governance, inequality, conflict, and peacebuilding in two country case studies: Kenya and South Sudan. The research in South Sudan was led by the University of Sussex and supported by colleagues in the University of Juba, University of Glasgow, and Universitat de Barcelona. The research was funded and commissioned by UNICEF’s Eastern and Southern Regional Office (ESARO), as part of their global Peacebuilding Education and Advocacy (PBEA) program.

1.2 Key concepts and definitions

A number of key conceptual tools are central to this research including the inter-connected concepts of governance, equity and inequality, social cohesion, and peacebuilding. This section of the report lays out working definitions of some of the key research concepts, and outlines the theoretical and analytical framework that has guided the research.
**Governance in education**

Governance refers to the sum of all concurrent forms of collective regulation of social issues: from the institutionalized self-regulation of civil society and the diverse forms of cooperation among state and private actors, to the action of sovereign state agents (Mayntz, 2003: 66). Aragon and Vegas (2009) highlight two distinctive aspects of definitions of governance. The first concerns political control of a system and the context this creates, with governance defined in terms of the policy-making process (e.g., how the rules of a political regime provide the context for policy-making). The second aspect refers more to technical capacity and the ability to implement policies and deliver and manage services (Smith, 2010, 2014). This study concerns both of these aspects: the politics and process of education sector governance.

A third and more analytical aspect of governance considers ‘governance’ as a concept of our time, reflecting a shift from government to governance, and for some towards ‘global governance’ (Rosenau & Czempiel, 1992). This involves a shift from the idea of the government as the unitary source of educational governance (that funds, provides, regulates, and owns the education system) towards a more ‘coordinating’ and facilitating role involving a range of actors operating at multiple geographical scales. This can be traced to the shift from Keynesian to neoliberal political economy approaches that have dominated international development debates since the 1980s (Robertson et al., 2006). Dale (2005) sees this as the scalar and functional division of education governance, which necessitates exploration of the supra-national or international, national, and sub-national levels. It also requires exploration of governance activities: funding, provision, regulation, and ownership, and the actors and institutions (state, market, community, and household) responsible for carrying them out. Analysis of educational governance reflects on who is doing what, where, with what outcomes, and for whom. This requires sensitivity towards the multi-scalar and functional division of these processes in contemporary contexts. This study adopts a broad view of the education sector, considering both formal and non-formal (alternative) education at primary and secondary levels.

**Equity and inequality in education**

Horizontal inequities have been identified as important indicators for conflict outbreak (Cederman et al., 2011; Stewart, 2010). For UNICEF, equity is a guiding principle and implies “that all children have an opportunity to survive, develop and reach their full potential without discrimination, bias or favouritism […] regardless of gender, race, religious beliefs, income, physical attributes, geographical location or other status” (UNICEF, 2011). UNICEF’s equity-focused approach to development “addresses the economic and social barriers that prevent access to services, focusing on the most vulnerable sectors and thus contributing to a fairer distribution of resources and benefits. It helps to level the playing field” (2012b: 8).

In this sense, education policies and programs aim to address root causes of inequality, to ensure the fundamental rights of all children, particularly those experiencing deprivation, including access to the basic protections and services necessary for survival and development. In discussions of equity and inequality, there are tensions over the principle of equality of opportunity and provision, versus targeted redress of unequal social location. For example, while a version of equity might be achieved through ensuring that all schools receive the same funding (based on pupil numbers), for others this would be seen as inequitable precisely because some schools are located in more socially deprived locations and face more difficult challenges than others and therefore should be prioritized. Reflecting UNICEF’s view of equity, Bourdieu (2008: 36) notes that,

*To favour the most favoured and disfavour the most disfavoured, all that is necessary and sufficient is for the school to ignore in the content and teaching it transmits, in the methods and techniques of transmission and the criteria of judgement it deploys, the cultural inequalities that divide children from different social classes. In other words, by treating all students, however much they differ, as equal in rights and duties, the educational system actually gives its sanction to the initial inequality.*

In seeking equity in education, the targeted distribution of resources might therefore be necessary to redress historical inequalities. This has been the underlying argument for policy measures such as affirmative action and positive discrimination. Analysis of equity in education thus needs to be grounded in the contextual analysis of the country, existing socio-economic, cultural, political, and religious inequalities, and the resources, policies, and practices aimed at addressing them. While the economic dimensions of inequalities or redistribution, are important, there are also other dimensions of inequality that require attention. Recognition refers to the ways in which culturally-related and identity-based issues manifest themselves,
while representation concerns a sense of isolation from decision-making spheres. As outlined by Nancy Fraser (1995, 2005), these reflect the ways in which different dimensions of inequity and inequality manifest themselves and highlight the need for a holistic strategy for redressing them.

**Social cohesion**

Social cohesion, like many key development concepts, is contested and open to a variety of interpretations (see Jenson, 2010). The Council of Europe defines social cohesion as “the capacity of a society to ensure the welfare of all its members, minimize disparities and avoid polarisation. A cohesive society is a mutually supportive community of free individuals pursuing these common goals by democratic means.” This definition captures two key aspects of many definitions: ‘inequalities’ and ‘social relations and ties’ (Berger-Schmitt, 2002: 404-5). The UNICEF Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy Program (PBEA) captures the social and structural dimensions of social cohesion, defining it as “the quality of coexistence between the multiple groups that operate within a society [...] along the dimensions of mutual respect and trust, shared values and social participation, life satisfaction and happiness as well as structural equity and social justice” (UNICEF, 2014).

Social cohesion is a societal rather than individual property based on the promotion of positive relationships, trust, solidarity, inclusion, collectivity, and common purpose. Social cohesion refers not only to individual or communal attitudes and relations (horizontal dimensions), but also involves structural aspects of governance (vertical dimensions) that affect connections between communities or civil society and the state (Colletta & Cullen, 2000; Friedkin, 2004). Social cohesion is linked to social justice and equity. Higher income inequality has been associated with lower social cohesion, while more equitable societies tend to have greater social and political trust and less violence and crime (Pickett & Wilkinson, 2010). Educational equality has been linked with greater social cohesion across a number of measures, with educational inequality positively correlated with violent crime and political unrest and negatively correlated with political and civil liberties (Green et al., 2006). Improving social cohesion requires addressing structural, inter-personal, and inter-group domains. In this sense, social cohesion can sometimes be used interchangeably with the concept of peacebuilding in conflict-affected contexts, as a kind of synonym for the aspirational production of a society with strong social inclusion, social capital, and social mobility (see OECD, 2012). In the UNICEF PBEA program, social cohesion has been used in several contexts as a proxy for peacebuilding, due to local sensitivities related to peace or peacebuilding language in some of the countries in which the PBEA operates.

**Peacebuilding**

While this study recognizes that there are multiple interpretations of the term ‘peacebuilding’, the framework herein draws on a conceptualization that focuses on the need for core transformations for post-conflict societies to move towards sustainable peace. Key post-conflict transformations necessary to produce sustainable peace, or positive peace, as Galtung (1976) calls it, requires going beyond the mere cessation of violence (negative peace) in order to address the root causes of violent conflict. This involves addressing both drivers and legacies of conflict and the promotion of both social justice and cohesion by addressing injustices and bringing people and communities together. This is in line with a range of contemporary theories of war and conflict (Stewart et al., 2005, 2010; Cramer, 2005), which see horizontal and vertical inequalities as drivers of conflict. Addressing these inequalities in their different economic, cultural and political dimensions supports the promotion of social cohesion whereby trust, solidarity, and a sense of collectivity and common purpose are strengthened. Such an approach is also highly relevant in fragile contexts where the risks of conflict are significant.

This research also refers to the concept of ‘conflict sensitivity’ in discussing peacebuilding approaches in the education sector. Drawing on UNICEF PBEA definitions (UNICEF ESARO, 2015), ‘conflict sensitivity’ involves explicitly addressing factors which contribute to violent conflict, mitigating the spread of conflict, supporting conflict-affected communities in dealing with trauma, and protecting vulnerable children and adolescents. However, conflict sensitivity has often been associated with humanitarian (‘emergency’) responses, which may limit analysis of the connections between education sector governance or management and the political, economic, social, and cultural dimensions of broader conflict and peacebuilding processes.

---

1 ‘Structural’ dimensions refer to institutional and political structures and patterns of societal relations and distribution of power and resources
Relationship between education, inequality, conflict, and peacebuilding

Within conflict studies, there has been a long and heated debate on the relationship between inequality and conflict. The debate is often framed in terms of greed versus grievance, which suggests that wars are driven less by justified ‘grievances’ and more by personal and collective ‘greed’ (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004). Humans are viewed as ‘economic agents’ making cost-benefit calculations and trying to maximize returns on engagement in violent conflict. Therefore, the route to peace and security is not through addressing inequality and structural exclusion, but through increasing the cost of access to resources for violent actors. While ‘greed’ may play a role in shaping, exacerbating, and reproducing conflict, a strong critique of this work argues that horizontal inequalities (between groups) are important indicators for conflict outbreak (Stewart, 2010), arguments supported by strong econometric evidence (Cederman et al., 2011). Horizontal inequalities, often related to ethnicity, tribe, or religion, involve a range of dimensions, as outlined in Table 1.

Table 1: Dimensions of horizontal inequality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic dimensions</th>
<th>Access resources, assets, employment (e.g. government, private), and income</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political dimensions</td>
<td>Access to political power and representation at all levels (e.g. government, local authorities, armed forces)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social dimensions</td>
<td>Access to public services (e.g. education, health, housing, water)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural dimensions</td>
<td>Recognition and respect for difference and identity (e.g. ethnicity, religion, language)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Stewart, 2010

In armed conflicts, real or perceived horizontal inequalities or injustice can provide a catalyst for group mobilization and uprisings. While a significant body of research has examined the role of education in conflict, there is limited research on the relationship between education and inequality and the manner in which it gives rise to violent conflict. Recent quantitative research drawing on two international education and conflict datasets (FHI 360, 2015) demonstrates a robust and consistent relationship, across five decades, between higher inequality in educational attainment between ethnic and religious groups, and the likelihood that a country will experience violent conflict. However, this research is less able to identify causal mechanisms (i.e. how inequities are perpetuated or reproduced via education sector management and service delivery). Therefore, as the authors note in their conclusions, there is a need to explore multiple dimensions of inequality beyond just educational outcomes, as well as the different ways in which the education system might contribute to or alleviate conflict. In this sense, the current research begins where this previous study ends, delving deeper into the broad nature of inequalities in education, the management of education and its relationship to governance, including the allocation of resources and development of policies, as well as the possible ways that education systems might address these inequalities and political economies that drive violent conflict.

This research distinguishes between concepts of ‘inequality’ and ‘inequity’. ‘Inequality’ is used to refer to measurement or analysis of differences between individuals and social groups, while ‘inequity’ is used to examine the implications of these inequalities for social justice. The term ‘inequity’ is used in quantitative data analysis, while ‘inequity’ is used when discussing structural or systemic factors shaping and perpetuating inequalities.

1.3 The 4Rs theoretical and analytical framework

The framework used in this study builds on some of the above concepts and thoughts. It develops an analytical and normative approach that seeks to capture the multiple economic, cultural, political, and social dimensions of inequality in education, and the ways in which these might relate to conflict and peace (see Novelli, Lopes Cardozo, & Smith, 2015). The framework combines four dimensions of recognition, redistribution, representation, and reconciliation, linking Fraser’s (1995, 2005) work on social justice with the peacebuilding and reconciliation work of Galtung (1976), Lederach (1995, 1997), and others, to explore what sustainable peace and development might look like in post-conflict environments. This approach has
many parallels with UNICEF’s equity approach (see Epstein, 2010), which emphasises inclusion, relevance and participation – concepts which overlap with redistribution, recognition and representation respectively, whilst adding reconciliation, which is vital in conflict-affected contexts.

This examination of inequalities in the education system seeks to capture the interconnected dimensions of these ‘4Rs’:

- Redistribution concerns equity and non-discrimination in education access, resources, and outcomes for different groups in society, particularly marginalized and disadvantaged groups (thus addressing the ‘access’ dimensions of equity).

- Recognition concerns respect for and affirmation of diversity and identities in education structures, processes, and content, in terms of gender, language, politics, religion, ethnicity, culture, and ability (thus addressing the ‘cultural’ dimensions of equity).

- Representation concerns participation, at all levels of the education system, in governance and decision-making related to the allocation, use, and distribution of human and material resources. This addresses the ‘political’ dimensions of equity.

- Reconciliation involves dealing with past events, injustices, and material and psychosocial effects of conflict, as well as developing relationships and trust.

The framework provides a useful tool for analyzing the extent to which education can support cross-sectorial programming for conflict transformation in terms of redistribution, recognition, representation, and reconciliation. It can also be used as an analytical tool in the education sector, as outlined in Table 2.

Table 2: Working in the Education Sector: Analysing Education Systems Using the 4Rs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Redistributing (addressing inequities)</th>
<th>Vertical and horizontal inequalities in education inputs, resources, and outcomes (quantitative data)</th>
<th>Distributive effects of macro education reforms or policies (e.g. impact of decentralization and privatization on different groups and conflict dynamics)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recognizing (respecting difference, addressing cultural equity)</td>
<td>Policies on language of instruction</td>
<td>Recognition of cultural diversity and religious identity in curriculum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Citizenship and civic education as a means of state-building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>‘Relevance’ of curriculum to diverse communities and local livelihoods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Addressing violence based on difference in educational settings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representing (encouraging participation, addressing political equity)</td>
<td>Participation (local, national, global) in education policy and reforms</td>
<td>Political control and representation through education administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>School-based management and decision-making (teachers, parents, students)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Support for fundamental freedoms in the education system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconciling (dealing with injustices)</td>
<td>Addressing historical and contemporary injustices linked to conflict</td>
<td>Integration and segregation in education systems (e.g. common institutions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Teaching about the past and its relevance to the present and future</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Vertical trust in schools and education system, and horizontal trust between identity-based groups</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1.4 Research questions and hypothesis

This research is guided by three primary questions:

1. To what extent is educational management generating equity or inequities in education in South Sudan?

2. In what ways is, or might, the governance of education contribute to ‘sustainable peace and development’ in South Sudan?

3. How do inequities perpetuated and/or produced via education reflect broader dynamics of political economy that contribute to violent conflict in South Sudan?

Following these guiding questions, a number of sub-questions were identified:

- What are the dimensions and main drivers of educational inequity in the country?
- How do these inequities relate to recognized drivers of conflict in the country?
- How do key decision-makers (global, national, local) see the relationship between educational inequity and violent conflict, and seek to address educational inequities?
- What are the effects of key educational reforms (e.g. decentralization, privatization) and policies on educational inequities and sustainable peace and development?
- What types of educational governance reforms might contribute to addressing educational inequities and to ‘inclusive’ state-building and sustainable peace and development?

This research is based on the hypothesis that inequities perpetuated and produced through the governance of the education system can contribute to pressures for conflict, reflecting broader political and economic dynamics. Addressing inequities in education management and delivery can thus support peacebuilding as well as broader political economy reform.

1.5 Structure of the report

This research report explores the ways the management and governance of education services in South Sudan is addressing or redressing inequity in its multiple dimensions (the 4Rs) and therefore promoting or undermining equity, social cohesion, and sustainable peace and development. Chapter 2 describes the research methods, while Chapter 3 provides a background to the research including conflict dynamics and an overview of South Sudan’s education system. Chapter 4 presents qualitative and quantitative findings on educational inequities including key dimensions of inequity linked to conflict. Chapter 5 outlines some key policy and program responses to aspects of inequity and redistribution, and their implementation in practice. Chapter 6 presents findings on vertical and horizontal dimensions of recognition and social cohesion in the education sector, reflected in approaches to school diversity, curriculum relevance, and equity in teaching. Chapter 7 discusses representation in education governance and management, including policy approaches to decentralization and school-based management. Finally, Chapter 8 provides conclusions and recommendations for policy and practice.
CHAPTER 2. RESEARCH METHODS

2.1 Data collection approach

This mixed methods study used both qualitative and quantitative approaches drawing on a range of data sources including first-hand discussions with diverse education and peacebuilding stakeholders in South Sudan, existing statistical datasets, and policy documents. This facilitated the inclusion of multiple perspectives and the examination of similarities and differences between different data sources. Existing literature on education governance in South Sudan was reviewed between September and November 2014 and a contextualised political economy and conflict analysis and overview of education sector inequalities as well as policy and program responses based on the review of government and donor policy and strategy documents, reports, academic literature, and education statistics. Following the desk review and initial visit to Juba in November 2014, the research team developed a broad methodological framework outlining key education governance and policy areas:

1. Educational inequalities (e.g., access, resources, outcomes)
2. Macro reforms (e.g., decentralization, privatization)
3. Horizontal and vertical dimensions of integration and social cohesion
4. Teacher policies and practices
5. Youth policies and programs
6. Context-specific issues (e.g., refugees and internally-displaced persons (IDPs), links to peace and reconciliation processes)

Quantitative analysis of secondary statistical data

Quantitative data analysis provided information on the nature and trends of educational inequalities at the national and subnational (state and county) level in South Sudan between 2009 and 2013. Existing statistical micro-data on education, socioeconomic conditions, and conflict was analyzed with South Sudan’s Education Management Information System (EMIS)\(^2\) providing data on educational access, resources, and outcomes for 2009-2013 (the most recent validated data available at the time of publication). In 2013, EMIS coverage rates\(^3\) were above 90 per cent for both primary and secondary schools (see Table 3). Population and socioeconomic data were obtained from the fifth Sudan Population and Housing Census of 2008 and population projections of the South Sudan National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). However, national and subnational EMIS trends must be interpreted with caution: key indicators on education access might be affected by political instability and conflict as well as under-estimation of 2008\(^4\) population census data (on which enrolment rate estimates are based) and potential over-estimation of enrolment in EMIS data.\(^5\) Conflict data for 2011-2014 at both the state and county level were obtained from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) and the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project (ACLED).\(^6\) While EMIS and census data precede the current civil war (with 2014 and 2015 EMIS data unavailable at the time of analysis), identified inequities reveal social, political, economic, and cultural pressures potentially linked to the emergence of the current conflict.

\(^2\) EMIS data was extracted in November 2014 from the MoEST website ([http://www.southsudanemis.org/data](http://www.southsudanemis.org/data)). Inconsistencies in the available data were clarified with support from EMIS personnel.

\(^3\) Coverage rate refers to the percentage of known schools (schools identified and entered into the EMIS database) reached and accounted for in the data (MoEST, 2014a).

\(^4\) Census data was extracted in January 2015 from the Minnesota Population Center IPUMS website ([https://international.ipums.org/international/](https://international.ipums.org/international/)), the world’s largest archive of publicly available census microdata.

\(^5\) Census and EMIS data limitations were identified during discussions with NBS and MoEST representatives, respectively. 2008 population census under-estimations are due to huge population movement during the data collection period, with the return of South Sudanese from neighbouring countries. School managers or local authorities may inflate EMIS student enrolment figures in order to obtain additional teachers and resources.

\(^6\) UCDP data was extracted in March 2015 from the UCDP website ([http://www.ucdp.uu.se/](http://www.ucdp.uu.se/)), which provides annual data on state-based armed conflict, non-state conflict, and one-sided violence. ACLED Version 5 data was extracted in May 2015 from the ACLED website ([http://www.acleddata.com/data](http://www.acleddata.com/data)), which provides event data on political violence between state and non-state actors.
Table 3. EMIS coverage rate by education sector for 2009-13

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Primary education</th>
<th>Secondary education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of schools</td>
<td>3,221</td>
<td>3,766</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coverage rate (%)</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>98.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: EMIS 2009, 2013 (MoEST, 2015e)

Qualitative data collection

Qualitative data collection took place between December 2014 and August 2015, through in-depth interviews and focus group discussions with approximately 200 participants. National level, in-depth interviews were conducted with officials from various MoEST directorates and other relevant ministries (e.g. MoCYS, MoGCSW), and representatives of international and national education and peacebuilding actors. In sub-national sites, interviews and group discussions were conducted with officials from state ministries of education and county and payam education offices, national and international education and peacebuilding actors, youth organisations, and primary and secondary school managers, teachers, PTA members, and students (see Table 4). Prior to data collection, ethical approval was obtained from the University of Sussex Social Sciences, Arts and Humanities Cross-School Research Ethics Committee. South Sudan’s central MoEST approved the study as part of the country research clearance process, and researchers adhered to UNICEF’s Ethical Guidelines on research with children. Informed consent, either written or verbal, was obtained from participants after explaining measures to protect their confidentiality and anonymity (see Appendix 4 for data collection documents). No identifying information (e.g. name, position, location) is included in this report or shared with any person outside the research team.

Table 4. Summary of research participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participants</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central MoEST officials</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other ministry officials</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State MoEST officials</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>County education officials</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Payam education officials</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School managers</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers, union representatives, and PTA members</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students and youth representatives</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education partner representatives</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil society representatives</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacebuilding actors</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>217</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.2 Research sites

Data collection sites were selected with the aim of representing diverse geographic, demographic, and conflict contexts, although initial site selection as well as follow-up visits to certain sites was affected by on-going violence during the fieldwork period. Data was collected from seven sites in five states: Juba in Central Equatoria state (CES), Yambio in Western Equatoria state (WES), Wau in Western Bahr el Ghazal state (WBG), Kuajok and Tonj East in Warrap state (WS), and Malakal and Wau Shilluk in Upper Nile state (UNS) (see Figure 1 for a map of South Sudan). These represent diverse geographic, demographic, and conflict contexts, reflecting a range of perspectives and experiences of inequality, conflict, and education. Table 5 provides some descriptive figures illustrating differences in poverty, conflict events, education access and resources, and ethnicity in the study states and counties, although correlations between these indicators are not analyzed. Detailed descriptions of the research sites are located in Appendix 1.

Figure 1: Map of South Sudan
Table 5. County profiles for selected research sites

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>County</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Ethnic majority</th>
<th>Poverty rate 2008</th>
<th># conflict events 2011-14</th>
<th>Gender parity index</th>
<th>Student-teacher ratio</th>
<th>Student-class ratio</th>
<th>Drinking water access</th>
<th>Latrine access</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Juba</td>
<td>CES</td>
<td>Bari</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>56.6</td>
<td>61.4</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>70.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malakal</td>
<td>UNS</td>
<td>Shilluk</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>61.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maiwut</td>
<td>UNS</td>
<td>Nuer</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>111.6</td>
<td>502</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>15.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gogrial</td>
<td>WS</td>
<td>Dinka</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>123.4</td>
<td>50.4</td>
<td>47.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tonj</td>
<td>WS</td>
<td>Dinka</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>45.6</td>
<td>218.4</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>21.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wau</td>
<td>WBG</td>
<td>Fertit, Jur-Chol</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>71.7</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>58.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yambio</td>
<td>WES</td>
<td>Azande</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>404</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>63.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 2008 Census (Minnesota Population Center, 2015), EMIS (MoEST, 2015e), ACLED (Raleigh et al., 2010)

Data analysis and validation

Drawing on a template coding approach, the field researcher analyzed qualitative data, including interview transcripts and notes. Themes and sub-themes were identified through the analysis of a sample of data, and were then used to organize the remaining data for more in-depth analysis (see Crabtree & Miller, 1999). From April to August 2015, reflections on the data were shared during discussions with UNICEF, MoEST, and University of Juba representatives. Final research findings and recommendations were reviewed during two national validation workshops held in August 2015 and feedback obtained from ministry and partner representatives during a workshop held in collaboration with UNICEF, MoEST, civil society and university (faculty and student) representatives, the Centre for Peace and Development Studies, and the University of Juba. The research report was revised based on feedback from validation workshops, and was finalized following a peer review process involving the University of Sussex, University of Juba, UNICEF South Sudan, and UNICEF ESARO.

2.3 Research partnerships and capacity development

Fieldwork for this study would not have been possible without the support of the UNICEF South Sudan Country Office and MoEST, at both the national and state level. Both institutions facilitated access to research sites and research participants, and also provided feedback on emerging findings during the validation process. The Centre for Peace and Development Studies at the University of Juba was also a key research partner and provided feedback and support during the data analysis and validation processes.

Training workshops on qualitative and quantitative research approaches were facilitated in order to contribute to national-level capacity development as part of the research process, and following a request for support from MoEST’s Peacebuilding Reference Committee. A qualitative research training workshop organized in collaboration with MoEST representatives and facilitated by the University of Sussex field researcher and UNICEF South Sudan’s PBEA personnel was held in Juba in July 2015. Participants included MoEST and MoCYS representatives from the Peacebuilding Reference Committee and officials from facilitating knowledge exchange between the research team and MoEST, and exploring different ways in which ministry officials in different directorates can engage in policy-oriented research activities.

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7 According to the 2008 Sudan Population and Housing Census, the poverty rate refers to the estimated percentage of the population in each county or state with per person consumption below the poverty line (72.9 Sudanese pounds, SDG) (NBS, 2012).
2.4 Research limitations

Certain limitations should be noted when considering the research findings. This research aims to present a comprehensive description and discussion of how education sector management and governance contributes to inequality and conflict as well as to equity and peacebuilding in South Sudan. The validity of the data is strengthened by the triangulation of data and methods through the inclusion of diverse perspectives (e.g. government officials, partners, teachers, students) across multiple sites and the use of multiple data collection methods, including individual interviews, group discussions, literature and policy review, and secondary quantitative analysis. This research is not an assessment or evaluation of the outcomes of particular education policies or programs.

While the research sites represent diverse geographic, demographic, and conflict contexts, site selection was affected by ongoing violence during the fieldwork period. Data was collected in one state (Upper Nile) affected by ongoing government-opposition violence involving government representatives and members of displaced communities, but for security reasons, it was not possible to visit opposition-held areas. Interviews with representatives of organisations working in opposition-held communities provided some insight into challenges faced. Education service provision and governance in these areas is likely markedly different from other areas in South Sudan.

It is important to note that the significant diversity of experiences and perspectives across and within communities in South Sudan has shaped the responses provided by research participants and also limited the generalizability of findings. Perceptions, experiences, and expectations of education services may differ widely between ethnic, linguistic, religious, geographic, or livelihoods communities between South Sudanese who have returned from East Africa, Sudan, North America, or Europe, and those who remained in South Sudan prior to and after the CPA and independence. Additionally, as in all research, it is possible that some participants may have provided the answers that they thought the researchers expected. In order to address this limitation, measures taken to ensure confidentiality and anonymity were explained to each participant, and efforts were made to maximize their sense of safety and comfort during interviews (for example, taking hand-written notes rather than audio-recording the interview if a participant expressed any hesitation about recording).

This report does not quantify participant responses by indicating the number or percentage of participants who raised a particular point. While this can be of interest when examining qualitative research results, calculating the frequency of responses across both individual interviews and group discussions involving multiple individuals, and across semi-structured interviews and discussions during which different questions were discussed, presented challenges. Ultimately, even concerns or suggestions raised by one or two participants are considered to be of value and significance in the context of this research. Efforts were made to note when particular points were raised by broader participant sub-groups, such as students, teachers, payam or county officials, and so on, and to note the state in which participants raising location-specific points were based, although without providing information that could enable participant identification.
CHAPTER 3. CONFLICT, PEACEBUILDING, AND EDUCATION IN SOUTH SUDAN

3.1 Chapter introduction

This chapter provides the context for the research in South Sudan, describing historical and current conflict dynamics, approaches to governance and social services in peacebuilding processes, and the history of the education system in South Sudan, including the use of education as a mechanism of colonial and post-colonial governance and exclusion. The current structure, policy context, and financing of the education system are also examined, providing some background to the broader political and economic dynamics reflected in the education sector.

3.2 Conflict and peacebuilding in South Sudan

History of conflict in South Sudan

The history of violent conflict in South Sudan is clearly linked to patterns of marginalization, exploitation, and inequity. From 1899 to 1955, during Sudan’s Anglo-Egyptian colonial period, development favoured the north, with minimal administrative presence, infrastructure, or resources in the south. Following Sudan’s independence in 1956, the south was largely excluded from political processes (Johnson, 2003; Young, 2012). The northern government attempted to legitimize and enforce state control and ‘national’ identity through the imposition of Arabic language and Islamic religion and law. In the 1960s and 1980s, ties with Arab states, including Egypt and Saudi Arabia, influenced the promotion of Islamist and Arab nationalist ideologies (Ayers, 2010; Deng, 1995; de Waal, 2007; Johnson, 2003; Medani, 2012). Armed conflict broke out between north and south in 1955 following the Anyanya I rebellion among southern soldiers, linked to interconnected factors including political exclusion, economic marginalization, and southern exclusion from ‘national’ identity (Deng, 1995; de Waal, 2007; Rolandsen, 2011; Young, 2012). The politicization and mobilization of religious, ethnic, and geographic identity in conflict over political and economic power, resources, and opportunities (Ayers, 2010; Johnson, 2003) also played a role in the conflict.

The signing of the 1972 Addis Ababa agreement resulted in the creation of an autonomous southern region (encompassing the Greater Bahr el Ghazal, Equatoria, and Upper Nile regions) and some (limited) reform and development (Young, 2012). The northern government revoked the agreement in 1983 following the discovery oil in the south, triggering armed rebellion in the south (Medani, 2012; Young, 2012). The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), led by Dr John Garang, emerged as the dominant rebel force, fighting for control of land and oil resources in the south and north/south border areas. From the 1990s, the United States supported the SPLM/A, influenced by security and counter-terrorism agendas (with Sudan considered a centre of ‘Islamism’ in the Horn of Africa), economic interests (including oil), and evangelical Christian lobbies, and provided military support to SPLM/A allies such as Ethiopia and Uganda (Autesserre, 2002; Ayers, 2010; de Waal, 2004; Young, 2012). Fighting also occurred between forces within the south, including between SPLM/A factions that split in the early 1990s due to disagreement over leadership and political agendas. Armed groups targeted civilians through mass killings, often along ethnic lines, and also diverted or blocked humanitarian aid from opposition areas (Autesserre, 2002; de Waal, 2013; Young, 2012).

In 2005, following decades of war during which an estimated 2.5 million people died and 4.6 million were displaced (Knopf, 2013), the Government of Sudan and SPLM/A signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which focused on power sharing, oil revenue, and security arrangements during a six-year transitional period. The process was led by the regional Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), which includes Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda, and was supported and influenced by the US and allies Britain and Norway. The CPA legitimized the SPLM as the ruling party and the SPLA as the official army, while excluding other actors and paying limited attention to justice, human rights, and reconciliation (Rolandsen, 2011; Selby, 2013; Young, 2012). This represented the constitution of a political authority based on power imbalances (one-party dominance), heavily centralized authority, and militarized administrative institutions characterized by coercion and force rather than trust (African Union, 2014; De Waal, 2014; Knopf, 2013). This has influenced existing governance structures, including within the education sector.
The semi-autonomous Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) was formed in 2005, and the Government of the Republic of South Sudan (GRSS) established when South Sudan became independent following the 2011 referendum. Tensions between Sudan and South Sudan persist, linked to border demarcation and security, oil revenues (South Sudanese oil is exported through Sudanese pipelines), citizenship rights, cross-border population movement (and associated conflict involving ‘pastoralist’ communities), and mutual accusations of support to rebel forces (Bennett et al., 2010; Jok, 2013; Kimenyi, 2012). North-south conflict was linked to internal conflict dynamics in the south, which have persisted since the CPA, including the mobilization of ethnic communities by different SPLM/A factions (and other southern forces) and mass violence against civilians, often along ethnic lines (Ayers, 2010; Jok, 2013; Young, 2012).

Current conflict dynamics

Violent conflict has persisted across South Sudan since the CPA, including fighting between government and non-state ‘rebel’ forces, and inter-group or communal conflict, including between ‘pastoralist’ communities. Tensions at both the national and local level are linked to inequitable distribution of government power and resources (especially oil revenues), border demarcation, economic and natural resource access and control, and inadequate services and economic opportunities (Bennett et al., 2010; Knopf, 2013; Pedersen & Bazilian, 2014; Schomerus & Allen, 2010; Sudd Institute, 2014; Young, 2012). Increased pressures on land, social services, and economic opportunities have resulted from the post-CPA return of over 1.5 million South Sudanese from neighbouring countries as well as internal displacement due to internal conflict and natural crises occurring since 2005 (Bennett et al., 2010; Pantuliano et al., 2008). Anger and trauma are also linked to violence against civilians perpetrated by southern groups (including SPLM/A factions) during the previous civil war, which were not addressed by the CPA (HRW, 2014).

Conflict between government and opposition forces has persisted in South Sudan since 2005 (ACLED, 2015). Tensions have persisted in South Sudan between southern militia (rebel) leaders and the SPLM/A over concerns about political, geographic, and ethnic representation, which were not effectively addressed by the CPA (Knopf, 2013; Sudd Institute, 2014). Following the CPA and independence, the government has reached agreements with certain rebel groups and leaders (such as the David Yau Yau’s South Sudan Democratic Movement/Army-Cobra Faction in Jonglei state), including agreements on administrative control and/or integration into the SPLA (ICG, 2014; Sudd Institute, 2014).

In mid-2013, President Salva Kiir dismissed Vice President Riek Machar, as well as other key government and party figures including the SPLM Secretary General. This was prompted by competition for party leadership ahead of elections scheduled for 2015 (Knopf, 2013; Rolandsen, 2015; Sudd Institute, 2014). Violence broke out in Juba, the national capital, in December 2013, and quickly spread to other states, primarily north-eastern Unity, Upper Nile, and Jonglei states. Some blame the violence on an attempted coup while others refer to attempts to silence government rivals (ICG, 2014), along with weak state institutions, power imbalances, and militarisation of government institutions (African Union, 2014), illustrating the effects of the post-CPA type of political authority on current conflict. While the conflict involves some ethnic dimensions with Dinka forces largely loyal to Kiir and many Nuer forces joining Machar’s SPLM-In Opposition (SPLM-IO), it is also rooted in competition for power and long-standing divisions within the SPLM/A and members of diverse ethnic groups, who have been mobilized by government and opposition forces. (In the 1990s, Machar headed a faction that split from, and later re-joined, the SPLM/A). Numerous armed groups are active in different states – some are aligned with government or opposition forces, and some are not (ICG, 2014; Johnson, 2014; Rolandsen, 2015; Sudd Institute, 2014).

Armed conflict concentrated in the oil-rich Upper Nile and Unity states continues where armed forces have been fighting for the control of state capitals and oil-producing areas. Civilians (including children) have been targeted through abductions, destruction of villages, sexual violence, and killings, including on the basis of ethnic and political allegiances (Amnesty International, 2014; HRW, 2014; Sudd Institute, 2014). This has resulted in massive population displacement. As of August 2015, approximately 1.6 million people had been displaced within South Sudan and over 615,000 had fled to neighbouring countries (UNHCR, 2015). Humanitarian activities have been obstructed with armed forces targeting humanitarian property and personnel (Amnesty International, 2014; HRW, 2014).

The government and SPLM-IO signed multiple ceasefire agreements between January 2014 and August 2015, following IGAD-led negotiations in Addis Ababa, although neither party has adhered to the agreements. In August 2015, both parties signed an Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict, which focuses on transitional power sharing and security arrangements. This largely replicates pre-2013 structures, and omits
clear responses to underlying conflict dynamics. The US, UK, Norway, European Union, and China have supported the peace process, linked to regional security and economic (especially oil) interests. Uganda and Kenya’s involvement in peace processes reflects economic interests in the country, and Ugandan military support reflects long-standing ties with the SPLM/A. On its part, Sudan has reportedly provided assistance to the SPLM-IO (ICG, 2014).

In addition to conflict between government and non-state forces, communities in South Sudan are affected by ‘local’ inter-group or communal conflict involving over 100 ethnic and communal militia groups (ACLED, 2015), which increased with high fatalities after 2005. This includes conflict between ‘pastoralist’ (cattle-keeping) and farming communities and between cattle-keeping groups linked to disputes over local borders, resource (e.g. land, water) access and control, and cattle raiding and reprisal attacks (Bennett et al., 2010; Knopf, 2013; Schomerus & Allen, 2010; Young, 2012). Local violence is often described as ‘ethnic’ conflict, taking place between particular tribes, sections, or clans. There are approximately 64 main ethno-linguistic groups in South Sudan (and significantly more when sub-groups, such as sections or clans are counted). The four largest groups (Dinka, Nuer, Zande, and Bari) represent roughly 65 per cent of the population and the largest 10 groups (including Shilluk, Otuho, Luo, Moru, Mandari, Didinda, and Toposa) represent roughly 80 per cent (Marshall, 2006; Power & Simpson, 2011).

However, purely ‘ethnic’ explanations of conflict are overly simplistic and misleading, reflecting limited attention to the structural patterns of marginalization reflected in political institutions and policies, the impacts of environmental pressures (e.g. delayed rainfall) and economic pressures (e.g. rising dowry costs), and trauma resulting from many decades of conflict. The role of political instrumentalization of group identities and allegiances linked to broader political and conflict dynamics (including the mobilization of community members by politicians or militia leaders on the basis of grievances linked to ethnic or geographic marginalization) in this conflict should also be taken into consideration. These pressures for conflict are of critical importance in discussions of educational inequalities, governance, conflict, and peacebuilding.

Peace- and state-building approaches

Early peacebuilding frameworks, beginning with the CPA, focused on north-south conflict and its perceived root causes, with little attention to ‘internal’ conflict dynamics. State and peace-building efforts were rooted in this north-south understanding of conflict with little attention to internal grievances over political representation and governance of resource access. The 2005 Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) ‘Framework for Sustained Peace, Development and Poverty Eradication’, developed by the United Nations and World Bank in collaboration with the SPLM and Government of Sudan guided the implementation of the CPA. The 2008-2011 ‘Sustaining Peace through Development’ Plan developed by the Government of National Unity and GoSS (GoNU & GoSS, 2008) built on both CPA and JAM priorities. In addition to security arrangements, these plans prioritized strengthening governance through institutional reform, including a focus on decentralization, resource management, and accountability (CPA, 2005; GoNU & GoSS, 2008; JAM, 2005). They also emphasised expansion of basic services, including education, suggesting that access to education itself would support peace and state-building by providing a ‘peace dividend’, rather than examining links between governance and education service delivery (GoNU & GoSS, 2008; JAM, 2005), including attention to the ways in which the education system had previously been used, as a tool of political control and marginalization (Briedlid, 2010).

These priorities have been echoed by national peace and reconciliation bodies established in South Sudan since independence, including the South Sudan Peace and Reconciliation Commission (SSPRC), established in 2011, and the church-led Committee for National Healing, Peace and Reconciliation (CNHPR), established in 2013.9

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9 Some potentially problematic issues with the term ‘pastoralist’ must be acknowledged. The term is often used to indicate broad ethnic origin, with less attention to people’s actual (and changing) livelihoods. Research participants generally used ‘pastoralist’ to refer to cattle-keeping and herding communities, although communities may shift between pastoralist and agro-pastoralist livelihood activities. Many cattle-keeping communities in South Sudan are also engaged in small-scale agriculture (FAO, 2012).

9 The government established the SSPRC as an independent body to oversee peacebuilding policies and initiatives, advise national and international peacebuilding actors, and develop local peacebuilding capacity (Ministry of Justice, 2012; SSPRC, 2013). The CNHPR was established by presidential mandate in 2013, operating as an independent body intended to strengthen intergroup relations, transform individual and community ‘mind-sets’, and develop more inclusive institutions (CNHPR, 2013). The CNHPR replaced the former National Reconciliation Committee, led by Riek Machar. A National Platform for Peace and Reconciliation (NPPR) was established in 2014, composed of the SSPRC, CNHPR, and the Specialised Committee for Peace and Reconciliation (based in the National Legislative Assembly and responsible for overseeing development and implementation of legislation on peace and reconciliation) (NPPR, 2014).
They have emphasized the importance of ‘good governance’ including decentralization and accountability, and access to education services (CNHPR, 2013; SSPRC, 2013), with no explicit consideration of the ways in which governance of social services can contribute to conflict pressures or to addressing root causes of violence. Similarly, these issues have been neglected in the 2012 Peacebuilding Support Plan guiding United Nations’ actions, which includes a focus on inclusive political settlements as well as basic service (including education) delivery systems (UNESC, 2012).

3.3 History of education in South Sudan

Development of education in South Sudan

The history of education in South Sudan reflects patterns of political, economic, and cultural marginalization by colonial and post-independence Sudanese governments. These include minimal investment in and development of education, the imposition of an Arabic-language, Islamic religious curriculum, and closure of non-government (missionary) schools, which had provided most education services in the south. Education was used as a tool of power, representing an approach to population repression and control that supported the broader political, economic, and social marginalization of the south (Breidlid, 2010, 2013). The use of education as a tool of political power, and resulting inequalities in educational services between Sudan’s north and south (see Table 6), led to feelings of resentment, alienation, and exclusion among southern Sudanese, contributing to the outbreak of conflict in both the first and second civil wars.

Table 6. Educational indicators in Sudan in 1960 and 1972-83

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Educational level</th>
<th>1960 North</th>
<th>South</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>1972-83 North</th>
<th>South</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary schools</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary enrolment</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,349,000</td>
<td>143,000</td>
<td>1,492,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># of primary schools</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5,343</td>
<td>809</td>
<td>6,152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary teachers</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>39,188</td>
<td>3,432</td>
<td>42,620</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># of intermediate schools</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>1,378</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>1,474</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boys’ schools</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Girls’ schools</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># of secondary schools</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boys’ schools</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Girls’ schools</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial/technical schools</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># of universities</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3,499</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>3,528</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Education became a site of resistance in terms of language of instruction (English or southern languages) and curriculum content (secular or Christian) (Breidlid, 2010; Deng, 2003; Sommers, 2005). The SPLM/A established a Secretariat of Education and developed an education policy and curriculum in 2002 for regions under their control. Education policies were viewed as central to the establishment of a more inclusive national identity, although lack of resources restricted implementation (Breidlid, 2013; Brophy, 2003; Kevlihan, 2007; Sommers, 2005).

From 1989 to 2003, international support for education was coordinated through the UNICEF-led Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), a UN-NGO consortium (Sommers, 2005; UNICEF, 2008), although system-level support to education was limited and services were fragmented and restricted primarily to SPLM/A-controlled areas (Brophy, 2003; Kevlihan, 2007; Sommers, 2005). Subsequent donor initiatives focusing on education access and enrolment included the USAID-led Sudan Basic Education Program launched in 2002, and the UNICEF-led Go-to-School initiative, launched in 2006, while additional initiatives focused on promoting girls’ education (Culver et al., 2010; Sommers, 2005). Under CPA power-sharing protocols, GoSS was identified as the southern education authority and a national Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (MoEST) established. Between 2005 and 2013, primary school enrolment increased from roughly 700,000 to nearly over 1.3 million, and secondary school enrolment increased from 17,000 to 47,000 (see Table 7) (MoEST, 2014a; World Bank, 2012). However, decades of conflict resulted in high numbers of out-of-school children and youth; prior to the outbreak of conflict in 2013, between 1 million and 1.3 million primary school-aged children were out of school (Watkins, 2013; World Bank, 2012).

**Table 7.** Primary, secondary, and AES enrolment by state in 2005, 2013, and 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CES</td>
<td>95,261</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>150,629 (153,718)</td>
<td>7,403</td>
<td>14,988 (15,472)</td>
<td>194,230</td>
<td>25,506</td>
<td>12,673</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EES</td>
<td>51,233</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>94,876 (95,370)</td>
<td>4,655</td>
<td>3,816 (3,325)</td>
<td>112,041</td>
<td>4,369</td>
<td>4,179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>107,144</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>205,389</td>
<td>2,039</td>
<td>22,274</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lakes</td>
<td>82,206</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>97,894 (98,264)</td>
<td>949</td>
<td>26,256 (23,276)</td>
<td>128,949</td>
<td>3,049</td>
<td>21,819</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NBG</td>
<td>72,984</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>161,425 (162,788)</td>
<td>4,621</td>
<td>43,974 (38,045)</td>
<td>191,772</td>
<td>5,824</td>
<td>31,735</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unity</td>
<td>53,935</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>99,488</td>
<td>1,771</td>
<td>38,393</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNS</td>
<td>88,523</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>177,583</td>
<td>10,467</td>
<td>21,235</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warrap</td>
<td>87,998</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>182,997 (183,231)</td>
<td>4,218</td>
<td>12,568 (10,051)</td>
<td>203,186</td>
<td>6,054</td>
<td>13,382</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WBG</td>
<td>29,146</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>58,735</td>
<td>5,726</td>
<td>10,380 (9,952)</td>
<td>83,727</td>
<td>6,755</td>
<td>10,616</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WES</td>
<td>40,579</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>82,451 (82,556)</td>
<td>4,718</td>
<td>14,686 (12,751)</td>
<td>91,457</td>
<td>5,444</td>
<td>12,434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>700,448</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,311,467 (834,662)</td>
<td>46,567</td>
<td>208,570 (112,872)</td>
<td>1,005,362</td>
<td>58,928</td>
<td>106,838</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: GoSS & UNICEF, 2005; MoEST, 2014a, 2015c

The current conflict has hugely disrupted the education sector. As of May 2015, 70 per cent of schools in Jonglei, Unity, and Upper Nile were non-functional, an estimated 13,000 children and adolescents had been recruited or abducted by government or opposition forces, and roughly 400,000 previously-enrolled students were out of school due to school closure, displacement, and chronic insecurity (UNICEF, 2015a, 2015b) (see Table 7). Children and youth in conflict-affected areas have lost nearly two years of education since fighting broke out between government and opposition forces in 2013. Substantial resources have been diverted from development to humanitarian response, resulting in significant short- and long-term education development consequences.

Notes: Figures in parentheses represent updated 2013 enrolment numbers cited in the 2015 education statistics report (MoEST, 2015c).
National policy context

South Sudan's education policies and strategies, including the 2012 General Education Act and the General Education Strategic Plan (GESP) for 2012-2017, have been developed within a broader national legal and policy context based on the 2011 Transitional Constitution, the Vision 2040 national planning strategy, and the 2011-2013 South Sudan Development Plan (SSDP), and within a global policy context based on Education for All (EFA) and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The Transitional Constitution and General Education Act guarantee the right to free primary education and to equitable education services free from discrimination on the basis of gender, ethnicity, race, religion, ability, or health status (GoSS, 2011b; GRSS, 2012a). The GESP draws on Vision 2040 and SSDP objectives (GoSS, 2011a; GRSS, 2011), focusing on enhancing education access and quality, increasing enrolment and gender equity in education, improving learning outcomes, infrastructure development, curriculum and textbook development, teacher recruitment and development, strengthening leadership and management, and promoting partnership between government and development partners (GRSS, 2012a). The Implementation of GESP priorities has been limited by low resources, unrealistic timelines, and lack of clear objectives and indicators (National Education Forum & Local Education Group, 2012; Sigsgaard, 2013). A new General Education Sector Policy Framework is currently being developed.
3.4 Contemporary education system management and governance

**Education system in South Sudan**

MoEST is responsible for the development and provision of education services in South Sudan. The Ministry includes seven directorates and one secretariat: Directorates of Planning and Budgeting, Administration and Finance, General Education, Alternative Education Systems, Technical and Vocational Education, Quality Promotion and Innovation (which includes Departments of Curriculum Development, Teacher Education and Training, and National Languages), and Gender Equity and Social Change (which includes Departments of Girls’ Education and Inclusive Education), and the Secretariat of Examinations. A proposed MoEST restructuring includes three new secretariats: National Curriculum, National and Foreign Languages, and Teaching Service, Training and Management. South Sudan’s education system includes primary education, secondary education, technical and vocational education and training (TVET), the alternative education system (AES), and early childhood development. The formal education system includes eight years of primary education (P1 to P8) and four years of secondary education (S1 to S4).

South Sudan’s ten states are divided into counties, which are further divided into payams and bomas. Based on the 2009 Local Government Act, South Sudan’s education system is meant to be decentralized, involving a central MoEST, state education ministries, county education departments (CEDs), and payam education offices. The central MoEST is responsible for the formulation of national education policies and guidelines, strategies and standards, and curricula, the development of annual budgets, and the management of teacher training institutions (TTTs) and national secondary schools. State ministries are responsible for implementation and resource distribution at the state level, including delivery of secondary education and TVET. CEDs are responsible for the delivery of primary and alternative education in collaboration with payam offices (GoSS, 2009, 2010; GRSS, 2012a; MoEST, 2014c; RSS, 2012; World Bank, 2012). School governing bodies are responsible for school management. Each school is required to have a parent teacher association (PTA) and a school management committee (primary schools) or board of governors (secondary schools) responsible for school management, plans and budgets (DFID-GESS, 2014). See Appendix 2 for proposed education sector roles and responsibilities.

The way in which power is negotiated shapes the governance of institutions, and influence of (informal) political bargaining and settlements on the functioning of the education sector must be considered. The Sudanese-based National Congress Party was responsible for the post-CPA MoEST in South Sudan. Under the first independent government in 2011, the now-dissolved United Sudan African Party was responsible for the Ministry of General Education and Instruction (MoGEI), while the SPLM controlled key ministries of cabinet affairs, national security, defence, foreign affairs, and finance (Africa Confidential, 2011; Stephen, 2010), which have the highest budgets. The limited power and resources accorded to the education ministry may signify that it is more likely to be ‘given’ to opposition parties, which is of particular interest given ongoing transitional power-sharing negotiations. According to the August 2015 Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict (IGAD, 2015), the SPLM, SPLM-IO, and other political parties will select ministries on a rotating basis from three clusters: governance (e.g. national security); economic (e.g. finance); and service delivery (e.g. education). The education ministry may be among the last selected, due to its limited resources, may be allocated fewer government resources, and perceived as less legitimate at central and local levels if it is under the control of the political opposition.

**Education sector financing**

Since 2006, education sector allocations have accounted for between 5 per cent and 8 per cent of total government spending in South Sudan, with an even smaller proportion of allocated funds actually disbursed; in 2013-14, less than 60 per cent of funds allocated to the education sector were actually disbursed (MoFCIEP, 2014). This is lower than education sector allocations in other East African countries (UNESCO, 2014; World Bank, 2013b), and much lower than the Global Partnership for Education recommended amount of 20 per cent of the overall government budget (National Education Forum & Local Education Group, 2012).
In 2014-2015, 5 per cent of the national budget was allocated to the education sector (SSP 603,643,900; USD 203,933,750), while 49 per cent went to the rule-of-law and security sectors. Security has been allocated the majority of government funds since 2006, with the majority going to salaries of armed forces. In 2013-2014, actual security sector spending was nearly 20 per cent higher than the allocated budget (MoFCIEP, 2014). Education spending is focused on primary education, with nearly half the education budget (47 per cent) allocated to basic education in 2014-2015 (see Table 8). Nearly all education funds (85 per cent in 2014-2015) are allocated to recurrent costs including salaries and operating costs (MoFCIEP, 2014).

South Sudan's economy is heavily dependent on oil revenues, which accounted for roughly 98 per cent of the national budget between 2006 and 2010 (World Bank, 2012). Revenues dropped as a result of the global financial crisis in 2009 and oil production was shut down in 2012 following disputes with Sudan over transit fees. This resulted in the adoption of austerity budgets, significantly reducing funding allocations to education. Although oil production resumed in 2013 following agreements mediated by the African Union, financing pressures persist due to revenue loss linked to reduced production and low global oil prices (Knopf, 2013; Watkins, 2013; World Bank, 2013a). The current conflict has had further negative economic impacts, resulting in a projected 15 per cent drop in GDP for 2014 (Frontier Economics et al., 2015). Ongoing fighting centred in the oil-rich Upper Nile and Unity states has further disrupted oil production and strained relations with investors, including China (ICG, 2014). However, oil revenues continue to account for the majority of South Sudan's national budget, identified as the source of 80 per cent of government funds in 2014-2015 with 11 per cent from non-oil revenue (e.g. taxes, fees, customs), and 8 per cent from financing (external and commercial loans) (MoFCIEP, 2014).

South Sudan’s education sector relies heavily on support from donors and development partners, who support nearly all education development. In 2013-2014, external funds accounted for roughly 30 per cent of all education funding, focusing primarily on basic education (75 per cent of funds were allocated to basic education and 6 per cent to alternative education). Approximately 67 per cent of donor education funds came from bilateral donors, with 55 per cent of these from the United Kingdom (Department for International Development, DFID), 38 per cent from the United States (USAID), and the remainder from Norway, Canada, and France (MoFCIEP, 2013). DFID (UK Aid) is funding Girls’ Education South Sudan (GESS), a five-year program that promotes girls’ education and school development through capitation grants and cash transfers (GESS, 2014). USAID is funding Room to Learn, which includes the establishment of community-based schools.

In 2013-2014, 31 per cent of donor education funds came from multilateral donors (92 per cent from UNICEF and 9 per cent from the European Union), with another 2.3 per cent from the Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF) (MoFCIEP, 2013). UNICEF’s education programs include the Global Partnership for Education (GPE), which includes policy advocacy (e.g. curriculum development), school construction, and girls’ education, the Peacebuilding Education and Advocacy program (PBEA), which focuses on life skills and peacebuilding education and policy advocacy, and Education in Emergencies (UNICEF South Sudan, 2013).

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**Table 8. Approved education sector budget allocations for 2014-15**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Allocation in SSP</th>
<th>Allocation in USD</th>
<th>Proportion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basic education</td>
<td>281,025,867</td>
<td>94,941,171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-primary</td>
<td>86,039,142</td>
<td>29,067,277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES</td>
<td>6,159,090</td>
<td>2,080,773</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher/tertiary</td>
<td>155,189,059</td>
<td>52,428,736</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>75,230,742</td>
<td>25,415,791</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>603,643,900</td>
<td>203,933,750</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MoFCIEP, 2014

---

14 USD amounts are calculated using the official exchange rate of SSP 2.96, as cited in the 2014-15 Budget Book (MoFCIEP, 2014).

15 Post-primary education includes both secondary and TVET. ‘Other’ includes policy and systems development, capacity strengthening and quality assurance, and support systems. USD amounts are calculated using the official exchange rate of SSP 2.96, as cited in the 2014-15 Budget Book (MoFCIEP, 2014).
The EU is funding the Improved Management of Education Delivery (IMED) program, which focuses on planning and management capacity development of central and state ministries, as well as capitation grants. South Sudan is a member of the GPE, which is managed by UNICEF and coordinated by UNESCO and USAID, with funds intended to support GESP implementation (Watkins, 2013). GPE priorities for 2013-2016 include strengthening national systems, school construction and rehabilitation, curriculum development, and girls’ education.

Overall, the education sector receives only a small proportion of international development and humanitarian funds in South Sudan. In 2013-2014, roughly 6 per cent of donor aid was allocated to education (MoFCIEP, 2013). In the 2015 Humanitarian Response Plan for South Sudan, education funding accounted for 3 per cent of requested funds (OCHA, 2015a). Despite advocacy efforts by the South Sudan Education Cluster emphasising the importance of education in humanitarian response, education is generally viewed as a long-term development goal rather than a ‘lifesaving’ service. 16

**Education sector coordination**

A number of mechanisms have been established to facilitate coordination between MoEST and various education sector partners. The National Education Forum, overseen by MoEST, focuses on key sector policies and strategies and includes all main MoEST directorates, the Ministry of Finance, education partners, and other stakeholders. The Education Donor Group is responsible for the organisation and coordination of donor and partner efforts, including support for education sector plan development. The Partners for Education Group (PEG) includes international and national NGOs and CSOs, and is chaired by MoEST. Finally, the GPE Joint Steering Committee coordinates the implementation of four major donor projects: GPE, GESS, IMED, and Room to Learn. The Joint Sector Review (JSR), launched in 2014 with GPE support and led by MoEST and the Ministry of Finance, evaluates education progress and sector needs and priorities. Research participants reported that these coordination mechanisms are functioning well, with strong MoEST involvement. However, short-term partner objectives may not fully support longer-term education system development, and programs and materials (e.g. teacher training) developed by different partners may not be clearly aligned (with one another or with MoEST programs) in terms of content, duration, or target populations.

At the sub-national level, coordination mechanisms include State and County Education Forums (MoEST, 2015a). Financial monitoring and coordination mechanisms include State and County Transfers Monitoring Committees, responsible for coordinating and monitoring the use of budget transfers and grants, and regular budget reporting (MoEST, 2014a). However, forums and monitoring committees are not functioning in all states or counties. At the central and state level, the South Sudan Education Cluster (SSEC), co-led by UNICEF and Save the Children, oversees the coordination of humanitarian ‘education in emergencies’ (EiE) activities by national and international partners. However, as discussed in Section 5.4, there are gaps in the coordination of humanitarian and government activities in EiE contexts.

Technical working groups have been established within MoEST to focus on specific issues including gender and girls’ education, AES, TVET, teacher education, curriculum, and national languages (MoEST, 2015b). A Peacebuilding Technical Reference Committee involving representatives of seven directorates, MoCYS, and UNICEF (PBEA) has also been established in MoEST. This committee is responsible for integrating conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding principles into MoEST activities and policies, although its influence appears to be affected by consistency in representation among ministry directorates and its engagement with external peacebuilding bodies.

In general, there appear to be few links between the education sector and broader peacebuilding processes. Peacebuilding actors have been involved in some education initiatives such as the involvement of peacebuilding and reconciliation bodies in the UNICEF-MoEST Learning Spaces as Zones of Peace Conference in 2014 and in education projects involving partner organizations supporting conflict response and transformation (e.g. UNDP). However, there does not appear to be sustained engagement between MoEST or education donors and key peacebuilding actors (e.g. SSPRC, UNMISS) or civil society organizations working on peacebuilding issues. Relationships between education and peacebuilding actors do not appear to be fully institutionalized through, for example, mutual influence on sectorial policy and strategy development.

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16 Tensions between humanitarian and development goals are discussed in UNICEF ESARO’s (2015) PBEA case study on humanitarian action, conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding through education in South Sudan
The perception among certain peacebuilding actors of education as a development activity may limit engagement with the education sector. One national peacebuilding representative, for example, stated that education service support must wait until some degree of peace (stability) has been secured reflecting a ‘security first’ perspective. However, security does not necessarily lead to development or sustainable peace (Novelli & Smith, 2011; Richmond, 2009). Limited engagement between education and peacebuilding actors may also be linked to the view equating ‘peacebuilding’ in education with EiE activities (discussed in more detail in Section 5.4).

The governance of education services is also affected by coordination challenges between the education sector and other ministries. For example, the Ministry of Gender, Child and Social Welfare (MoGCSW) is responsible for supporting young people with disabilities, orphans, and children living on the street, while the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports (MoCYS) provides programs and support for out-of-school youth. Both the MoCYS and Ministry of Labor are responsible for vocational training, and the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and Ministry of the Environment can play a key role in livelihoods training. However, the actual degree of cross-sectoral engagement seems to vary by state and sector, and linkages are generally project-based rather than institutionalized.
Caption: © UNICEF/ Young people playing sport in a Protection of Civilians site, South Sudan, 2015.
CHAPTER 4. EXAMINING EDUCATIONAL INEQUALITIES IN SOUTH SUDAN

4.1 Chapter introduction

Inequalities between groups are drawn along horizontal identity lines (e.g. religion, ethnicity, gender, geographic or urban/rural location) and vertical socioeconomic lines (e.g. class). Such inequalities result not only from differences in available opportunities (inequality of opportunity), but also from discrimination of some territories or groups by decision-makers such as governments or donors (inequality of treatment). This chapter presents the results of quantitative analysis of dimensions of educational inequalities related to access, resources, and outcomes. It focuses on national trends and inequalities between states and counties and also explores the level of association between the occurrence of conflict and educational development indicators at the state and county level. This quantitative analysis is integrated with qualitative discussions of educational inequalities focusing on dimensions of inequality identified by research participants as being connected to pressures for conflict in South Sudan, including inequalities related to geographic location, socio-economic status, livelihoods, and older youth.

Measuring inequality in education: Quantitative analysis

In this study, quantitative analysis was intended to measure and describe the nature and trends of educational inequalities at the sub-national level in South Sudan, and to explore the association between these inequalities and conflict occurrence for the period under study. In order to capture different dimensions of quantitative educational inequalities, the study distinguishes between inequalities of 1) access, 2) resources, and 3) outcomes:

Access. Inequality of access often results from unequal patterns of demand for education (e.g. child labour, pastoralist communities) and unavailability of schools in a particular area (e.g. distance to school). In this study, three key indicators of access inequality are examined: gross enrolment rates (GER), net enrolment rates (NER), and gender parity index (GPI).

Resources. Resource distribution is an important source of inequality in lower-income and conflict-affected countries. Schools with inadequate provision of teachers, materials, or infrastructure face greater difficulties in ensuring effective student learning opportunities. Indicators such as student-teacher ratios or school facilities represent proxies to measure whether resources (material and human) have actually reached schools in particular areas. In this study, four key indicators of resource inequality are examined: student-teacher ratio, student-classroom ratio, school access to drinking water, and school access to latrines.

Outcomes. Inequality of outcomes refers to the unequal capability of students to make the most of available educational opportunities. Unequal outcomes usually result from the combined effect of inequalities in quantity, quality, and relevance of educational provision. While often referred to as 'efficiency indicators', outcome indicators used in this study include promotion, repetition, and dropout rates, although these indicators are not very reliable and are difficult to interpret due to inconsistencies in data reporting by schools and cohort size effects. In this study, the percentage of students enrolled in the last grades of primary (P7 and P8) was used as the key outcome indicator. High attrition rates in South Sudan reflect the inability of many students to complete primary education. The percentage of students in P7 and P8 can be interpreted as a measure of the real opportunities available to students to complete primary education.

17 Both GER and NER indicate general levels of participation in education. GER considers the total number of students of all ages in a specific grade level, while NER considers only students of official school age (6 to 13 for primary education) enrolled at appropriate age and grade level. The GPI measures the relative access to education of males and females, expressed as a ratio of girls to boys, with 1 indicating perfect equality and values lower than 1 indicating lower female participation.

18 Student ratios measure the level of human resources (e.g. teachers) and facilities (e.g. classrooms) available to students. The higher the value of the ratio, the lower the access to resources.
**Understandings of inequality: Qualitative perspectives**

During interviews and group discussions, participants spoke of educational inequalities perceived as linked to conflict and violence. They referred primarily to inequality in terms of access, retention, and performance of children and youth, particularly girls and older youth, with a focus on those living in poverty, hard-to-reach rural areas, and cattle-keeping (pastoralist) communities. For these groups, education experiences are affected by school costs, distance from schools, household and livelihood responsibilities, and risk of violence (e.g., gender-based violence). Geographic disparities in school infrastructure, teaching, and program availability, as well as the (ir)relevance of formal curricula are also mitigating factors. Participants’ emphasis on the inequalities associated with poverty, rural location, and cattle-keeping communities reflect national population demographics, and reflect some of the key findings emerging from the secondary quantitative analysis.

Participants expressed a range of perspectives on inequality; some sub-national officials (state, county, and payam authorities) and teachers, particularly in the Equatorial states, stated that there are no inequalities in education, with no groups facing greater challenges in access to education, for example than others. As one state-level ministry official explained, there is no challenge of inequality as both girls and boys are allowed to enter the school. In general, participants’ definitions of ‘equality’ focused on equal rights and access to the same education services (e.g. the same curriculum), fair or equal treatment in schools (focusing on boys and girls or children with disabilities), and equal distribution of resources to schools, payams, and counties.

“Equality in education means children [are] given chance of education equally. We do not say that, ‘These are boys, these are girls,’ no. They [are] given equal chance” (State MoEST official).

Some participants also defined equality in terms of interaction, collaboration, helping others and working together, as well as sharing knowledge and skills. In this context, most participants described educational inequalities as resulting from a lack of awareness of the importance of education, rather than the inequitable distribution of education opportunities and resources or broader systems of marginalization. As one central MoEST official stated,

*This place has been marginalized [...] It’s actually a place that the community are not very much in knowledge of the value for education here. So it’s very marginalized and it’s only because the community are following much of their own tradition.*

While these factors affect education access and outcomes, a narrow focus on community perceptions or awareness can limit attention to broader inequalities (and inequities) in the distribution of education opportunities, resources, and decision-making power. Additionally, understandings of (in)equality focused almost exclusively on students with limited attention to teachers and significantly less (if any) attention to these issues at the level of management, including representation in leadership and decision-making.

**4.2 Inequality of access**

International comparisons illustrate the significant challenges faced by South Sudan with respect to access to both primary and secondary education. Economic and social development challenges combined with the consequences of decades of conflict have resulted in education access indicators well below international averages (see Table 9). In 2013, only 42 per cent of primary school-aged children were enrolled in primary education, and for every four boys in school there are only three girls. National education access trends have worsened in a number of domains in recent years with data showing little improvement in access to education in primary and secondary education and the alternative education system (see Table 10). The total number of students in primary education declined between 2009 and 2013, as did gross and net enrolment rates. This decline began before the current civil war, during a period of relative peace and stability, illustrating the importance of examining factors other than conflict (e.g. systemic inequalities) affecting access to education.

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19 Other disadvantaged groups, identified less frequently, include children and youth with disabilities, orphans, and children living in the streets, reflecting the significant impact of violent conflict on South Sudan’s young population. While these are key dimensions of educational inequity, this report will focus on political, economic, and cultural dimensions which participants, including officials, teachers, and students from all research sites, identified as being of greatest importance in relation to dynamics of conflict and peacebuilding.
Table 9: International comparison of education access by country type in 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Type</th>
<th>Primary education NER</th>
<th>Gender parity</th>
<th>Secondary education NER</th>
<th>Gender parity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High income countries</td>
<td>95.5</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>89.9</td>
<td>1.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle income countries</td>
<td>89.7</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>66.8</td>
<td>0.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low income countries</td>
<td>79.9</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>0.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fragile/conflict-affected countries</td>
<td>74.9</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>0.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>0.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>89.0</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>66.0</td>
<td>0.96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: World Bank & EMIS 2013 (MoEST, 2015e)

Table 10. National trends in education access for 2009-13

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of students</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>GER</th>
<th>Gender parity</th>
<th>NER</th>
<th>Gender parity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>1,380,580</td>
<td>871,804</td>
<td>508,776</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>1,311,467</td>
<td>800,868</td>
<td>510,599</td>
<td>61.9</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>41.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% change</td>
<td>-5</td>
<td>-8.1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>-14</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>-13.5</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Secondary education</td>
<td>44,027</td>
<td>31,977</td>
<td>12,050</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>46,567</td>
<td>31,709</td>
<td>14,858</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% change</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>-0.8</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>-17.7</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>-36.7</td>
<td>35.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Alternative education</td>
<td>217,239</td>
<td>124,959</td>
<td>92,280</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: EMIS 2009, 2013 (MoEST, 2015e)

When examining enrolment statistics, it is important to note the large differences (>20 per cent) between gross and net enrolment rates in many states, indicating a significant proportion of over-age students. The majority of enrolled students in South Sudan are significantly older than official school ages (6 to 13 for primary, 14 to 17 for secondary); in 2013, 87 per cent of primary students and 91 per cent of secondary students were over-age (MoEST, 2014a).

During qualitative interviews, participants emphasized the challenges associated with the large proportion of over-age students enrolled in primary education. Some primary school managers reported enrolment of students of up to age 30 or 40, linked to the limited availability of alternative or adult education services. While access to education for older youth and adults is extremely important (contributing to livelihoods activities, increased confidence, community engagement, leadership, and so on), the presence of older youth and young children in the same class was described as negatively affecting learning and social outcomes for all students, including reducing the likelihood that over-age students will complete primary education and/or continue to secondary education.
Access inequalities across geographic locations

An analysis of educational inequalities between geographic regions such as states and counties in South Sudan reveals inequalities between groups, as inequalities between locations overlap with other sources of inequality such as ethnicity and social class. EMIS data indicated significant differences in access indicators between states. Enrolment rates (see Figure 2) are higher in Upper Nile, Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Western Bahr el Ghazal, and Warrap, which is somewhat counterintuitive given the high levels of poverty in states such as Northern Bahr el Ghazal and Warrap. County-level EMIS data illustrates inequalities in gender parity within states as well as between states (see Figure 4). Within-state differences are very important in states such as Central Equatoria where equity of access is very low in counties such as Terekeka, one of the poorest counties in the country.

Figure 2: Net and gross enrolment rates in primary education by state in 2013

Source: EMIS 2013 (MoEST, 2015e)

Rural/urban location represents another dimension of inequality linked to geographic region. Approximately 83 per cent of South Sudan’s population lives in rural communities (SSCCSE, 2010a). Socio-economic indicators, such as poverty and literacy rates vary significantly across rural and urban communities, as outlined in Table 1, as well as across states and counties. Reliance on agriculture and cattle in rural areas can increase the impact that livelihood responsibilities have on children’s access to education.

Table 1. Socio-economic indicators for rural and urban areas in 2008-09

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Rural areas</th>
<th>Urban areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary school-aged children out of school</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never attended school (age 6 and older)</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literacy rate (age 15 and older)</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty rate</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SSCCSE, 2010a, 2010b; World Bank, 2012

Distance from schools is a particular barrier for remote and dispersed rural populations. Participants reported that education services, especially secondary education and TVET, are generally concentrated in urban areas, primarily in state capitals: “The schools from rural areas, they sit primary leaving certificate
and they do not have access to secondary schools [...] There are no secondary schools open outside the town” (State MoEST official). However, even within urban centres, including Juba, secondary schools are generally concentrated in one area, while surrounding neighbourhoods and payams have no secondary schools (although available EMIS data does not provide concrete data on number of schools per payam). As a result of lack of schools in rural areas and insecurity, many young people move from rural to urban centres in order to access education. This incurs added transport and accommodation costs, putting children at risk of living on the streets if they do not have a support structure in town, and leading to over-crowding in schools.

Access inequalities and gender

While negative trends were observed in overall enrolment, positive patterns are observed in gender equality. The number of girls remained stable in a period of overall enrolment reduction, resulting in a slight improvement in gender parity in education access between 2009 and 2013, and potentially reflecting the influence of various programs focusing on the promotion of girls’ education. In general, gender parity may be a better indicator of access inequality than enrolment rates, as it is not affected by population census underestimations. Gender parity comparisons across states (see Figure 3) present a different picture from enrolment comparisons. There are wide primary-level gender disparities between states, with greater equity in states such as Central and Western Equatoria and greater inequity in Warrap and Lakes, where for every two boys in class there is only one girl. When comparing gender equality at the county level (See Figure 4), there is relative gender equality in primary school access in counties such as Juba and Kajo-Keji. Generally, central (Yirol East, Yirol West, Awerial, Terekeka) and northern counties (Gogrial West, Gogrial East, Tonj North, Tonj East, Tonj South, Jur River) experience more significant inequalities in access to education between boys and girls.

Figure 3: Gender parity in primary education by state in 2013

Source: EMIS 2013 (MoEST, 2015e)

During qualitative interviews, although participants in Warrap discussed the impacts of ‘cultural’ or ‘traditional’ practices on girls’ education more frequently, participants in all states identified gender as a key dimension of educational inequity. These include traditional gender role expectations, reproductive health concerns (e.g. menstruation), and patterns of gender-based discrimination and gender-based violence (GBV), including sexual harassment, ‘sex for grades’, rape in schools, and early and forced marriage. Family financial concerns related to dowry payment often determine girls’ access to education, as they are generally viewed as a source of wealth for the family (particularly in cattle-keeping communities). Schooling may be viewed as delaying marriage, resulting in lower dowry payments (younger age is associated with higher dowry), and of increasing risk of sexual activity or violence due to contact with male students and teachers, which would decrease girls’ perceived value. Early marriage may be linked to family poverty and efforts to reduce the risk of sexual activity or violence (CARE, 2014), with parents (particularly in poorer families) focusing on girls’ immediate ‘value’ (e.g. dowry wealth) rather than longer-term benefits of their education.
Some say, like the boys say, if they are sent to school, who will be looking after the animals? So it is difficult. The girls, if they go to school they will get spoiled and they will lose these cows for dowry. (Central MoEST official)

[Cattle] are providing meat [and] they are giving wealth in terms of creating dowry [...] to the extent that, ‘Okay, why should I educate [the] girl? When she grows up she’s going to be married and given animals.’ So not knowing that the value of this girl via education is higher than what you see as provision of cows to the family. (State MoEST official)

Figure 4: Gender parity in primary education by county in 2013

Source: EMIS 2013 (MoEST, 2015e)

Access inequalities and socio-economic status

Although a quantitative analysis of educational inequality by wealth or income was not possible with the available data, socio-economic status was identified as a key indicator of inequality during qualitative interviews. South Sudan’s 2011 Transitional Constitution and 2012 Education Act state that primary education is to be compulsory and free of charge. However, families must still cover school costs such as contributions to ‘school development funds’, examination paper fees, uniforms and materials, as well as hidden costs, presenting significant challenges for families and young people living in poverty. School capitation grants20 and feeding programs are intended to ease the financial pressure on families and ensure that all children can access schools, regardless of financial status: “The capitation grant is building the management capacity of the school, meaning there’s no child that can be sent home because of the registration [fees]” (Central MoEST official). While capitation grants are intended to remove school registration fees, schools continue to collect funds (as ‘school development funds’) from parents. When families cannot cover school costs for all children, boys are generally prioritized, and financial concerns cause many young women and men to drop out of school in order to earn a living by working in the market or setting up informal businesses such as selling tea.

20 Capitation grants (GRSS and UK funded) are provided to primary and secondary schools. Grants are based on student enrolment, and include a set amount per school (SSP 5,000 for primary, SSP 10,000 for secondary) and an amount per pupil (SSP 39 for primary, SSP 80 for secondary) (MoEST, 2015a).
Questions of poverty and wealth in South Sudan are very complex, and it is important to distinguish between wealth in monetary terms and other forms of wealth, such as cattle. For example, some families or communities may be described as unable to financially support their children's education, but may hold significant wealth in terms of cattle. In general, participant discussions of poverty and inequity focused on monetary/financial resources, but various forms of wealth within families and communities, and the ways in which they may or may not be used to support education access and service provision, should also be considered.

**Access inequalities and cattle-keeping communities**

As noted by participants in all states, challenges associated with school access and relevance are particularly significant for ‘pastoralist’ or cattle-keeping communities (FAO, 2013; Forcier, 2013). It is estimated that 70 per cent of out-of-school children in South Sudan live in pastoralist communities (Watkins, 2013) and that over 85 per cent of the population is engaged in livestock care (FAO, 2012). There are an estimated 11 to 12 million cattle in the country, with Jonglei, Northern Bahr el Ghazal, and Warrap states each home to roughly 1.6 million cattle (SSCCSE, 2010a, 2010b). Numerous groups are identified as ‘pastoralist’ groups, including diverse Dinka, Nuer, and Mundari sections in different states and counties. The size of ‘pastoralist’ populations in different states is difficult to estimate, as cattle herding is not identified as an occupational category in the 2008 population census, and as such, quantitative analysis of inequalities affecting these communities was not possible.

During the dry season, cattle-keeping communities move far away from established schools to seek pasture and water. In the rainy season, when cattle camps are established close to towns, education services may not be available due to a general lack of schools in certain counties and payams and timetables that overlap with cattle supervision schedules (young people are responsible for herding cattle – a very time and labor-intensive activity. Insecurity also affects the implementation of education services, including mobile schools.21 However, when discussing cattle-keeping communities, ministry officials generally cited ‘lack of awareness’ of the importance of education as the key challenge, rather than (in)equitable distribution of opportunities and resources:

> How do people know the importance of education while they are just used to their cows? What do they know [when] their nearest resource is cow? So now, when you go to one community and you say, ‘Okay, let us build a school,’ you will see the community seems not more eager to do that […] [They] will say, ‘School for what? Our children are just pastoral.’ (Central MoEST official)

However, as discussed in greater detail in Section 6.4, barriers to education access for children and youth in cattle-keeping communities are not necessarily due to the perceived unimportance of education, but rather the cultural and economic irrelevance of formal education and training programs.

**4.3 Inequality of resources**

**Resource inequalities across geographic locations**

Inequality of resource distribution between geographic regions is of great importance for education policy and planning in a country facing huge resource challenges in terms of infrastructure, teachers, and so on. The provision of resources to schools has markedly improved during the period under study (see Table 12). Between 2009 and 2013, the number of schools increased by 17 per cent and the number of classrooms more than doubled, resulting in decreased student-classroom ratios at both primary and secondary levels and, in turn, potential improvement in learning conditions. Teacher deployment has not improved as markedly, suggesting that it has been easier to build new schools and classrooms than to train and deploy teachers to those schools and classrooms. The increase in AES centres (40 per cent) has been higher than in primary education, and student-teacher ratios are somewhat lower in AES (35) than in primary education (47).

21 The AES programme includes pastoralist mobile schools where teachers and materials move with cattle camps. However, mobile schools accounted for only 0.7 per cent of AES centers and 0.3 per cent of teachers in 2013 (MoEST, 2014a), due to insecurity and difficult working conditions for teachers.
Table 12. National trends in educational resources for 2009-13

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number of schools</th>
<th>Number of classrooms</th>
<th>Student-class ratio</th>
<th>Number of teachers</th>
<th>Student-teacher ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Primary education</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>3,221</td>
<td>10,663</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>26,575</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>3,766</td>
<td>24,279</td>
<td>99.6</td>
<td>27,709</td>
<td>47.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% change</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>127.7</td>
<td>-22.8</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Secondary education</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>764</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>2,191</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>1,197</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>3,042</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% change</td>
<td>49.4</td>
<td>56.7</td>
<td>-29.3</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>-23.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Alternative education</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>1,022</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5,753</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>1,429</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5,947</td>
<td>35.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% change</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>-7.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: EMIS 2009, 2013 (MoEST, 2015e)

There are also inequalities in terms of the distribution of trained teachers, with a large proportion of underqualified or unqualified teachers in South Sudan. In 2013, 40 per cent of primary teachers, 61 per cent of secondary teachers, and 42 per cent of AES teachers had some form of training (MoEST, 2014a). Teacher training in South Sudan is quite fragmented as teacher training institutions (TTIs) and County Education Centres (responsible for in-service training) are not functioning in many states, resulting in training disparities across states (AET, 2015), with some teachers receiving short-term training on specific topics from various international organisations. In 2014-2015, only 0.2 per cent of the national education budget was allocated to the management of teacher training, and in 2013-2014, no allocations were actually disbursed (MoFCIEP, 2014).

Disparities in teacher deployment and teacher absenteeism across different states, counties and rural areas are linked to insecurity and access to accommodation and services. Inequities in teacher distribution may be linked to lack of transportation, accommodation, and basic services in many communities, as well as a lack of incentives to encourage teachers to work and remain in remote or difficult areas. When considering inequalities in teacher distribution, it is also important to consider questions of attendance, absenteeism and distribution of supervision resources. Weak education sector human resource management and supervision systems contribute to disparities in teacher deployment, attendance, and performance, as discussed in detail in Section 6.5.

Regional comparisons of resource distribution inequalities is relevant in political terms, as these can be considered an indicator of capacity limitations on the part of central and sub-national governments and international donors to respond to the needs of students in certain areas. Participants described significant variations with respect to school infrastructure and facilities, materials, school functioning (e.g. school calendar, hours, and grades), and teaching coverage and capacity. They described perceived inequalities in education services and resources across geographic areas, such as hard-to-reach rural areas, different counties or payams, or different states such as conflict-affected versus ‘peaceful’ states. Participants in each state identified counties that face particular challenges in education governance and service provision, focusing on the most remote or hard-to-reach counties, as well as counties in which cattle-keeping communities are based (e.g. Terekeka County in Central Equatoria).

Quantitative analysis reveals significant disparities in student ratios between states (see Figure 5), with higher ratios of students per classroom and teachers in states such as Jonglei, Upper Nile, Unity, Warrap, and Lakes, indicating that learning conditions in these states may be significantly poorer than in others. Inequalities are particularly high for student-classroom ratios and slightly lower for student-teacher ratios (although this does not tell us about teacher absenteeism rates). The percentage of schools with adequate facilities such as drinking water and latrines, represents another good indicator of resource inequalities between geographic regions, illustrating the quantity and quality of available resources. With respect to facilities, states such as Upper Nile and Unity experience the greatest limitations in resource provision (see Figure 6), while states such as Central Equatoria and Western Bahr el Ghazal have a greater proportion of schools with access to basic facilities.
The combination of data on student ratios and school facilities provides a general overview of resource inequalities between states in South Sudan. Patterns of inequalities in distribution of teachers and facilities (e.g. drinking water) exist across counties within states (see Figures 7 and 8). Moreover, counties with higher student-teacher ratios (reflecting lower teacher numbers) are also characterized by lower school access to drinking water, suggesting that certain geographic areas (e.g. Rumbek in Lakes state, Akobo in Jonglei state) are affected by limited access to both human and material resources. In general, counties in the south seem to enjoy a more adequate provision of school resources, while resource provision is poorer in central and northern counties. The government and donors should pay attention to these consistent patterns of resource distribution inequalities between counties in making decisions on allocation of material resources such as infrastructure, and facilities, as well as human resources (e.g. teacher deployment).
Figure 7: Student-teacher ratio in primary education by county in 2013

Figure 8: Percentage of primary schools with access to drinking water by county in 2013

Source: EMIS 2013 (MoEST, 2015e)
4.4 Inequality of outcomes

Educational outcomes represent an area of major concern for education planners and practitioners, although access to comprehensive data is often limited due to limitations in how data is collected and reported. In South Sudan, the proportion of students enrolled in upper primary level is very low (see Table 13), with less than 7 per cent in P7 and P8. Although national trends show a slight improvement in primary school retention between 2009 and 2013, national figures remain very low.

Table 13. National trends in primary education outcomes for 2009-13

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>% change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% enrolled students in P7</td>
<td>2.55</td>
<td>3.98</td>
<td>56.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% enrolled students in P8</td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td>2.52</td>
<td>90.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: EMIS 2009, 2013 (MoEST, 2015e)

Outcome inequalities across geographical locations

Given the low percentage of students in the last grades of primary education, inequalities between geographic regions appear quite low, although inequalities do exist (see Figure 9). In states such as Central Equatoria and Western Bahr el Ghazal, roughly 4 per cent of primary students are enrolled in P8, while in states such as Jonglei the proportion does not reach 1 per cent. There are no significant differences between enrolment in P7 and P8, indicating that most dropouts occur in early primary grades.

Educational outcomes vary across counties within the same state (see Figure 10). In states such as Central Equatoria and Eastern Equatoria, some counties (Magwi, Torit, Juba, Kajo-Keji, Yei River) have a relatively high proportion of students in upper primary levels while the proportion is very low in others (Budi, Kapoeta South, Lopa, Terekeka). Reflecting patterns of inequality identified above, central and northern counties generally experience lower educational outcomes. While educational outcomes are not necessarily the direct consequence of resource provision, there appears to be a clear pattern in that regions with lower access to educational resources (potentially reflecting marginalization and neglect) are those with the poorest educational outcomes.

Figure 9: Percentage of primary students enrolled in P7 and P8 by state in 2013

Source: EMIS 2013 (MoEST, 2015e)
Outcome inequalities and socio-economic status

During qualitative interviews, participants at the school and ministry level described socio-economic inequities in terms of educational opportunities accessible to children from wealthy or elite families, reporting that the children of many ‘big men’ are sent to study in neighboring countries where the quality of education is higher: "Those who are able, they send their children outside, mostly to Kenya or Uganda, for education. What about the poor? That means their children will not be educated" (Central MoGCSW official). Some families may also view the Sudanese, Ugandan, or Kenyan secondary certificates as more valuable than a South Sudanese certificate in terms of international recognition and access to post-secondary education and employment. A group of secondary teachers reported that some students travel to neighbouring countries to write secondary leaving examinations.

While some ministry officials discussed the resulting impacts on the development of national identity and social cohesion, most focused on inequities in education outcomes. For example, a group of secondary students explained that employers (government and private organisations) are more likely to employ young people with foreign credentials, resulting in jealousy and conflict: "You are in good condition, I am in worse condition." Some participants felt that ministry officials are less likely to advocate for education sector improvement if their own children are not affected by national policy and management decisions. These practices can therefore contribute to the reproduction of socio-economic inequities as well as to pressures for conflict linked to grievances over access to higher quality educational and employment opportunities.

Outcome inequalities and older youth

South Sudan’s Youth Development Policy defines ‘youth’ as young people between age 15 and 35\(^22\) years (MoCYS, 2014). In 2008-2009, 72 per cent of South Sudan’s population was under age 30, while 55 per cent was under the age of 19 years. These young people face significant inequalities in educational and economic outcomes (see Table 14).

\(^{22}\) This definition reflects contextual social, demographic, and judicial dynamics and was adopted by stakeholders at the policy validation workshop (MoCYS, 2014), aligning with the African Youth Charter definition of “youth” (AU, 2006).
### Table 14. Socio-economic indicators for youth aged 15 to 34 years in 2008-2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Never attended school</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literacy rate</td>
<td>40% (15-24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty rate</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SSCCSE, 2010a, 2010b

Many participants identified youth, particularly ‘idle’ or ‘redundant’ (out-of-school and unemployed) youth, as sources of insecurity due to their involvement in criminal activities and communal conflict (e.g. cattle raiding), and their mobilization by politicians and armed forces (see also Bennett et al., 2010; Jok, 2013; Knopf, 2013; Schomerus & Allen, 2010). This was linked to lack of relevant training and employment opportunities as well as to poverty, as noted by national and sub-national government officials and international organisation representatives. Youth in conflict-affected areas may be particularly vulnerable to recruitment by armed forces in the absence of education, training, and employment opportunities (OCHA, 2015a; UNICEF, 2015b).

They are redundant and then it will lead to, they are involved in this kind of violence. If there are places like Malakal and Bentiu where they can join the armed forces, they will always join […] There were no opportunities for going to school, so they had no choice but to join the forces. (International organisation representative)

### 4.5 Conflict occurrence and educational inequalities

Analysis of conflict data reveals that conflict events were concentrated in southern Equatorial states prior to 2011 and shifted to central and northern regions (primarily in the Greater Upper Nile region of Unity, Upper Nile, and Jonglei) after independence, although the Juba region experienced a high occurrence of conflict both before and after 2011 (see Figures 11 and 12). This geographical shift in violent conflict reflects broader governance dynamics and patterns of power (ACLED, 2015). During the second civil war, most militia groups were based in the Greater Upper Nile region, which had historically been isolated and marginalized from both north and south (Sudd Institute, 2014). The continued concentration of rebel commanders (including Riek Machar) and their bases of support in the Greater Upper Nile, combined with perceptions of marginalization from political power concentrated in Juba, have contributed to armed mobilization. The geography of conflict also reflects the role of oil resources in ongoing conflict, with government and SPLM/A-IO forces battling for control of oil fields concentrated in the north-eastern states.

Areas more affected by violent conflict are expected to present worse educational development indicators than those less affected by conflict. Analysis of EMIS and conflict data reveals that states with the highest occurrence of conflict events during 2011-2014 - Unity, Upper Nile, and Jonglei - are those where provision of educational resources (teachers and facilities) is the lowest (see Table 15). Similarly (with the exception of Upper Nile), these are the states with the lowest percentage of students in upper primary grades. While conflict occurrence appears to be correlated with inequalities in educational resources and outcomes, gender parity in access to primary education does not appear to be related to conflict occurrence.

In South Sudan, states with the highest occurrence of conflict are precisely those that receive fewer educational resources in terms of teachers, classrooms, and school facilities. The relationship between indicators of conflict and educational access, resources, and outcomes at the county level were examined as part of the quantitative analysis (see Figure 13 below). The highest correlation occurs between indicators of resources and outcomes, suggesting a strong relationship between these forms of educational inequality at the county level. Less pronounced, but still significant, is the correlation between gender parity and resources and outcomes. However, although analysis shows a geographic shift in conflict events before and after 2011, measures of correlation between conflict and educational indicators are generally quite low. This is expected given the wide socio-economic diversity between counties, concentration of conflict events in some counties (outliers), and large number of counties with zero conflict events. Additional factors affecting analysis include potential under-reporting of conflict events in 2013, as well as the exclusion of ‘criminal’ violence from conflict data, which may reflect the effects of past violence and the prevalence of violent behaviours influencing current conflict.
Table 15: Occurrence of conflict and educational inequalities by state in 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict events 2011-14</th>
<th>Access</th>
<th>School resources</th>
<th>Outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CES</td>
<td>EES</td>
<td>Jonglei</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>213</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>33</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>58.3</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>67.6</td>
<td>50.7</td>
<td>37.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.89</td>
<td>4.96</td>
<td>3.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.14</td>
<td>2.84</td>
<td>2.07</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|                        | CES     | EES              | Jonglei   | Lakes   | NBG  | Unity | UNS | Warrap | WBG  | WES  |
|                        | 213     | 0.99             | 0.83      | 372     | 194  | 52    | 309 | 67      | 60   | 27   |
|                        | 33      | 60               | 85        | 44      | 43   | 59    | 66  | 52      | 41   | 33   |
|                        | 58.3    | 46               | 196       | 136     | 61   | 201   | 126 | 134     | 69   | 79   |
|                        | 67.6    | 50.7             | 37.7      | 47.3    | 36.6 | 31    | 20.3| 42.5    | 47.8 | 32.2 |
|                        | 5.89    | 4.96             | 3.51      | 4.57    | 32.4 | 25.0  | 35.2| 37.2    | 53.8 | 55.5 |
|                        | 4.14    | 2.84             | 2.07      | 2.78    | 4.21 | 1.31  | 3.49| 3.33    | 4.11 | 2.96 |

Source: UCDP (UCDP, 2015)

Figure 11: Number of conflict events by county in 2011-2014

Source: ACLED (Raleigh et al., 2010)
In sum, the quantitative analysis of educational inequalities provides some insight into the current education and conflict situation in South Sudan. Despite efforts to expand education services through school construction and teacher deployment, large inequalities persist in the provision of educational resources across states and counties. Some states (Unity, Upper Nile, and Jonglei) have experienced a relative deprivation of resources. These are precisely the states with the highest concentration of conflict events following a shift from south to north since 2011. These inequalities in resource distribution could be associated with inequitable distribution of development partners in different counties, as well as to the historical marginalization of particular geographical regions including the Greater Upper Nile states, which may be linked to the shifting geography of violence in South Sudan. Education planning and educational interventions should consider these regional inequalities in allocating educational resources if they wish to expand the education system while contributing to greater equity, social justice, and cohesion.

4.6 Chapter summary

Quantitative analysis of education, census, and conflict data have revealed clear patterns of inequality in educational access, resources, and outcomes in South Sudan. Inequalities were particularly clear across different states and across counties within states. For example, states in the Greater Upper Nile region experienced low access to school facilities and resources as well as low enrolment in upper primary grades, while southern counties were generally characterized by more adequate school resources and outcomes compared to central and northern counties. Analysis of EMIS and conflict data reveals that states with the highest occurrence of conflict events since 2011 (Unity, Upper Nile, Jonglei) have the lowest provision of educational resources and the lowest percentage of students in upper primary, reflecting the relationship between conflict occurrence and inequalities in educational resources and outcomes. These concerns were reflected in qualitative interviews during which participants described the effects of inequalities associated with geographic location, rural communities, socio-economic status, livelihoods activities (e.g. cattle-keeping), and older youth on education access, resources, and outcomes. These were perceived as contributing to pressures for conflict.
These patterns of inequality, and their contributions to pressures for conflict, illustrate the importance of the redistribution of education opportunities and resources to support equitable access and outcomes for marginalized or disadvantaged population groups. Equitable access and outcomes are also linked to education policies, programs, and curricula that recognize diverse identities and are relevant to the needs and priorities of communities across South Sudan. This in turn is rooted in equitable representation in decision-making on the allocation of education sector resources and the content of education policies and programs. Taken together, these elements can support horizontal processes of reconciliation between groups as well as vertical relations between communities and government, thus addressing structural legacies of conflict.

Figure 13: Scatterplot matrices of conflict and education inequalities by county in 2013

Source: ACLED (Raleigh et al., 2010), EMIS (MoEST, 2015e)

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24 Scatterplot matrices enable rapid evaluation of correlations between multiple variables. In Figure 14, variables are written in a diagonal line from top left to bottom right and each variable is plotted against the others, with the points representing counties. For example, in the matrix plotting students in P7 and in P8, the points follow an approximate 45-grade line representing a strong, positive correlation between the two variables. In the matrix plotting NER gender parity and student-teacher ratio, points move from top left to bottom right, representing a negative, and rather weak correlation.
CHAPTER 5. REDISTRIBUTION: RESPONSES TO INEQUITIES IN EDUCATION

5.1 Chapter introduction

Redistribution involves ensuring equity and non-discrimination in education opportunities and resources for different groups in society in response to patterns of disadvantage and marginalization. In South Sudan, a range of policy initiatives have been aimed at addressing different dimensions of educational inequity including for girls, students with disabilities, ‘pastoralist’ communities, and older youth. This chapter examines policy initiatives responding to different dimensions of inequity in education, and factors affecting their implementation in practice including approaches to education resource allocation, distribution, and management by both government authorities and international partners. This chapter also examines the potential effects on peacebuilding, reproduction of inequities and pressures for conflict, and explores the ‘humanitarian-development divide’ in education service provision, which is critical to discussions of (re) distribution of education opportunities and resources in South Sudan.

5.2 (Re)distribution of education opportunities

While South Sudan’s national education policies (including the GESP and national curriculum framework) refer to ‘inclusive’ services at all levels, specific policy objectives and responses focus primarily on gender equity and disability, reflecting the influence of global education agendas and priorities such as EFA and MDGs (see also Holmarsdottir et al., 2011). South Sudan recently launched the Girls’ Education Strategy for South Sudan for 2015-2017 (and some states have developed their own policies for girls’ education), and a National Inclusive Education Policy, focusing on learners with disabilities, is being developed. A Directorate of Gender Equity and Social Change, responsible for girls’ education and inclusive education (disability),
Education Sector Governance, Inequity, Conflict and Peacebuilding in South Sudan

has been established within MoEST. Inclusive education objectives are also included in the National Gender Policy and the National Disability and Inclusion Policy (MoGCSW, 2012, 2013). While reflecting advances in the development of an equitable and inclusive education system, these also reflect gaps in systematic policy responses to some of the over-arching and context-specific dimensions of inequity described in the previous section. For example, while the Inclusive Education Policy refers to the inclusion of linguistic, ethnic, and cultural minorities and disadvantaged or marginalized areas, specific policy strategies focus only on learners with disabilities.

The Alternative Education System (AES), guided by the 2014 Policy for Alternative Education Systems, addresses some of the dimensions of inequity emphasized by participants including poverty, rural location, and cattle-keeping communities at the program level. The AES includes non-formal basic education programs such as Community Girls’ Schools (CGS) in (rural) communities without regular schools, Accelerated Learning and Basic Adult Literacy Programs (ALP, BALP) for older youth and adults, with some focus on women, the Pastoralist Education Program (PEP), which includes flexible mobile schools, and Intensive English Courses (IEC) to facilitate transition from Arabic to English instruction (MoEST 2014c).

TVET programs also target older youth, generally focusing on trades such as construction, carpentry, welding, masonry, auto mechanics, computers, food processing, and tailoring. Three ministries are responsible for aspects of vocational training (MoEST, MoCYS, and the Ministry of Labour and Public Service). However, lack of a cohesive policy and programming approach has resulted in program fragmentation. In 2014, a TVET policy was drafted with support from UNESCO; a national policy and strategy review is underway and modules are being developed as part of the national curriculum review process. However, as discussed in detail in Section 6.4, these training programs focus on ‘modern’ commercial activities that may hold limited cultural and economic relevance for local livelihoods systems in rural and cattle-keeping communities.

Not all AES and TVET programs are prioritized in implementation. This limits responses to specific dimensions of inequity, including geographic location and age, which are linked to conflict. In 2013, CGS accounted for 4 per cent of AES learners and PEP for 0.7 per cent, while ALP accounted for 84 per cent (MoEST, 2014a). Programs are not equitably distributed across geographic regions. For example, CGS and PEP are not implemented in all states or counties. For example, it was reported that in Warrap, ‘pastoralist’ education programs are being implemented in only four of six counties. Sub-national officials reported that they did not know why AES programs are implemented in some locations and not in others. Only two government TVET centres are reportedly functioning, and the few operating government or donor-supported programs are concentrated in towns limiting access for young people in other counties and communities and reinforcing urban/rural divides. MoCYS has developed a Youth Payam Service program intended to provide local livelihoods and skills training. This has not yet been launched due to lack of funds.

Several participants, particularly at the state level, reported that ALP and BALP implementation focus heavily on security forces, including military and police, and that technical, livelihoods, and literacy training has been included in national demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR) efforts (SSDDRC, 2010; UNESCO, 2013). In some cases, ALP services are also provided for civilian (host community) populations, such as in the context of reintegration programs for children involved in armed groups. However, in many states, a strong security-oriented focus – at least in terms of implementation – has the potential to influence perceived inequity in terms of who benefits from such programs. This can contribute to frustrations and grievances and pressures for conflict when young people see that members of security forces benefit from alternative education programs while the wider population does not.

Programs intended to address various dimensions of educational inequality are primarily supported by donors. For example, the DFID-funded GESS program focusing on capitation grants and cash transfers is the main girls’ education initiative. In an approach intended to encourage retention, girls in upper primary and secondary (P5 through S4) receive cash transfers of 125 SSP per year based on regular school attendance. The program also includes community awareness and mentoring components. The WFP-supported Food for Education school feeding program also provides incentives to encourage girls’ education, as well as broader school enrolment and retention in rural schools. AES and TVET programs are also supported and implemented primarily by donors and development partners. In 2013-2014, 70 per cent of budgeted AES funds were from external donors (MoFCIEP, 2013), with donors such as USAID are supporting the provision and expansion of alternative education, including CGS and ‘pastoralist’ education. Reliance on donor
support in these areas may limit government initiative in responding to dimensions of inequity linked to pressures for conflict, and contribute to the dominance of global agendas over context-specific priorities.

**Examining ‘peace dividends’ in education**

How education sector opportunities are (re)distributed affects public perceptions of government legitimacy, which represents one of the key links between education service provision and conflict (or peace) (Barakat et al., 2008; Burde et al., 2011; Rose & Greeley, 2006). The education sector is of particular significance in shaping relations and trust between governments and populations “given that it is the largest, most widespread and visible institution in the country” (Rose & Greeley, 2006: 4). In South Sudan, post-CPA government and donor strategy documents described education as representing a ‘peace dividend’ or tangible peace outcome through increased access to education and livelihoods opportunities (e.g. GoNU & GoSS, 2008; UNESCO, 2011; UNICEF, 2012). Provision of services is itself viewed as the key objective, with little or no consideration of how those services may contribute to structural or cultural forms of violence and inequity and to pressures for conflict.

During qualitative interviews, participants in all research sites reported that aspects of education sector governance limited public confidence and trust in the government. Local officials and school representatives, including PTA members and head teachers, expressed frustration over insufficient government resources for education: “[The] government only sends teachers, but they don’t even give a piece of paper to the school” (Payam official). A national public opinion survey in South Sudan (IRI, 2013) found that 68 per cent of respondents were not satisfied with government provision of education services. As one group of secondary students stated, when the government does not provide needed resources, citizens are ‘exposed’ to risks (associated with poverty and a lack of services and economic opportunities) and will blame the government. This undermines post-CPA promises and expectations of ‘peace dividends’ for communities through increased access to social services such as education. This affects state-society relations, including community perceptions of government legitimacy linked to quality of service delivery (Davies, 2011; Knopf, 2013; Rose & Greeley, 2006). This is of key importance in a context in which relations between government and citizens, and public trust in government and governance institutions, is identified as central to peace and state-building (e.g. GoNU & GoSS, 2008; JAM, 2005).

In general, participant discussions about the (re)distribution of education services and the importance of facilitating access to education for marginalized groups identified service provision as the key objective, with limited consideration of connections to structural forms of violence and inequity. For example, participants stressed the importance of engaging ‘idle’ or ‘redundant’ youth to keep them busy and to prevent crime, political mobilization, and armed violence. These narratives illustrate a stabilization and security-oriented view of youth as risks to be controlled in order to maintain social order (Davies, 2011; Rose & Greeley, 2006). This reflects a neoliberal view focusing on the security contributions of both education (Novelli, 2010; Robertson et al., 2006; Rose & Greeley, 2006) and peacebuilding (Paris, 2010), as well as a ‘greed’ (as opposed to ‘grievance’) understanding of conflict. However, primarily security-oriented perspectives often focus on ‘containment’, with less attention to underlying conflict dynamics including power relations, exclusion, and grievances (Newman, 2011). Service provision is the key objective, with little or no consideration of how those services may contribute to perpetuating structural forms of violence and inequity.

### 5.3 (Re)distribution of education resources

**Budgeting and distribution of education funding**

How resources are allocated can redress or entrench marginalization and inequity, as well as contribute to conflict. This is of particular significance with respect to the education sector, which may be especially prone to manipulation and polarisation (Davies, 2011). Funds are transferred and distributed to states and counties in the form of general block grants and conditional transfers earmarked for education, used for salary payments and operating costs. Transfers vary by state and county, based on the number of schools and personnel (MoFCIEP, 2014).

Transfers reflect equal but not necessarily equitable allocation, as they are not necessarily proportional to population size, student enrolment, actual service provision costs, or level of need, reflecting the significant under-funding of the education sector and resulting in inequitable allocation of resources (and development) across states and counties (see Table 16). Per-student spending varies widely across states, ranging from SSP 143.5 (USD 48.5) in Warrap to SSP 394.9 (USD 133.4) in Upper Nile in 2014-2015. Connections between state funding allocations and conflict are unclear, given that Upper Nile, characterized by some of the
greatest educational inequalities and conflict events, receives the highest per-student allocations, reflecting the need for attention to how education transfers are allocated and managed at the state and sub-state level. Disparities across geographic locations reflect disparities across ethnic groups or sub-groups, as many local borders (e.g. counties, payams, bomas) are drawn along ethnic lines (Schomerus & Allen, 2010). This can result in perceived marginalization when there are significant inequities in distribution of human and material education resources across counties, as illustrated by the quantitative analysis.

Table 16. Annual primary education delivery transfers to states for 2014-15

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CES</td>
<td>33,271,522</td>
<td>1,462,604</td>
<td>150,629</td>
<td>220.9 74.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EES</td>
<td>26,839,787</td>
<td>1,274,684</td>
<td>94,876</td>
<td>282.9 95.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jonglei</td>
<td>34,516,137</td>
<td>1,753,272</td>
<td>205,389</td>
<td>168.1 56.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lakes</td>
<td>23,024,245</td>
<td>963,541</td>
<td>97,894</td>
<td>235.2 79.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NBG</td>
<td>27,671,719</td>
<td>955,346</td>
<td>161,425</td>
<td>171.4 57.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unity</td>
<td>20,954,335</td>
<td>804,703</td>
<td>177,583</td>
<td>118.0 39.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNS</td>
<td>39,284,490</td>
<td>1,281,365</td>
<td>99,488</td>
<td>394.9 133.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warrap</td>
<td>26,261,122</td>
<td>1,283,621</td>
<td>182,997</td>
<td>143.5 48.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WBG</td>
<td>17,598,572</td>
<td>440,010</td>
<td>58,735</td>
<td>299.6 101.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WES</td>
<td>25,105,336</td>
<td>759,884</td>
<td>82,451</td>
<td>304.5 102.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MoEST, 2014a; MoFCIEP, 2014; NBS, 2015

USD amounts are calculated using the official exchange rate of SSP 2.96, as cited in the 2014-2015 Budget Book (MoFCIEP, 2014).
While some program decisions such as school construction may consider disparities in education indicators based on EMIS data, for example, planning and budgeting generally do not account for geographic disparities (Sigsgaard, 2013). There are also variations in the proportion of funds actually disbursed versus those allocated across states (MoFCIEP, 2014). Counties are responsible for distributing funds to payam offices, and allocating (reportedly) an equal share to each payam. However, this can result in inequities across geographic areas, disadvantaging counties with more payams or counties and payams with larger populations. Perceived inequities in budget allocations among local authorities may also be associated with lack of participation in decision-making.

The allocation sent to Tombura County, it's bigger than that of Ibba County [...] [But] Ibba County has five payams, when Tombura County has three payams [...] The small allocation for the county with five payams, when it is divided it is very less, compared to the bigger county that has only three payams. (Participant from Central Equatoria)

Transfers to states and counties do not currently cover operating and capital costs. In theory, they are meant to ‘top off’ transfer funds through local revenue or income (e.g. taxation, customs charges, oil revenues), although different states have different levels of access to revenue sources such as oil or customs charges. In practice, states generally do not have their own revenues and rely on central transfers for education service provision (GRSS, 2012a, 2013; RSS, 2012; Watkins, 2013; World Bank, 2012). Oil-producing states are meant to receive 2 per cent of national oil revenues, and communities (local government councils) in oil-producing areas are meant to receive 3 per cent. However, existing legislation has not been implemented, and although revenues are reportedly disbursed, there are few oversight and accountability procedures and revenues barely benefitted communities (Deng, 2015). Some MoEST officials felt that local revenue shortages were due to a lack of motivation at the state level, or that revenues are not allocated to education:

There's no political will in the lower level of governance. Because if the states prioritize education, that means from their own local revenue collection, they can top up from their own generation of resources. But they don’t want [to]. Instead, from what we sent, they deduct it for their own use. (Central MoEST official)

In discussing allocation of funds to the state level, a number of central and sub-national MoEST officials interviewed as part of this study described concerns regarding the transfer process, including blocking or diverting of funds at the state level, reflecting limited vertical trust between levels of government. Some payam officials criticized the lack of follow-up by the central MoEST, to ensure proper budget allocation (“They just stay there idle in Juba”). Funds are transferred from the centre to the state Ministry of Finance, and then to the state MoEST, and some central and state MoEST officials also described poor communication, delayed disbursement, and diversion of education funds by the Ministry of Finance, reflecting a lack of trust between different ministries within states. As one central official noted, “When these states receive this money, they go and pay their local staff instead of paying teachers. The little money that goes to the teachers, the state government uses it for other things.”

Those who are transferring the cash from Juba, the national Ministry of Finance, they don’t provide us with copies of transfer. So sometimes we don’t know if this money is transferred or not [...] How can we go and ask [the state] Ministry of Finance that we have money here if we don’t have some paper? [...] That is why sometimes we don’t know what is going on. Is this money going to the counties or not? No, we don’t know. (State MoEST official)

When states and counties are unable to cover basic school operating costs (e.g. infrastructure, facilities, supplies), schools charge registration fees (‘school development funds’ contributions) which can affect access for certain populations, including children with limited financial means, and girls in particular (GRSS, 2012a; Watkins, 2013; World Bank, 2012). This practice also reinforces disparities between wealthy and poor communities, contributing to pressures for conflict. As illustrated by quantitative analysis, certain areas that experience greater deprivation in educational resources (e.g. Unity, Upper Nile, Jonglei) have also experienced more conflict events since 2011, reflecting the importance of considering the potential effects of educational inequities on broader pressures for conflict.
Budget allocations illustrate gaps between global and national education policy priorities (e.g. expanded access to education opportunities) and their implementation, as well as limited equity-oriented redistribution of resources in terms of the populations and areas targeted. Stated priorities are also undermined by allocation disparities within MoEST (see Table 17), which suggest that sector budgeting does not necessarily address, in practical terms, key areas of inequity and governance identified by research participants as being connected to conflict. For example, in 2014-2015, AES received 1 per cent of the education budget and TVET received 0.5 per cent although in 2013-2014, only 21 per cent of AES allocations and no TVET allocations were disbursed. Funds are allocated primarily to basic education, with only 14 per cent allocated to secondary and TVET (and less actually disbursed) (MoFCIEP, 2014), reflecting limited attention to older youth, who are often accused of involvement in violent conflict. In addition, those responsible for addressing equity and inclusion in the MoEST are marginalized in terms of resource allocation: the Directorate of Gender Equity and Social Change received 0.2 per cent of the education budget in 2014-2015, and in 2013-2014 only 4 per cent of allocated funds were disbursed.

Table 17: Select budget allocations and outturns for 2013-2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Budget allocation</th>
<th>Reported outturn</th>
<th>% disbursed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basic education</td>
<td>322,454,219</td>
<td>252,966,110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES</td>
<td>6,905,309</td>
<td>1,480,278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary education</td>
<td>67,799,510</td>
<td>24,733,747</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TVET</td>
<td>3,741,974</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management of teacher training</td>
<td>3,963,491</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promotion of national languages</td>
<td>783,330</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy and systems development</td>
<td>42,250,253</td>
<td>1,054,302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender equity and social change</td>
<td>2,357,323</td>
<td>87,332</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MoFCIEP, 2014

Donor allocation of school resources

Donor and government representatives were generally aware of the potential for resource distribution to contribute to community tensions. Some described the use of ‘conflict-sensitive’ criteria for resource distribution (e.g. school construction, capitation grants, and school feeding), as intended to avoid tensions and political influence, and to encourage communities to improve their schools in order to access resources. Criteria for different programs include accessibility (presence of roads and mobile networks), security, school facilities (e.g. latrine, kitchen), school governing bodies, and record-keeping (e.g. registration and attendance). However, certain schools and communities, particularly in hard-to-reach or conflict-affected areas, struggle to meet criteria (e.g. accessibility, communication, security, school facilities) and to adhere to program requirements (e.g. school calendars, reporting), resulting in further disadvantage or marginalization.

Donor resources are often allocated based on the presence of NGOs or other implementing partners in specific areas. One research participant explained that numerous NGOs may be concentrated in certain areas, and that states or counties with multiple NGOs providing resources and services receive the same government budget as those without. This can shape perceived inequities in resource distribution as well as disparities across locations. How education partners engage with schools also affects perceived inequity in the allocation of resources. Teachers, PTA members, and students in different states reported frustrations when donors and partners visit schools, conduct needs assessments and raise expectations, and do not subsequently provide the expected support or even share assessment results. This leads to perceived inequity when they hear (on the radio or television) that other schools or communities have received resources such as learning materials or latrines, while their school or community has not.

You will go and generate kind of a need and an interest in the community and you move out, so it will kind of cause a frustration in the community because this [donor] came and has gone out with nothing that they have left on the ground. (International organisation representative)

Some payam officials and school managers stated that they do not know how donors make decisions about
resource allocation, for example, why some schools receive resources while others do not, or why donors decide to stop providing support to some schools. This impacts community or school trust in donors and development partners. In this sense, efforts to promote equity for certain communities may further entrench actual marginalization and inequity for others, even when criteria for resource allocation exist, and can contribute to perceived inequities among communities or geographic areas. As one teacher and PTA group explained, when resources are allocated to one community or school and not to others, “we think that we are not important.” This is particularly significant in conflict-affected contexts where perceived fairness of resource allocation for service delivery affects community perceptions of government (and donor) legitimacy (Davies, 2011), as discussed in greater detail in Section 5.4 below.

**Transparency and accountability of education resource utilisation**

Concerns identified by some teachers, payam and county officials, and education partner representatives, included political influence over resource allocation and distribution (e.g. school construction, distribution of materials), nepotism in teacher and school headmaster appointments (including politically-motivated appointments), and diversion of funds, including salaries, all of which have been cited as examples of misuse and ‘elite capture’ of resources in the education sector (Hallak & Poisson, 2007). The diversion of public funds represents a significant concern in South Sudan’s ‘political marketplace’, limiting resources available for the delivery of basic services such as education (de Waal, 2014; Mores, 2013). During interviews, participants spoke of the diversion of educational resources or opportunities (e.g. influence on school construction, hiring of teachers) as a means of securing political support, as well as in terms of ‘collective’ benefit (e.g. enabling access to resources and services, such as schools, for communities). However, diversion or manipulation of scarce educational resources and opportunities, particularly when linked to ethnic or tribal politics (Mores, 2013; Rolandsen, 2015) can entrench existing inequities and exacerbate factional social and political divides.

Recognizing the need to address such issues, the government has introduced a number of systems and initiatives to increase accountability and transparency in education sector resource management. These include the development of the World Bank-supported Local Services Support (LSS) education sector planning, budgeting, and reporting guidelines for state and county governments, and the establishment of State and County Transfers Monitoring Committees, responsible for coordinating transfer use and monitoring and producing regular budget performance reports (GRSS, 2013; MoEST, 2014). However, these are not implemented at all levels or in all states and counties, and local dynamics of political authority shape decision-making processes at the sub-national level.

**Privatisation of education**

Donors referred to the increasing number of private schools in South Sudan. These include church-run, NGO-run, and community-run schools as well as for-profit schools run by individuals or groups. Between 2009 and 2011, the number of private primary schools increased from 117 to 275, and private secondary schools rose from 30 to 59 (MoEST, 2010, 2014a). In 2013, 74 per cent of primary schools and 62 per cent of secondary schools were government-run or government-aided, while 26 per cent of primary schools and 37 per cent of secondary schools were private or community-managed (MoEST, 2014a). Private teacher-training institutions (TTIs) also play a central role in the education system, as faith-based TTIs have been described as the only fully functioning TTIs in the country.

The privatization of education services reflects neoliberal policies focused on private responsibility for public service provision, which is linked to efforts to lower public spending and facilitate cost-effective education service expansion, individual choice and increased efficiency, accountability, and quality through competition (Astiz et al., 2002; Mundy & Menashy, 2014; Robertson & Dale, 2013). In South Sudan, private schools are meant to “bring about school competition leading to improved quality of delivery, increase access to education, reduce congestion in public schools and facilitate sending children abroad for studies” (MoEST, 2015a: 34). Private schools are described as filling much-needed gaps in the education system, and account for the majority of enrolment in some areas. For example, non-government schools accounted for 52 per cent of all primary schools in Juba County in 2013, compared to 23 per cent in Malakal County (MoEST, 2014a). One payam official reported that it would be impossible to meet education needs without private schools; roughly 6,600 students are registered in government primary schools in the payam, while over 19,500 are registered in private primary schools.
While private schools must be registered with MoEST, there is no national policy to regulate private schools (one is reportedly under development) and no guidelines have been established for registration fees, teacher salaries, or student admission. Private schools are based primarily in towns, rather than in rural areas, and fees are often quite high, restricting enrolment for students of lower income groups. This has the potential to reinforce socio-economic stratification across schools. Inequities also emerge in relation to the quality of teaching and learning; private schools can afford to hire qualified teachers, for example from Kenya or Uganda, and class sizes are smaller.

It appears that both the government and donors are explicitly or implicitly encouraging this system of education: private (not-for-profit) schools can access capitation grants if they have annual fees of less than 200 SSP in urban centres or 100 SSP in rural areas, and can benefit from WFP school feeding if they meet similar criteria. However, it has been reported that low-fee private schools do not necessarily facilitate access for poor communities (Robertson & Dale, 2013), and might also reflect that donors (and indeed MoEST) have lost confidence in the national government to deliver public education services. While it appears that most private schools in South Sudan are ‘low fee’ rather than ‘elite’ private schools, the potential implications for inequality in access, resources, and outcomes must still be considered. The privatization of education services can marginalize or exclude certain groups, reinforcing existing inequities – including both horizontal inter-group and vertical socio-economic inequities. Privatization of schools can also contribute to the reproduction of an ‘elite’ class with greater access to economic and political resources, contributing to pressures for conflict.

5.4 The humanitarian-development divide

Responses to inequity and conflict in the education sector in South Sudan are further complicated by ongoing armed conflict. This includes fighting between government and opposition forces concentrated in Unity, Upper Nile, and Jonglei, while the other seven states have been affected by past and recent smaller-scale fighting between government and non-state armed groups, and between ‘communal’ groups. Inequities in education services and outcomes in conflict-affected areas, including between northern and southern states, have been exacerbated by school closure, displacement, chronic insecurity, and the targeting of young people by armed forces. These inequities have in turn created pressures for young people to join armed groups, feeding into cycles of violence. However, discussions of education and conflict in South Sudan have focused predominantly on the disruptive effects of conflict on education, rather than on the contributions of the education sector to conflict. This requires attention to how approaches to resource allocation in humanitarian contexts contribute to inequities and, in turn, to pressures affecting the continuation or reoccurrence of violent conflict. Two key governance concerns 26 were identified during qualitative interviews: the emergence of a ‘parallel’ system of education in conflict-affected contexts, and geographic inequities in education resource allocation resulting from a focus on humanitarian response.

A parallel system of education

A critical concern stated by representatives of central and sub-national ministries and education partners was the emergence of a parallel system of education, based on the use of different curricula, teacher training programs, and management approaches (e.g. school fees), in humanitarian contexts. Education services in these contexts are provided nearly exclusively by (international) humanitarian organizations, with limited government engagement, although discussions with government and humanitarian actors revealed differing perspectives. Government actors stated that they would like to be involved in EiE provision, but were limited by security concerns. For example, a participant in Upper Nile explained that MoEST would like to reopen a primary school in Malakal, but that parents are afraid of sending their children out of the Protection of Civilians site (POC – where education services are provided) due to continued insecurity. An international NGO representative added that parents are also reluctant to send their children to government schools because education services are provided free-of-charge in the POC. MoEST officials perceive some humanitarian actors’ approaches to service provision as overshadowing or bypassing the government, resulting in tensions and potentially affecting community perceptions of government legitimacy: “Are you in front of the government, or are you supporting the government?” (Central MoEST official).

26 Tensions between humanitarian and development goals are discussed in detail in UNICEF’s (2015) PBEA case study on humanitarian action, conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding through education in South Sudan.
On the other hand, a number of international organization representatives described MoEST’s lack of involvement in EiE services, with one explaining that the ministry views POCs ‘as another nation’. In many conflict-affected communities, including opposition-held areas, the government is viewed with hostility, and MoEST education services may be viewed as tools of the government, which restricts MoEST officials’ access here due to security concerns. This raises questions about how to support government services in a context in which the government is a key conflict actor. In cases where the government cannot provide education, humanitarian services are necessary. In these areas, communities may view the government as having limited legitimacy, potentially due to perceived marginalization in terms of the redistribution of education services and resources, as illustrated by quantitative analyses revealing greater resource inequalities in states such as Unity and Upper Nile. In these conflict-affected areas, government services may also be viewed as reflecting limited representation and recognition of diverse political perspectives and ethnic communities, linked to broader dynamics of political, economic, and cultural exclusion. However, as noted by some international organization representatives, the government has questioned the ‘impartiality’ of humanitarian actors operating in opposition-held areas and criticized their cooperation with the SPLM-IO.

(Perceived) inequities in humanitarian resource allocation

Approaches to education resource allocation by international donors in humanitarian contexts have been described as fuelling and reinforcing geographic inequities and contributing to pressures for conflict. In August 2015, education cluster (EiE) humanitarian activities were being implemented in 9 of 10 states (Northern Bahr el Ghazal was the exception), with education activities concentrated primarily in Unity, Upper Nile, and Jonglei (OCHA, 2015b). Humanitarian activities have necessarily focused on communities most highly affected by conflict, including POCs and IDP communities in the Greater Upper Nile region. However, this has led to frustrations among authorities and communities in ‘stable’ (e.g. Equatorial) states, due to perceived exclusion from resources and support as well as perceived ‘rewarding’ of violence (‘conflict dividends’), which was noted by both central and state MoEST officials: “Where there is fire, more water will be thrown […] If you are okay, no one takes care of you” (Central MoEST official). As noted in one paper, this “suggests that the only way a community can be heard is by taking arms against its government” (Lotyam & Arden, 2015: 8). While some participants explained that they understood why international responses were concentrated in ‘crisis’ areas, the significance of perceived inequities for example by sub-national governments or communities, was nonetheless emphasized.

The distribution of national and international partners across geographic locations affects education service provision and perceived inequities, including within conflict-affected states. Participants explained that organizations may be concentrated in particular locations, or there may be gaps in geographical coverage, exacerbating disparities in services and support across regions and communities. For example, in Upper Nile state, five education cluster partners were operating in Malakal County in August 2015 and none were operating in six other counties, with further disparities across payams (OCHA, 2015b). However, this is also due to the prioritization of particular areas resulting from funding shortages. While operation sites are determined based on security, physical access, access provided by opposition forces, population displacement, presence of implementing partners, and so on, implications for community perceptions of marginalization should be considered.

Currently we have partners but in a handful, just a few pockets of locations. Some of the locations have not had the kind of responses […] What has always been a problem is that in some of the locations good partners are able to take on the activities. In some of the locations there are no partners. (International organization representative).

The diversion of funds from development to humanitarian response since late-2013 has significantly affected the operation of South Sudan’s education sector, placing additional pressures on a system that was already reproducing patterns of inequity and pressures for conflict. However, both MoEST and donors described efforts to ensure the continuation of development-oriented programs across the country, including in conflict-affected areas. GPE funds were not diverted to humanitarian response, and the government and partners both decided to retain those resources for longer-term national education system development.

27 While maps showing the distribution of education cluster (EiE) partners across counties in South Sudan are prepared by OCHA (see http://www.unocha.org/south-sudan/), comprehensive geographic distribution information is not available for education development partners. However, the PEG is conducting a partner mapping exercise that includes details on geographic areas of operation.
GESS capitation grants are being provided in opposition-held areas, and programs such as UNICEF’s PBEA are being implemented in EiE contexts, representing the flexibility of certain development-oriented programs in terms of their adaptation to humanitarian response. The PEG is currently working on a strategy to address the emergency-development divide, although it is unclear to what extent (if at all) multiple dimensions of inequity and peacebuilding objectives will be considered.

Short-term humanitarian efforts respond to the impacts of violence, ideally using a conflict-sensitive approach, rather than addressing issues at the root of the conflict. However, these efforts have long-term implications that can perpetuate inequities and contribute to pressures for future conflict. This is linked to perceptions regarding inequities in resource (re)distribution and recognition of the diverse needs of different conflict-affected communities, as well as the resulting effects on vertical relations between communities and decision-makers, including government authorities and donors. In South Sudan, efforts are being made to integrate principles of conflict sensitivity into both development and humanitarian efforts. For example, the retention of GPE funds for longer-term education development is based on the requirement that efforts involve a conflict-sensitive approach considering how education programs can contribute to (or mitigate) conflict. A conflict-sensitive tip sheet has been adapted to guide planning and implementation of CHF-funded EiE activities. This represents a significant step beyond pre-2013 development approaches that were ‘conflict-blind’ and did not consider the ways in which service delivery might contribute to inequities and pressures for conflict. However, as noted earlier, conflict sensitivity has often been associated with humanitarian EiE responses, which may limit analysis of the connections between education sector governance or management and the political, economic, social, and cultural dimensions of broader conflict and peacebuilding processes.

5.6 Chapter summary

In South Sudan, a range of policy initiatives and programs such as the AES have aimed to address different dimensions of educational inequity. However, specific policy strategies, including those focusing on girls’ education and students with disabilities, reflect the influence of global education agendas, with less attention to context-specific dimensions of inequity linked to conflict including ‘pastoralist’ communities and older youth. Gaps between policy and practice are linked to under-resourcing of the education sector, inequitable budget allocations across states, counties, and communities (linked to ‘equal’ or ‘transparent’ criteria), and limited budget allocations and expenditures on equity priorities within the MoEST. In this sense, approaches to the (re)distribution of opportunities and resources (including increasing support for private education services) on the part of both government and donors may be reproducing certain dimensions of inequity linked to conflict, along geographic, socio-economic, ethnic, and other lines.

Following the CPA, the expansion of education services was described as a key ‘peace dividend’, with little attention to how approaches to the (re)distribution of opportunities and resources might reproduce inequity and contribute to future conflict. Failure to deliver these ‘dividends’ and meet community expectations has affected perceptions of government legitimacy and trust. This in turn has significant implications for confidence in political representation and vertical dimensions of cohesion (and reconciliation) between communities and authorities. (Re)distribution of education opportunities and resources in South Sudan has been hugely affected by the outbreak of violent conflict and associated humanitarian responses. This has raised concerns about (government) representation in education service provision, the emergence of a ‘parallel’ system of education in conflict-affected contexts, and geographic inequities in humanitarian-development resource allocation, as well as perceptions of ‘conflict dividends’.
CHAPTER 6. RECOGNITION: INTEGRATION AND SOCIAL COHESION IN EDUCATION

6.1 Chapter introduction

The broader dimensions of integration and social cohesion are influenced by recognition of, respect for, and responses to diversity, identity, and equity in education structures, processes, and content. This chapter examines how responses to diversity in schools affects inclusion and integration, including specific attention to national and border schools, as well as responses to conflict and violence in schools. The effects of the management and governance of the education sector on patterns of cultural violence and inequity are also examined in this chapter, which also explores how education content and narratives, including languages of instruction, curriculum content, and the economic relevance of education programs, contribute to both social cohesion and cultural violence. Finally, this chapter examines aspects of recognition among teachers, who play a critical role in ensuring inclusive and cohesive learning processes, focusing on the impacts of recruitment and management practices.

Understanding education’s peacebuilding role

Participant descriptions of the education sector’s peacebuilding role focused primarily on shaping social relations, behaviours, and identities and contributing to (horizontal) social recognition and cohesion. They described education, including schooling and co-curricular activities, as promoting peaceful attitudes (e.g. having ‘peace in your heart’), ‘good’ behaviour (e.g. respect, self-control, obedience), non-violent conflict resolution (e.g. apologising for mistakes, negotiation), and cooperation and coexistence. This reflects a view that reduces cohesion to peace education, rather than considering more complex horizontal and vertical dimensions of recognition and cohesion.

Education will build peace instead of increasing conflict, because it will make people understand how to solve problems instead of resulting in violence [...] If there’s a problem, you discuss or solve it through dialogue, and maybe you agree and you solve it peacefully rather than taking violence [first]. (Central MoEST official)

While these are essential peacebuilding elements, they reflect a view of peacebuilding as individual or inter-personal knowledge, attitude, and behaviour, resulting from learning about peace (peace education) and inter-group contact (Novelli & Smith, 2011; Tawil, 2001), rather than responding to structural patterns of political, economic, and cultural inequity that manifest themselves in the education system through policy, financing, and implementation. While peacebuilding approaches focusing on inter-group contact and dialogue can have positive impacts on individuals’ attitudes and relations, they generally have a limited effect on political and economic structures or realities linked to conflict (Abu-Nimer & Hallward, 2007; Hewstone et al., 2014; Steinberg, 2013).

6.2 School diversity, integration, and cohesion

Diversity in schools: Promoting inclusion and integration

Nearly all participants spoke of the importance of schools in bringing together students of different (ethnic) groups, to facilitate interaction and understanding. However, school diversity may be limited in areas where local borders (e.g. payams, counties) are drawn along ethnic lines, with students and teachers more likely to come from the same community. Some participants felt that this can contribute to peace in schools: “There [are] the borders between county and county, and the people remain in their own [...] It is good because they will have their own peace within themselves” (Central MoEST official). Others felt that “tribal” schools reinforce divisions, while mixed schools are central to peacebuilding:

Quantitative data on student and teacher ethnicity across different locations (e.g. counties, payams, schools, urban or rural locations) in South Sudan is not available, which limits comprehensive analysis of these trends.
You have some schools, tribal schools. You see maybe a school for Bari, and right from a teacher to the pupils, all belong to the same ethnic group[...]. There is no mixing at all and they should regard maybe others as not their friends[...]. If you have mixed schools, children play together. Different tribes, they are in school, they make friendship with one another, and they can form a new generation which is different from the old one which is divided on tribal lines. (Central MoEST official)

School diversity appears to vary by level of education, as well as by location. Diversity may be greater in urban schools and secondary schools, which tend to draw students from different communities. Primary students are more likely to remain within their own communities, while secondary students may study outside their community due to the lack of secondary schools in many areas. Generally, schools in urban centres were described as being more diverse than schools in rural areas. For example, one primary school in Tonj East reportedly included students from six or seven payams, representing multiple sections and clans of the same tribe. Discussions of diversity in schools are also shaped by perceptions of inter-group difference and similarity, which vary across geographic areas and communities. For example, there may be greater perceived similarity and lower perceived conflict among Equatorial communities (due to similar or shared languages, for instance) compared to Dinka, Nuer, Shilluk, and others.

School diversity in different communities may also be increasing due to the scale of internal displacement. However, while many participants emphasised the importance of diversity in schools, the potential results of such diversity were rarely critically examined, with interaction, understanding, and unity often an assumed outcome and the potentially negative implications (e.g. conflict) generally silenced.

Questions of diversity and integration are key concerns in education for displaced communities including IDPs, refugees, and returnees. Partner representatives in Malakal, for example, described ethnic tensions and violence in the POC (between Nuer, Dinka, and Shilluk communities), resulting in segregation of schools along ethnic lines. Another partner representative explained that they ensure that education services (e.g. ALP) are provided (separately) to each ethnic group in the POC, in order to reduce tensions. On the other hand, actors supporting refugee and returnee communities generally promote school integration with host communities. One donor representative emphasized the importance of allowing local students to study in schools for refugee communities, in order to reduce tensions over education costs, as schools for refugees are free. However, while host community students may be free to access refugee and returnee schools, and vice-versa, integration may be limited by the physical separation of the communities. One participant in Warrap state explained that residents are able to attend schools constructed by UN agencies for ‘returnees’ from Sudan. However, returnees have settled on one side of town, apart from the rest of the community, and this physical separation can limit school integration.

National schools and border schools

Many participants including teachers, school managers, education officials, and partner representatives, emphasized the importance of national secondary schools in bringing together students from different states and ethnic groups. These schools are meant to be “the symbol of unity, model, cohesion and centers of excellence in the country[...]. and set the state for interethnic dialogue, leading to peacebuilding” (MoEST, 2015a: 34). Each state is supposed to have one national secondary boarding school with students from all states (20 per cent from the host state, 80 per cent from other states), but these schools are “are operating in name, but not in the full status” (State MoEST official). Students generally come from the host state, with a few from neighbouring states, and the admissions process can marginalize or exclude certain groups, reinforcing existing inequities. One school principal explained that student admission is based on absolute levels of academic performance (South Sudan primary school leaving examination), with no clear criteria to ensure equitable access based on gender, socio-economic status, or community (e.g. pastoralist, rural) background.
People may perceive inequities between national and state-run secondary schools, especially when criteria for admission are not clearly communicated or are perceived to marginalize certain groups. These potential impacts are not necessarily recognized by national school management; as one school principal reported, there is no difference in outcomes between national and state schools because the same curriculum is used. Inequalities are also perceived to exist between teachers in national and state-run secondary schools. For example, teachers in national schools reportedly receive housing allowances, which state-managed teachers do not.

Local border schools, located between counties, payams, or communities, represent another approach to promote school diversity and reconciliation by bringing together members of conflicting groups. For example, UNICEF has supported the construction of schools along borders between conflict-affected payams in Tonj East County. A donor representative in Malakal described the establishment of education services along POC borders in response to tensions between Nuer, Dinka, and Shilluk communities. However, very few participants discussed the potential value of local border schools, which, compared to national schools, would require fewer resources to establish, benefit both primary and secondary students as well as communities outside state capitals, and specifically target conflicting groups.

**Conflict and violence in schools**

While aspects of language and curriculum reflect ‘cultural’ forms of violence, broader dynamics of direct conflict and violence are also perpetuated in schools (Tawil, 2001), representing the legacy of historical conflict and contributing to intergenerational transmission of violence and to community involvement in continued conflict. In terms of education sector management and governance, this requires attention to the ways in which different forms of violence (including GBV) are manifested, how conflict and violence in schools and surrounding communities are handled, and how such factors affect horizontal and vertical relations.

During interviews and group discussions, some participants noted that teachers may be biased toward particular students, favoring some based on ethnicity or tribe. Primary and secondary teachers generally reported that they did not observe inter-group (e.g. inter-ethnic) conflict between students, although conflict may occur over limited classroom resources (e.g. pens, desks, seating). Previous experiences of violence, and parental influence, can affect how students respond to and cope with conflict and diversity in schools, which is increasingly likely given the scale of internal displacement. Some primary students described fear, hatred, and conflict between ‘newcomer’ students and other students, while other students and youth reported that parents may affect conflict dynamics in schools, reflecting some intergenerational transmission of fear and violence: “They will think their child has been treated badly and will bring tribe into it. They will say that the child is treated badly because of tribe.” (Youth representative).

Participants emphasised the role of both teachers and students in responding to school conflict. In some schools, head girls and boys or student committees will address conflict between other students, while teachers (disciplinary committees) deal with disciplinary measures and more serious conflicts. Students and teachers in different schools reported that conflicts are addressed through mediation and dialogue. While some students described the use of physical discipline methods (for example, one primary student referred to students ‘who deserve a stick’), teachers denied using physical punishment. This may reflect limited knowledge of alternative discipline methods, with some teachers reporting the need for training on conflict management skills (and classroom management in general). Teachers’ experiences of violence, as well as systems of power based on fear or humiliation, may also influence their classroom approaches, reflecting legacies of exposure to previous conflict and militarized governance systems. Numerous participants explained that as a result of decades of violence in South Sudan, people ‘just react’ (violently) to disputes.

Many participants described the key role of PBEA life skills and peacebuilding education (LS&PE) in promoting non-violent conflict response on the part of both teachers and students. This program is being piloted in primary, primary, secondary, alternative, and vocational education, in both EiE and ‘development’ contexts, and for out-of-school youth. During a joint UNICEF-MoEST conference in 2014, MoEST and MoCYS signed a Communiqué on Learning Spaces as Zones of Peace (including both formal and non-formal learning spaces). The two ministries are currently developing standards for learning spaces as zones of peace. In addition, the updated Education Sector Plan (currently under development) refers to the establishment of learner support services to respond to legacies of past and current violence.
GBV is another key factor affecting education experiences and outcomes, reflecting broader patterns of discrimination and violence, and how vulnerability to violence is increased in conflict situations. The national curriculum framework refers to gender equity and stereotypes, but does not appear to include specific GBV content. International partners have provided GBV training to school actors, and GBV and sexual health is included in the LS&PE curriculum, reflecting their importance in peacebuilding. These topics should be fully covered at all levels in the national curriculum. National Standard Operating Procedures for GBV Prevention, Protection, and Response (MoGCSW, 2014) call for MoEST to develop strategies to address GBV in schools and ensure safe environments for survivors. No school representatives spoke of specific responses in education spaces or content. Forms of GBV do not appear to be taken seriously at the school level; one group of male secondary teachers referred to sexual harassment as a ‘very minor’ form of violence. This might also reflect teachers’ involvement in GBV, as well as broader societal impunity or acceptance in response to certain forms of GBV (such as marriage between male teachers and female students). There also exist broader systemic barriers to GBV reporting and response, including non-enforcement of existing laws and guidelines and reliance on customary judicial structures (CARE, 2014; D’Awol, 2011).

Participant discussions involved limited attention to connections between GBV and broader conflict and peacebuilding dynamics. This reflects broader marginalization of structural gendered violence in security and peacebuilding efforts, which often refer to the end of male-dominated violence despite the continuation of GBV (Handrahan, 2004; Pankhurst, 2003). Community security responses in South Sudan have generally paid limited attention to forms of domestic and community violence affecting women, which have persisted since the CPA (D’Awol, 2011; Oosterom, 2014). This reflects limited recognition of the different forms of violence that affect diverse student and teacher populations in the education sector.

6.3 Integration, cohesion, and cultural violence in the curriculum

Languages of instruction

English is the official language of instruction in South Sudan. This is intended to contribute to the formation of national identity, equitable access to economic opportunities, and regional ties and trade (Power & Simpson, 2011), illustrating the political and economic priorities associated with language of instruction policies. While some participants acknowledged the role of English as a unifying language, they were more preoccupied with the challenges associated with the transition from Arabic to English learning. Many teachers use Arabic or national languages to provide explanations or examples to students, and some felt that Arabic would be a more practical (and unifying) language: “People can unite using the language. South Sudanese, they speak Arabic as their language, almost everybody speaks Arabic as their lingua franca” (Central MoEST official). Many participants expressed frustration with the perceived lack of attention to the practicalities of the transition from Arabic to English, but explained that English as the official language cannot be questioned:

The announcement of English language as the language of instruction and official language is political [...] No one thought about, ‘Okay, this is going to be the official language. How is it going to be implemented?’ No one thought about it, and it’s still hanging […] [But] English is the official language. That one, you can never even discuss it. It cannot be discussed. (NGO representative)

The Education Act and national curriculum framework call for national language (or ‘mother tongue’) instruction in early primary years, to respond to ethno-linguistic diversity, increase school access, and facilitate early learning (MoEST, 2014b). P1 to P3 would be taught in national languages, with a move to English and Arabic from P4 onwards. The term ‘national languages’ reflects Education Act and Transitional Constitution statements that all indigenous languages are ‘national’ rather than ‘local’ languages. While some participants described the benefits of national language instruction, many discussed the selection of languages for instruction as linked to inequity and conflict. Language selection is an extremely sensitive and political issue, as language is so closely tied to ethnicity and identity: “The language here is the vehicle of culture [...] Everybody wants his language to appear” (Central MoEST official). This illustrates language’s unifying and dividing role, with selection reflecting either recognition or repression (Bush & Saltarelli, 2000; Tawil, 2001). Language selection may result in frustration and anger among particular groups when education services are seen to represent certain group interests while excluding others.
We have 64 languages [...] Of course the country cannot implement 64 languages. Now, we know that the country’s undergoing a lot of war and all this, a lot of tribal affiliations, so the problem comes if the country, the curriculum now [...] there are certain languages that will not be implemented. (Central MoEST official)

In this sense, national language policy efforts and implementation have the potential to contribute to identity-based divisions and pressures for conflict linked to language-based dimensions of education access and outcomes. They can also affect the perceived representativeness of education sector decision-makers, thus affecting vertical dimensions of social cohesion.

While a policy framework for national languages is being developed, it is unclear how many languages will be selected for piloting and instruction, how they will be selected, and by whom. The 2013-2014 budget document identified 10 languages for national language instruction (Dinka, Nuer, Zande, Bari, Shilluk, Murle, Moru, Avokaya, Mondu, and Baka) (MoFCIEP, 2013), although participants more recently reported that three to six pilot languages would be selected. The level at which languages of instruction will be selected has significant implications for their perceived representativeness in schools and communities. Individual schools, states, and the central MoEST have, at different points, been identified as responsible for language selection, with no mention of community involvement. The languages to be selected are those with an existing writing system and basic literacy materials. These would likely be the language of the majority group (Spronk, 2014).

These language selection guidelines risk further marginalizing minority groups, and raise questions as to how ‘majority’ is defined; does this refer to the majority language of a school, payam, county, or state? While some different language groups may understand one another, there are also differences in language among sections of the same group. For example, some words may be different for Dinka communities in Lakes state versus Warrap. The national language policy proposes additional research on the ‘inclusiveness’ of national languages with respect to gender, disability, and urban/rural location, which is key to ensuring that language selection does not further disadvantage these groups.

Some education officials suggested that national language instruction might be more appropriate in rural areas than in more diverse urban centres, where English may be a more appropriate language of instruction: “The mother tongue is supposed to be taught in the rural areas. [In the towns there] is a combination of different tribes so no language could be chosen to be taught” (Central MoEST official). In general, however, lower value may be attached to national language learning by teachers, students, and families, given that political and economic engagement, for example, employment, is often linked to proficiency in English, Arabic, or other regional languages such as Kiswahili or French, which are identified as languages of instruction at the secondary level in the national curriculum framework.

National language instruction may also affect the deployment of primary teachers, who may be more likely to remain in their home communities or experience frustration or resentment if deployed to an area where a different language is taught, as illustrated by a central MoEST official: “[If] you transfer him to another state, he has to learn another language [...] Why should I learn the language of another person?” Primary students may be more likely to be taught by teachers of the same ethno-linguistic group, affecting school diversity. Other challenges affecting national language instruction, and associated inequities, include inadequate teacher capacity training in national languages, cost of producing learning materials, lack of a clear implementation plan, and inadequate budgetary resources. National languages received only 0.1 per cent of the education budget in 2014-2015 and in 2013-2014, no national language funds were actually disbursed for the development of language policies (MoFCIEP, 2014), demonstrating a mismatch between policy aspiration and realistic implementation.

Curriculum content

South Sudan’s revised national curriculum framework, covering Early Childhood Development (ECD), primary, and secondary levels, was launched in October 2015. It focuses on promoting national citizenship, unity, and cohesion, with LS&PE, Environmental Education, and Human Rights as cross-cutting components.

The national curriculum review process began in 2013, drawing on existing primary and secondary curricula developed after 2005. The revised framework, launched in September 2015, represents South Sudan’s first comprehensive national curriculum. The process was supported by UNICEF GPE and DFID, reflecting the influence of global education priorities on the national curriculum.
While many participants described the importance of LS&PE in changing individual attitudes and behavior, some donor and peacebuilding representatives noted that simply adding peacebuilding components to the curriculum will not change long-held, group-level beliefs. This emphasizes the importance of concurrently addressing structural aspects of conflict. Structural patterns of marginalization and inequity are reflected in representations of historical narratives, citizenship, and identity. These curriculum issues are key to reconciliation and peacebuilding, either representing one ‘official’ national history or citizenship (for political purposes) or recognizing and legitimizing, rather than suppressing, diverse stories, experiences, and identities (Bush & Saltarelli, 2000; Cole & Barsalou, 2006; Davies, 2004a; Tawil, 2001), redressing or entrenching patterns of cultural marginalization.

Many participants described how the current curriculum, which draws on curricula from neighbouring countries, lacks relevance for students and limits the development of a cohesive national identity. As one county MoEST official stated, “These curricula are confusing our people […] Children mentally will be geared toward other countries.” Participants stressed the importance of students being able to learn about the geography, history, leaders, and people of South Sudan, including traditional knowledge and practices (e.g. traditional systems of governance, conflict resolution, and reconciliation), in order to strengthen connections to the past.

The importance of promoting a ‘shared’ history has been emphasized as part of broader peacebuilding and reconciliation approaches, such as the Committee for National Healing, Peace and Reconciliation. The revised curriculum framework refers to the importance of historical narratives, such as South Sudan’s struggle for independence and key leaders, although it is not clear how these will be represented, as curriculum materials are under development. Subjects such as geography also involve questions of recognition; for example, given current conflict linked to local borders and territories, the representation of payam and county borders in learning materials requires significant consideration.

Curriculum development presents an opportunity to formulate inclusive representations of national identity and citizenship that promote cohesion and belonging. The education system (citizenship, political, and legal education) plays a key role in the development of civic culture in conflict-affected contexts, with critical understandings of human rights, discrimination, accountability, identity, diversity, and nationalism identified as being of particular importance (Davies, 2004a). Participant discussions of ‘constructive’ citizenship, particularly at the central MoEST level, focused primarily on legal rights and responsibilities, rather than questions of identity (ethnic, linguistic, religious, geographic, etc.). Some peacebuilding and CSO representatives emphasized the need to acknowledge the central importance of ethnic or tribal identity, rather than focusing only on ‘national’ identity. However, it has also been noted that in contexts affected by violent conflict and identity-based divisions, a focus on rights and responsibilities, rather than ethnic or cultural identity, may be considered a more appropriate approach to citizenship education (Smith, 2003).

MoEST officials emphasized the importance of states’ involvement in the curriculum development process to ensure representation and relevance, of particular importance in the post-independence context: “Every citizen in South Sudan must feel that he’s in there […] because we were not included in the curriculum done by the North. We don’t see ourselves inside there” (Central MoEST official). This reflects the use of education as a tool of political and economic power and southern repression and control by post-colonial Sudanese authorities, based on an Arabic language, Islamic religious curriculum (Breidlid, 2010, 2013) that almost completely excluded southern histories, cultures, and religions (Oyenak, 2006, cited in Breidlid, 2010). Under the current system in South Sudan, state ministries were formally involved in curriculum and sector policy development but county and payam officials were not. This potentially limits recognition of diverse experiences and identities across places and groups within states and reproducing patterns of historical and cultural marginalization within national curricula.

Integration and cohesion processes are also affected by the continued use of curricula from neighboring countries. The use of different curricula across schools and regions was identified by a number of participants as a form of inequity, resulting in different learning outcomes for students, some of whom expressed confusion and frustration over the use of different curricula. The adoption of the English-language curriculum has been more difficult for northern states, particularly in the Greater Upper Nile region, compared to Equatorial states bordering East African countries. The current conflict has also delayed the transition to the South Sudan curriculum: “We have to phase out all the Arabic syllabuses, but war now has stopped everything” (Participant from Upper Nile). This may also be linked to post-2011 shifts in the geography of violence and ‘centralisation’ of authority in Juba, with greater stability in the Equatorial states facilitating education management and curriculum implementation.
The frontline states, especially Greater Upper Nile, most of them are Arab pattern [...] They were so much oriented to the education system in Sudan, so for them to switch quickly to the South Sudan curriculum, to the language of instruction, is still a huge challenge [...] They are really doing very badly, while teachers of states like Greater Equatoria that are very close to East Africa, Kenya, Uganda, and so on, they do very well. (Central MoEST official)

Decentralization of education has been associated with lower consistency in the implementation of national curriculum (Astiz et al., 2002), both in terms of language and content. This might be due to disparities in implementation capacity on the part of decentralized authorities in different locations, or their resistance to centralised policies linked to perceived marginalization (non-recognition) of particular languages or cultural or geographical narratives from national curricula. This presents a challenge to the push for the implementation of a unified, consistent curriculum in South Sudan, which was described by numerous participants as central to educational equity as well as the development of national identity. Geographic differences and disparities in curriculum implementation and teaching approaches are also linked to the fragmentation of inspection and supervision approaches due to a lack of a national framework, with sub-national offices developing their own tools and procedures. The disparities are also related to a variation in the capacities of state and county inspectors, as well as payam supervisors. Lack of a national inspection framework has led to a variation in content and quality of guidelines across states, counties, and payams. MoEST is currently in the process of developing this framework.

Narratives of diversity: Reproducing exclusion and cultural violence

Although national government (and MoEST) discourse reflects a general attempt to deny ethnic divisions, the ways in which education sector actors speak about different groups or communities reflect systems and structures of cultural violence that contribute to inequities and alienation and contribute to pressures for conflict. For example, in ‘peaceful’ regions, discussions of conflict and peacebuilding often focus on ‘others’ (other ethnic groups or geographic locations) who are involved in violence; one participant suggested that teachers in Central Equatoria refer to violence among groups in Jonglei and Upper Nile as examples for students during peace club activities. While this can stimulate discussion of conflict and peacebuilding issues, it also has the potential to contribute to divisive ‘us/them’ perceptions and strengthen pre-existing ethnic or tribal stereotypes.
Participants in all states consistently identified cattle-keeping communities as responsible for insecurity and violence, linked to ‘bad’ cultural practices or traditions, cattle raiding and reprisal attacks, and cross-border movement to neighbouring counties and states. Some MoEST officials described education as a means of “teaching them other ways” (playing a ‘civilizing’ role) in order to reduce tensions and conflict. For example, by preventing population movement, reducing group contact, and promoting commercial activities through formal education.

*If we would compare those who are in the cattle camps and those who are in the school, I think there is a bit of difference, like those who are in the cattle camp who misbehave in a different setting compared to the others, especially if you compared the cattle keepers and the other communities in South Sudan.* (International organisation representative)

*We want our communities to be stable. They need to settle so that we build for them permanent houses, and then build houses for the teachers [...] I'm talking about targeting the Greater Upper Nile and the Bahr el Ghazal, then we need those communities to settle.* (Central MoEST official)

While cattle-keeping communities are involved in violent conflict, a focus on ‘bad’ culture limits attention to the political, economic, and environmental dimensions of violence. Consistently negative descriptions or portrayals of diverse cattle-keeping communities and their cultural, economic, and political systems, have the potential to (further) stigmatize, marginalize, or alienate communities, rather than recognize or validate the diverse identities and cultures. This can also influence communities’ engagement with education services, if they perceive them to be focused on changing their culture. It may also negatively affect the perceived legitimacy and representativeness of education officials and institutions, thus affecting vertical dimensions of cohesion and trust. This reflects the importance of considering representations of cultural diversity in formal policies and curricula, as well as in terms of how actors, particularly at the ministry level, speak about diverse communities and the role of education.

Many participants explained that conflict and violence happen because people are uneducated or ‘ignorant’ (and thus vulnerable to mobilization by politics or armed groups), and that peace can occur when people are educated, as they will know how to resolve conflict without violence and resist mobilization. Many also described education’s peacebuilding role in terms of changing ‘bad’ cultural values and practices:

*“Education can open the mind [and] make you civilized [...] Due to lack of education, some people, some other tribes from other places are not educated, their behavior here is different”* (State-level MoEST official).

While education does play a key role in promoting positive changes in behaviour and attitudes, the equation of formal education with peace and ‘civilization’, and lack of formal education with ignorance and ‘violent cultures’ has the potential to stigmatize, marginalize, or alienate particular communities, as well as limit attention to structural inequities that contribute to the marginalization of those communities. Only two participants questioned the assumption that being educated necessarily leads to peace, explaining that conflict (including the current fighting between government and opposition) is often driven by ‘educated’ elites. They explained that this illustrates the importance of distinguishing between ‘academic’ learning and other dimensions of education.

### 6.4 Economic relevance of education programs

Participants’ descriptions of primary, secondary, and AES curriculum priorities and content reflect their limited cultural and economic relevance for certain communities and livelihoods systems, including youth from rural and cattle-keeping communities. This represents how education sector policy decisions and implementation perpetuate cultural violence as well as political and economic inequities. As discussed in Section 4.2, children and youth in cattle-keeping communities face particular barriers to education (at primary and post-primary levels), linked to lack of education services, cattle-herding responsibilities and the cultural and economic irrelevance of formal education and training programs. While parents and young people may consider formal education as important in order to facilitate access to wider economic and political participation (Forcier, 2013), research participants explained that cattle-keeping communities do not view formal curricula as relevant to their cultural and economic needs. Instead, they prioritize informal cultural learning and development of practical livelihoods skills (e.g. milk production and cattle treatment) by working in cattle camps. Parents may choose certain children to go to school while others supervise cattle (a time-consuming activity), in order to balance education with immediate livelihood needs, protect family
wealth, and wider community obligations. Some participants explained that children who are sent to school might be those considered unable to properly supervise cattle.

This reflects the importance of more flexible, relevant education options (e.g. afternoon lessons when cattle are resting) that enable young people to balance school and cattle-herding responsibilities. Participants emphasized the importance of adapting curricula to local contexts, as one youth union representative explained, young people in rural areas are looking for training on agriculture or cattle management, rather than, for example, micro-enterprise training (“They have their cows, they don’t need money”). Within the education sector, however, there appears to limited focus on livelihood skills such as agriculture or animal (e.g. cattle) husbandry, although these have been identified as important training areas (Atari & McKague, 2014). While some donors such as USAID and FAO are funding agriculture and animal care programs, as well as education programs for pastoralist communities in collaboration with relevant ministries, consistent links with the education sector at all levels appear weak. There may also be tensions between ministries involved in such projects (e.g. agriculture and education) over access to project resources.

Additionally, training (TVET) programs generally focus on ‘modern’ commercial trades such as construction, carpentry, welding, masonry, auto mechanics, computers, food processing, and tailoring, which may be more suited to urban or peri-urban areas where opportunities and access to materials are greater. This focus on ‘productive’ income-generating activities can devalue and marginalize unpaid productive work traditionally carried out by women or members of rural communities, including household labor and small-scale agriculture, as well as cattle-keeping communities. In South Sudan, youth are concentrated in agricultural and livestock sectors, with 62 per cent of employed individuals aged 15 and older working in agriculture, forestry, or fisheries (SSCSE, 2010a, 2010b). ‘Cookie-cutter’ approaches to training supported by neo-liberal global education agendas focused on market economies can fuel grievances when young people are encouraged to focus on formal knowledge and skills that are not aligned with local conditions. These youth may end up frustrated by the lack of economic opportunities in their communities.

The cultural and economic irrelevance of formal education to certain communities and livelihoods represents a key dimension of educational inequality emerging from this research. Disconnections between education and training curricula and local economies limit parents’ decisions to send their children to school, contribute to early school leaving, and reproduce patterns of marginalization and inequity along socio-economic lines. Similar findings are noted in a recent study on ‘pastoralist’ communities in Kenya (Scott-Villiers et al., 2015), which highlights the significant risks for a ‘lost generation’ of young people vulnerable to involvement in armed violence due to the irrelevance of the available formal educational opportunities.

6.5 Teacher diversity and cohesion: The impact of recruitment and management practices

Most participants discussed school diversity and cohesion with a focus on students, with only a few referring to diversity and cohesion among teachers and managers. However, recruitment and management practices can (re)produce inequities among teachers linked to factors such as geographic location, ethnicity, and language.

Diversity, cohesion, and inequity in teacher recruitment and management

Recruitment and deployment processes have significant effects on diversity and inequity among teachers. However, these processes are fragmented due to a lack of clear guidelines and procedures and affected by broader political developments in the country. Teacher recruitment and deployment at both primary and secondary levels, is the responsibility of the state MoEST and as such, procedures vary across states. Teachers are generally deployed within their own counties and payams, which can limit diversity among teachers in a school or community. Teachers in national secondary schools are the exception as they are nationally recruited and deployed to different states. Participants perceived benefits and limitations of this ‘localized’ deployment; some felt that this approach can help ensure teacher familiarity with local culture and language, foster community trust in teachers, and enable teachers to serve as role models within their own communities: “They know where they are applying to, they know that they are going to work in that particular community” (County education official). However, this can also limit teachers’ mobility, potentially disadvantaging those restricted to remote or conflict-affected counties or payams. Other participants felt that deployment across different states and counties could enable teachers to learn about different places, people, and languages, and share knowledge, contributing to a sense of nationalism.
Broader political networks influence teacher recruitment and deployment processes, resulting in the marginalization of particular groups or communities. For example, one group of primary teachers reported that state ministries recruit teachers from particular ethnic groups or counties, and some payam officials reported that the state ministry recruits (unqualified) relatives as teachers so that they can receive salaries, with teacher recruitment used as part of patronage and rent-seeking networks (Ratcliffe & Perry, 2009). These aspects of recruitment are reflected in the management of teacher promotion or advancement, which primary and secondary teachers identified as another key source of inequity and frustration. Teachers can spend 10 or 15 years in the same grade without being promoted or receiving a salary increase, with their salary grade not necessarily reflecting experience and performance. This is a particular source of frustration among teachers who began teaching prior to 2005 and who expected improved professional conditions, support, and opportunities with the CPA and independence. Teacher representatives reported that teachers in certain counties and from certain ethnic groups are promoted while others are not, as are civil servants from other ministries. This creates inequity when teachers who are due for promotion do not receive it and echoes the misuse of recruitment processes as part of patronage and rent-seeking processes. While some explained that this is due to a shortage of funds to cover salary increases, others were sceptical: “You will remain in your grade until you die or go to pension, [but] they don’t want you to ask about this” (Teacher union representative).

The recruitment of contract (e.g. part-time) or volunteer teachers by sub-national education authorities or school governing bodies has resulted in socio-economic inequities within the teaching workforce, as these teachers receive nominal or no remuneration. In 2013, volunteer or ‘unknown’ (e.g. part-time) teachers accounted for nearly one-third of teachers at primary (28 per cent), secondary (31 per cent), and AES (38 per cent) levels (MoEST, 2014a). Reliance on contract or volunteer teachers results from the inadequate provision of teachers to schools, which is in turn connected to inadequate education sector budget allocations. State salary transfers do not cover all recruited teachers, with states expected to cover funding gaps:

[If the states] have more teachers recruited now, they are considered volunteers. We are not responsible for them. We wanted the states themselves to top up that money […] The budget gets fixed because our budget also here has not been increased at the national level […] We have not increased the salary from here, for states. (Central MoEST official)

Teacher performance is affected by fragmentation of training, inspection, and supervision approaches. Fragmentation of teacher training experiences is linked to variations in the management of TTIs in different states and between government and private (e.g. faith-based) TTIs, and to a reliance on donor-supported teacher training programs due to the limited functioning of government teacher training services. Government TTIs are centrally run, admitting students from across the country, although many may remain in their own states, either by choice or due to a lack of financial resources necessary to study in another state. TTIs have been closed in conflict-affected states, which limits access to training. Additionally, in the current conflict context, certain groups may be excluded from training opportunities along ethnic lines. For example, one participant described the exclusion of Nuer students from government TTIs and universities in the Equatorial states, due in part to concerns for student safety. As one central MoEST official noted, “The majority of people who are teachers of this country come from Equatoria region […] The rest of the areas, those people there, they don’t even want to become teachers.”

Geographic inequities in teacher management are linked to the fragmentation of inspection and supervision approaches. As noted above, no national inspection or supervision frameworks have been implemented, and sub-national offices generally develop their own tools and procedures. Variations in tools and procedures and in capacities of state and county inspectors and payam supervisors result in disparities in approaches to teacher management, contributing to inequities in teacher support and teaching quality across states, counties, and payams. Failure to address inequities in teacher training, recruitment, deployment, and supervision, as well as support through payment of allowances and resource materials and recognition of teachers’ status, can contribute to the entrenchment of broader perceived inequalities in access to professional opportunities and resources across demographic groups and geographic locations.

**Teacher salaries and professional recognition**

Teacher salaries and support are of critical importance when considering issues of recognition, diversity,
and vertical dimensions of cohesion. Participants described severe inequities in salary scales across ministries, with teachers receiving the lowest salaries of all civil servants, although differences may also result when civil servants in some sectors receive allowances (in addition to base salaries) while others do not. Most primary teachers are at the ‘non-professional’ Grade 14 on the salary scale, receiving roughly SSP 300 a month, although specific amounts vary by state. Secondary teachers start at Grade 9 (based on ‘required’ qualifications), receiving roughly SSP 900, although a review of teacher pay scales is reportedly being planned. Low salaries are of particular concern given the current economic climate, with rising costs of living and rapid depreciation of the SSP. “A teacher is getting something like SSP 250 or 300 [...] The rate of a dollar in the black market is SSP [7], that means what they are getting is less than 50 dollars” (Central MoEST official). This economic devaluing of teachers’ professional role results in feelings of discouragement, resentment, and frustration, and also negatively affects motivation and retention: “If you don’t pay a teacher well then you are making him a third class in the society. He’s supposed to be a first citizen of this country because he is training people for the future” (Central MoEST official).

Teachers and MoEST officials at all levels described delayed, irregular, or non-payment of teacher salaries and incentives. While this may be linked to weak salary payment systems at the central and sub-national levels, some participants believed that non-payment of teacher salaries is due to diversion of funds at the state level: “When these states receive this money, instead they go and pay their local staff instead of paying teachers. That little money that goes to the teachers, the state governments use it for other things” (Central MoEST official). Others reported that delays or non-payment of government salaries is linked to the prioritization of security spending, reflecting another source of tension between social service and security sectors: “[Teachers] spend three, four months without salary. The money’s not there [...] We are no longer a priority. The priority is the war, all the resources are going to the war” (Central MoEST official). This reflects the political and economic prioritization of the security sector, contributing to inequitable distribution (and diversion) of education resources linked to local political and conflict dynamics.

Many teachers seek better-paying jobs in other sectors, which affects distribution of teachers and quality of teaching. As some teachers and ministry officials explained, ‘good’ teachers obtain other jobs while those unable to do so remain in teaching: “Teaching is work for people who have failed from other big things” (Central MoEST official). Teachers also join security forces (particularly in conflict-affected states), where entry-level salaries are higher, reflecting a key impact of education inequality on armed violence through the creation of pressures for involvement in armed groups:

> Imagine, somebody who has studied for eight years in primary school and goes to secondary school for three years. 11 years. When he sits [the] Sudan school certificate, he’s going to be appointed in Grade 14, and Grade 14 gets only SSP 270 [...] A villager who has never gone to school, when he comes and gets recruited to the police, then he will get 700 [...] This makes a teacher not feel at home. Some of them, they are even transferring to organized forces because of the high salaries. (State MoEST official)

Differences in salary scales also exist within the teaching workforce. Teachers in national secondary schools are recruited and paid by the central MoEST, rather than the state, and receive higher salaries than state-supported teachers as they receive housing allowances in addition to their salaries. For example, teachers in national secondary schools may earn SSP 1,400 at Grade 9, compared to roughly SSP 900 for state teachers in the same grade. However, as some teacher representatives stated, recruitment criteria for national teachers are unclear, which causes resentment among state-supported teachers. Teacher payment has also been used as a tool in the context of the current conflict. Some participants reported that teachers in opposition-held areas are not receiving salaries, and that in government-held areas in conflict states, teachers from certain ethnic groups (e.g. Dinka, Shilluk) are receiving salaries while others (e.g. Nuer) are not. In this sense, education (teacher) management, through salary payment, is used to ‘punish’ those said to be associated with the opposition (through ethnicity alone) and to coerce loyalty.

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30 Interview conducted in January 2015. At the time of writing (November 2015), the parallel exchange rate was approximately SSP 18=USD 1, while the official exchange rate remains unchanged at SSP 2.9 (Bank of South Sudan, 2015). Salary or income inequalities are further exacerbated by differential access to preferential exchange rates, with certain people (those with the ‘right’ connections) able to access US dollars at the official rate and sell them for SSP at the parallel rate.
Teachers and language inequities

Language capacity is a key concern for teachers and education officials and partners, reflecting a key aspect of inequity as well as affecting teaching performance and integration. The majority of qualified teachers, primarily in northern states, were trained under the Sudanese Arabic pattern system. Few have received comprehensive language training to enable them to teach in English. This presents barriers to their adaptation to the English-language South Sudan curriculum (Janke & Reisman, 2014; Power & Simpson, 2011; Watkins, 2013). Some teachers had received shorter-term in-service training, but this was viewed as insufficient to enable them to acquire the skills needed to teach in English with confidence. In addition to teaching ability, language capacity affects professional opportunities, such as promotion to education management positions: “Without English, there are a lot of things which is going ahead, which will not wait for you, somebody who doesn’t know English” (State MoEST official). For qualified Arabic-pattern teachers, difficulties in teaching in English and accessing professional opportunities reflect a process of de-skilling or ‘de-professionalization’.

Participants at all levels described a critical need for English-language training for Arabic pattern teachers. While in-service teacher training is meant to include English-language training (GRSS, 2012a; MoFCIEP, 2013), nearly all school managers and teachers reported that no government training has been provided, with some explaining that they learned English on their own, without any support. While the AES includes intensive English courses, state-level MoEST officials reported that these are provided for other government employees (e.g. prison guards), but not for teachers. There may be uncertainty or disagreement within the MoEST over responsibility for teacher language training (the Directorate of Quality Promotion and Innovation is responsible for teacher training, while AES is responsible for English courses), and no budget is allocated for teacher language training: “They have never, ever budgeted, in their annual grants from the central government, to train teachers in English language. It has always been a donor thing” (International NGO representative). However, MoEST is currently developing a policy framework for English language training in collaboration with Windle Trust and UNICEF.

Teachers’ perceptions of fairness in allocation of resources and opportunities (e.g. salaries, training, promotion) and professional recognition and respect affect their perceptions of government legitimacy and trust in government authorities (Davies, 2011; Rose & Greeley, 2006). Inadequate salaries and disparities across sectors, salary delays and non-payment, nepotism and patronage in recruitment and promotion opportunities, and perceived disregard for the profession affect teachers’ confidence in government and their perceptions of broader government legitimacy, negatively affecting vertical dimensions of cohesion. This also affects public recognition of teachers’ status: “Because of the low salary, low regard by political leaders at the top, people up there, toward teachers, [the] attitude toward teachers is so negative” (Central MoEST official).

6.6 Chapter summary

The role of schools in bringing together members of diverse communities is often identified as a key contribution of the education sector. However, education services promoting unity and cohesion may not necessarily be equitable, and may actually contribute to further inequity and exclusion. For example, there are geographic and socio-economic inequities in access to national secondary schools intended to bring together students from diverse communities. While responses to diversity and conflict represent opportunities to address the legacies of violence and contribute to (re)building both horizontal and vertical relations of trust, the ways in which policies and practices affirm or exclude diverse identities or forms of violence can reinforce patterns of inequity and contribute to pressures for continued conflict.

Education system policies and content have the potential to (re)produce patterns of cultural violence linked to languages of instruction (including the selection of national languages), the validation of particular versions of history and citizenship, ministry narratives that dismiss or disrespect ‘bad’ or ‘backward’ communities or cultures, and the development of formal curricula that focus on ‘productive’ economic activities and are not aligned with the economic and cultural priorities of diverse communities (of particular importance for cattle-keeping communities). These patterns of inequity contribute to pressures for violence linked to political, economic, and cultural marginalization in terms of representation in decision-making, recognition of identities and livelihoods, and access to relevant education opportunities.
Teachers, in addition to students, experience horizontal and vertical inequities that affect recognition and cohesion. Fragmented recruitment and management approaches, ‘localized’ deployment, recruitment and promotion based on patronage networks, salary disparities between sectors and within education (e.g. national and state teachers, permanent and contract teachers), and language capacity differences contribute to inequities along geographic, ethnic, and socio-economic lines. These reflect broader political and economic dynamics contributing to pressures for conflict, including allocation of opportunities and resources to mobilize and reward connections, as well as the negative effects on vertical relations of trust in government.
CHAPTER 7. REPRESENTATION: EDUCATION SECTOR GOVERNANCE AND MANAGEMENT

7.1 Chapter introduction

Representation concerns participation in governance and decision-making at all levels of education, from communities and schools to the central government. While approaches to decentralization may focus on technical aspects of institutional reform or capacity development, this research considers ‘political’ dimensions, including dynamics of representation and power, and perceived ‘voice’ in governance processes. This chapter examines approaches to decentralized education governance in South Sudan, examining perceptions of decentralization and participation in decision-making among education authorities as well as the influence of local political structures on decision-making processes. Aspects of representation at the school level are also explored, including the role of school governing bodies in school-based management and the representation of teachers in decision-making. Finally, the representation of youth in decision-making processes is examined.

7.2 Approaches to decentralized governance

South Sudan's education system is meant to reflect the country's broader system of political decentralization, as well as associated inequities in distribution of power and representation in decision-making. Different types of decentralization exist, involving different objectives and forms of decision-making authority. Deconcentration (often considered the weakest form of decentralization) redistributes financial and management responsibilities among different levels of the central government (e.g. to local administrative officials under the supervision of central government ministries). Delegation involves the transfer of responsibility for decision-making and administration to semi-autonomous authorities accountable to the central government, but with a great deal of decision-making power. Devolution involves the transfer of finance and management responsibilities to quasi-autonomous local governments with decision-making authority within recognized geographical borders (World Bank, n.d.).

South Sudan's 2009 Local Government Act and 2011 Transitional Constitution both refer to a system of decentralized governance based on the devolution of power and authority to state and local governments (GoSS 2009, 2011b). International donors actively support decentralized governance as part of broader state-building efforts in South Sudan, including social service delivery, emphasising fiscal decentralization, local financing and improved resource mobilization, capacity development, and enhanced local service delivery as well as efficiency and accountability (UN, 2012; USAID, 2011b; World Bank, 2013a). However, discussions with central and sub-national government officials reflected tensions between the perceived importance of locally responsive service delivery and more centralized policy development and management in practice.

Perceptions of decentralization in education

Several education-sector participants described potential benefits of decentralization for the education system, as a means of increasing efficiency and accountability, needs-responsive decision-making and resource allocation, and government visibility and legitimacy. Some participants explained that decentralization also contributes to increased service quality through competition between states, counties, and schools. One participant explained that decentralization allows regions that are more advanced in education to further expand their own education systems, and can serve as examples for surrounding regions, reflecting a devolved form of decentralization. Others spoke of decentralization as promoting local ownership and engagement in service provision, particularly in hard-to-reach areas:

There's a state of ownership, because we made it and we own it and we can run it, so that is the benefit. It also promotes a lot of teamwork, you know, people go together [...] ‘If these are the resources, then
we need to divide these resources accordingly,’ so that it allows for proper accountability. (State MoEST official)

Some donors channel resources directly to local authorities, such as county governments, while supporting institutional capacity development at central and state levels. For example, GESS (UK) and IMED (EU) programs both support decentralized service delivery through school capitation grants, and the World Bank-supported Local Services Support (LSS) program focuses on strengthening local government service delivery, transferring payam development grants for local projects (such as school construction) directly to county governments. One donor representative explained that sending funds directly to counties is faster and more efficient, as they pass through fewer hands, while another described the importance of local engagement: “Strong community involvement in education needs to be maintained and strengthened, especially in terms of reducing misuse of funds and facilities by officials.” While this can strengthen local service delivery and participation, it can also reinforce disconnections and tensions between central and local governments, as well as potentially undermining the legitimacy of state governments. This reflects a key tension between ‘centralised’ and ‘decentralized’ approaches to governance.

Decentralization is described as facilitating political reform and enhancing stability in conflict-affected contexts, responding to political and economic dimensions of conflict by dispersing power from centrist structures, responding to diverse population needs, and increasing political and institutional legitimacy (Crawford & Hartmann, 2008; Siegle & O’Mahony, 2006). Decentralization also reflects global (neoliberal) discourses of state restructuring and sub-national responsibility for public service provision linked to efforts to lower public spending and enhance competition, productivity, and flexibility (Astiz et al., 2002; Robertson & Dale, 2013). However, in practice, decentralization is limited by capacity, coordination, and communication gaps between government levels, lack of operating budgets for sub-national offices, limited sub-national policy dissemination and implementation, and physical access challenges. Challenges vary across states and counties, contributing to differences and disparities in education management, and the deconcentrated form of decentralization, which, in practice, limits political authority at the sub-national level compared to the devolved form described in policy documents.

The state-level Ministry of Local Government is mandated to play a key role in education service delivery and management, as stated in the Local Government Act 2009. Responsibilities of state ministries and Local Government Councils include establishing and managing primary education institutions, implementing education policies at local levels, and promoting peaceful coexistence and reconciliation among communities (GoSS, 2009). However, none of the state, county, payam, or school representatives interviewed for this study referred to Ministry of Local Government involvement in education governance. This may reflect limited engagement at the sub-national and community level. At the central level, the Local Government Board, responsible for decentralization support to local governments (including administration, financial management, and policy implementation), receives minimal budgetary support, accounting for 0.02 per cent of total budget allocations in 2014-2015 (MoFCIER, 2014). This suggests that in practice, these local government institutions at central and sub-national levels have limited capacity to support decentralized education management.

Sub-national participation in decision-making

In many so-called ‘decentralized’ education systems, national governments often maintain centralized control over policy and curriculum but deconcentrate or delegate responsibility for implementation (Astiz et al., 2002). While South Sudan’s Constitution and LGA refer to devolved governance, decision-making processes described by sub-national education officials reflect a deconcentrated approach with little space for participation in decision-making processes by local officials, let alone local community members.

Some argue that inclusive decision-making should be a key aspect of education governance in conflict-affected contexts (Ratcliffe & Perry, 2009). While state ministries in South Sudan described involvement in national policy reviews and state-level policy and budget development (based on national guidelines), devolution of decision-making power is limited, reflecting deconcentrated decentralization in practice: “The issue is everything is put in Juba. It’s not sent to the state […] Every money, every resources, every decision, only in Juba” (Youth union representative). Many state officials described irregular participation in decision-making, with involvement varying across states, and decision-making capacity restricted by budget
shortages, as transfers rarely cover anything but salaries. Many school, payam, and county representatives described limited representation related to lack of involvement in national or state policy processes, limited engagement by donors, difficulties in upward communication, and poor policy communication. At these levels, engagement with higher authorities is generally in the form of reporting, rather than decision-making.

Payam education officials in different states expressed frustration when government or development partners engage only with state and county authorities, or when they approach schools without passing through the payam office: “It is like in the family and someone goes direct to your children without consulting you as head of family […] so I feel as somebody who does not know anything […] I cannot feel like a responsible person” (Payam official). In this sense, government and donors might undermine what limited power local officials feel they have. School managers and teachers in different states also expressed frustration when donors and partners engage only with state and county authorities, as they feel that their voices and concerns will not be adequately represented, which was a frequent concern. As one head teacher explained, it is difficult to communicate concerns or suggestions to higher authorities as there are so many steps involved (school to payam to county to state to centre) and payam supervisors will not transmit their concern unless they consider it important. Some county and payam officials reported that they frequently communicate concerns and suggestions to the state ministry, but there is rarely any feedback and never any resultant increase in budget allocations, leading to frustration.

Participants’ descriptions reflected a deconcentrated form of decentralization, with generally limited vertical participation and engagement between different levels: centre, states, counties, payams, and schools. While some participants described involvement in aspects of national or state-level policy development, most described limited involvement in decision-making, significant challenges in policy communication, and perceptions that concerns and suggestions are not being adequately communicated ‘up the chain’ or considered by higher authorities.

Donor approaches to decentralization in South Sudan tend to focus on technical, rather than political, aspects of decentralization. Participants discussed support for decentralization in technical terms (e.g. ‘capacity development’ and ‘strengthening institutions’), without reference to the political aspects such as norms of power, representation, and voice (Davies, 2011), which were identified as important by payam and school officials, in particular. Partners often focus on strengthening the capacity of people in power, without explicitly encouraging more diverse and equitable representation (e.g. geographic or ethnic representation). However, this is of critical importance when considering the influences of local political structures on ‘decentralized’ decision-making, including in the education sector.

Local political structures and influences on decision-making

Local opportunities for representation in education sector administration and management reflect wider structures and dynamics of political authority at sub-national levels. The Local Government Act refers to the devolution of decision-making authority to (autonomous) local governments (GoSS 2009, 2011b), who are responsible for development planning and budgeting based on central government transfers and local revenues. However, in practice, governance in South Sudan is characterized by heavily-centralized, neo-patrimonial decision-making and authority over policy and legislation (de Waal, 2014; Rolandsen, 2015). This is reflected in the ‘deconcentrated’ nature of governance approaches and limited bottom-up education sector representation described in the preceding sections.

The ‘decentralized’ system is based on local administrative structures established by the SPLM/A during the previous civil war (Johnson, 2003). While county commissioners (who oversee education and other services) are meant to be elected, they are often appointed by state governors (themselves appointed by the central government, in practice) (Knopf, 2013), often along ethnic or tribal lines or based on military or political connections (Janke & Reisman 2014; Maxwell et al., 2012; Schomerus & Allen, 2010). Some participants, including MoEST officials and teachers, described factional political systems based on patronage, nepotism, and tribalism in hiring and promotion practices, which results in frustration and tension among education personnel. This is particularly significant in a context where government jobs, including in the education sector, are a primary source of employment (ICG, 2011; Knopf, 2013). One group of primary teachers, for example, felt that under the decentralized system, state ministries only employ people from one ethnic group or county, marginalizing others, so that members of their network can receive salaries. This rent-seeking
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approach to recruitment (Ratcliffe & Perry, 2009) can result in the recruitment of unqualified personnel, and the presence of officials with little education sector knowledge and experience.

*The ministers who are being appointed as ministers in the Ministry of Education, sometimes they don’t have the background of policy of education [...] Especially if they are not teachers, when they came here they don’t implement well the education policies [...] He does not ask how can this work to be implemented or how can the ministry be helped.* (State MoEST official)

However, most state, county, and payam level officials participating in interviews described long histories of involvement in the education sector, including experience as teachers. While discrepancies between perceptions of officials’ lack of education sector experience and the actual experience of many officials may be linked to limited interaction between ministry bodies and schools or communities, frustrations over inequality in decision-making representation based on patronage, nepotism, and tribalism can negatively affect trust in government legitimacy, thereby contributing to pressures for conflict. These processes also contribute to the reproduction of factional political systems and political ‘elites’ and grievances over exclusion from decision-making opportunities, increasing the risk of conflict by exacerbating ethnic, political, and geographic divisions in an already-fragmented society (Crawford & Hartmann, 2008; Siegle & O’Mahony, 2006).

Civilian administrative structures remain highly militarized, and military personnel occupy many senior government positions (Knopf, 2013; Pinaud, 2014; Sudd Institute, 2014). Some participants described ‘militaristic’ approaches to education sector leadership (linked to the presence of former armed group members in MoEST). They explained that within a rigid hierarchy, local education officials “work on orders” and often feel unable to voice suggestions (“You don’t give ideas to the boss. You just salute.”), and that education personnel (e.g. teacher) management is often based on rank, threats, intimidation, and fear.

Decentralization in South Sudan has been associated with competition for state-level political representation, opportunities, and resources, including land, infrastructure, and services (Awolich et al., 2015; Schomerus & Allen, 2010). Participants described ‘political’ influences on decision-making, focusing primarily on school construction, linked to the mobilization of community support: “Some politicians were saying, ’No, in my constituency, there is no school. They want a beautiful school there so that now people can vote for [them]’” (Central MoEST official). For example, some decision-makers may call for the equal allocation of school construction projects across all counties, in order to satisfy county commissioners and ensure their support for state governments. However, this can result in perceived inequities for states with fewer counties, as well as limiting responses to disparities in existing school conditions (for example, when certain counties or payams have more permanent or mobile schools than others). Perceived inequities in resource allocation and distribution are linked to frustrations and tensions across communities and to the entrenchment of ethnic identities and divisions, due to the links between administrative borders and ethnic distribution (Awolich et al., 2015; Schomerus & Allen, 2010). Describing previous resource allocation processes, one central MoEST explained that,

*They identified one county here and then jumped another county and then identified another one there and then jumped and identified. Now this county that is jumped, we say, ’[Is] this county you identified because so-and-so is from this county?’ That’s already brought a tribal conflict here, meaning you are not representing us all.*

Participant discussions generally illustrated limited vertical trust between schools and government, and between different levels of government, with those at ‘lower’ levels having limited confidence in higher levels to represent their interests and provide necessary resources. This perceived lack of representation in government decision-making, including in education sector management, and an associated lack of trust in higher levels of government can affect perceptions of marginalization and contribute to pressures for conflict. Considerations of (perceived) political representation, marginalization, and conflict are of particular importance in the context of what some participants described as a system of ‘ethnic’ decentralization, with county and payam borders drawn around territories settled by particular ethnic groups, sections, or clans. As one peacebuilding representative stated, “It’s good to have different states, but [the] issue of regionalization is getting worse and worse. People want to be more and more fragmented.”

31 This is reflected in the October 2015 Establishment Order Number 36/2015 dividing the existing 10 states into 28 new states, drawn largely along ethnic lines (Radio Tamazuj, 3 October, 2015).
Some participants described this form of governance as facilitating more ‘locally’ representative administration and empowering local communities. Others, however, felt that this would contribute to greater divisions between ethnic groups or sections and increase the risk of political mobilization and inter-group conflict.

### 7.3 School-level management and representation

**School governing bodies**

As stated in the South Sudan School Governance Toolkit, developed by DFID with support from the EU, “school-based management is a form of decentralization. It relies on the redistribution of decision-making authority from national or state government to head-teachers, teachers, parents, students and community members to stimulate and sustain improvements at school level” (DFID-GESS, 2014: 6). School-based management is described as promoting community engagement in school management and learning outcomes as well as accountability to communities (USAID, 2011a; World Bank, 2007).

School governing bodies, including PTAs, primary school management committees (SMCs), and secondary school boards of governors (BoGs), are responsible for overseeing school management, plans, and budgets. In general, school managers, teachers, and PTA members reported that they had a role to play in the management of education services, through participation in school planning and budgeting, disciplinary bodies, and contributing resources for school development. However, recent reports describe a lack of functioning governing bodies in South Sudan’s schools (GRSS, 2013; Janke & Reisman, 2014), and some study participants described members’ limited understanding of their specific roles:

> [They think it] is a forum where parents meet, probably to make contribution to the school, more money to the headmaster for particular work or increasing registration fees […] Many of them did not know exactly that the school belongs to them, that they have to ensure that they run [the] school. (International NGO representative)

School financing approaches can undermine the positive effects of school-based management in ‘decentralizing’ management responsibility and increasing community participation. Service delivery funds are transferred to primary and secondary schools in the form of capitation grants, which are intended to finance basic operating costs such as maintenance, supplies, and volunteer teacher incentives, to enable the provision of free primary education (MoEST, 2014d). Several participants reported that capitation grants have strengthened the role and influence of school governing bodies, whose presence is a requirement to obtain grants, as is the collaborative development of school development plans and budgets. However, tensions have been reported between governing body members and teachers over leadership and financial control. Some school managers explained that capitation grants, calculated based on student enrolment, are not sufficient to cover projects such as classroom or facility construction. Funding shortages mean that parents and communities often cover basic operating costs including volunteer teacher incentives and school materials and equipment, which are financed through ‘school development’ (registration) fees. This can affect access for certain populations, including those of lower socio-economic status, and girls in particular.

This also results in tensions over school support responsibility; several participants explained that the government expects communities to maintain schools because schools are ‘for the people’, while communities feel that schools should belong to the government, particularly when government and donors emphasize the importance of education for ‘national development’. Some MoEST and international partner representatives emphasized the importance of community contributions to school support and education service delivery:

> The community, they open schools and they are not serious of [looking] after them […] They take it for granted [that] children are children of the government and government will do the whole job. But the government has put the policy [and] is not having any funds to support the policy. It is only the parents who could support the policy. (State MoEST official)
We have to tell people school does not belong to the government, because people think the government comes and constructs the school [...] No, we are telling them, ‘The school belongs to you, the government is not here.’ (International NGO representative)

While community contributions illustrate the perceived importance of education and are key to service delivery in fragile and conflict-affected contexts (Ratcliffe & Perry, 2009), reliance on community financing can hinder longer-term government service development, create tensions between communities and government, and reproduce geographical and economic inequities as wealthy communities are better placed to maintain services and poor communities fall further behind. This can also contribute to pressures for conflict associated with perceived marginalization linked to inadequate resource distribution and perceived failures of ‘peace dividends’ through provision of education services.

**Teacher representation in decision-making**

Teachers reported a lack of representation in decision-making at the school level, as well as at the local government level. Primary and secondary teachers in different states reported that they do not receive information about education policies, or that information is significantly delayed. This causes confusion and frustration: “The Ministry of Education has its policy, but we don’t know what happens inside the office [...] Without transparency, there is something moving in the darkness. You will not see” (Teacher union representative).

As discussed in Section 6.5, limited recognition of teachers’ professional status, affected by marginalization and inequities in terms of allocation of resources and opportunities, influences public recognition of the status of teachers. The status of the teaching profession in South Sudan is low and teachers are not perceived as having political weight, despite the establishment of teachers’ unions in most states. Unions aim to address challenges faced by teachers (e.g. training), but they do not appear to be engaging in efforts to advocate for broader policy-level change. While there is some engagement between state ministries, they do not appear to be engaged in a concerted action for policy change. Relationships between unions and MoEST, and engagement in policy processes, vary from state to state. For example, a union representative in one state reported no involvement in MoEST planning processes, while a representative in another state described engagement with the state MoEST to ensure that teacher concerns (e.g. training, promotion, payment, allowances) are included in ministry plans, even though these are not necessarily implemented. One group of secondary teachers reported that the state union is not effective in encouraging government action or responses.

**7.4 Political and economic representation among youth**

Older youth, many of whom have histories of violence, face inter-connected challenges associated with limited training, livelihood, and employment opportunities, limited opportunities for social and civic engagement and participation in decision-making, and involvement in crime and armed conflict. These challenges were discussed by participants, and reflect the findings of other recent consultations with youth in South Sudan (Forcier, 2012; MoCYS, 2014). While some students described participation in student governments, disciplinary bodies, and clubs (e.g. peace clubs) that enabled some involvement in shaping education service delivery, a group of secondary students reported that they do not have opportunities or mechanisms to make their voice heard by decision-makers and to engage in peacebuilding processes.

MoCYS plays a lead role in youth policy and programming. With support from UNICEF and the Canadian International Development Agency, MoCYS has developed the South Sudan Youth Development Policy (focusing on ages 15 to 35 years), which emphasizes the importance of youth engagement in peacebuilding, leadership, and community development (for example, through voluntary service), in addition to access to education, training, and income-generating activities. Youth unions have been established at the national and state level, with representation from (and in) counties, intended to facilitate youth engagement and representation. However, only a few participants (primarily non-governmental actors) discussed the importance of engaging young people in civic activities and decision-making, in either education or peacebuilding sectors.

Discussions of youth engagement were generally quite depoliticized and instead focused on economic rather
than civic participation, for example. Many youth sector stakeholders, including union representatives, described active discouragement of youth engagement in political processes, to avoid manipulation by politicians. In addition, state youth unions are supported by the MoCYS, which may limit involvement in more ‘political’ activity. As one state union representative explained, the union is involved in implementing MoCYS policies and activities, but not in decision-making and policy advocacy, as it is a ‘non-political’ organization. Some union representatives, however, described more active engagement in politics, despite initial statements of ‘non-involvement’. For example, as one youth union representative explained,

*We challenge the government [...] This is our role as a civil society organization [...] This corruption issue, it is one of our topics [...] especially with this current conflict happening now. We don’t fear, but we challenge them diplomatically and clearly. We don’t insult, but we have to tell the truth.*

Existing mechanisms for civic engagement and decision-making representation can reproduce socio-economic inequities and marginalization in youth populations. Union executive positions can only be held by ‘qualified’ youth with at least a secondary school education, although representatives reported that most have advanced certificates, diplomas, or degrees. One state youth union representative reported that all executive members are also employed in the government or NGOs. While members may address issues affecting youth who are not engaged in formal education or employment, their voices may not be fully represented in decision-making and they may be viewed as union ‘beneficiaries’ rather than as active members.

Socio-economic inequities have a strong influence on access to political and economic representation for youth. For young people who have completed education and training programs, opportunities are limited by lack of employment opportunities in both the civil service and private sector. Youth representatives described inequities in access to employment across states (e.g. concentration of opportunities in Juba), as well as nepotism or tribalism in hiring practices. Inequities or disparities in access to education, training, and employment result in frustration and tensions among youth, and can take on added significance when such opportunities are framed as key peace dividends or post-independence expectations (Sommers & Schwartz, 2011).

*Youth who have their relatives in those places, they have those opportunities [and] it creates a gap [...] Others will say, ‘You are educated because you are the sons and daughters of big people’ [...] This brings conflict [...], especially as a young country which has come out of war, where people have many expectations to get money to sustain themselves. (Youth union representative)*

There are tensions related to perceived cultural and identity differences (e.g. ‘Sudanese’, ‘East African’, and ‘South Sudanese’) between older youth who remained in South Sudan during the previous war, and those who have returned from neighbouring countries. Unequal access to employment opportunities between these youth is also a source of tension. Returnee youth, particularly those from Kenya and Uganda, often have higher and ‘better’ educational qualifications, and have been educated in English. They are viewed as monopolizing positions in government and international organizations, which is particularly significant given the limited employment opportunities (Ensor, 2013; Jok, 2013; Sommers & Schwartz, 2011). Youth returning from Sudan, who have been educated in Arabic, face particular challenges with respect to (English-language) education and employment (O’Hagan, 2013; UNESCO, 2011; Watkins, 2013).

### 7.5 Chapter summary

South Sudan’s Local Government Act refers to a system of decentralized governance based on the devolution of power and authority to state and local governments. However, participant descriptions of sector management reflected a deconcentrated form of decentralization based on centralised policy decisions with limited political authority at the sub-national level and little space for representation of local education officials. School and payam level participants felt their voices and concerns are not clearly heard, and were often undermined by higher government levels and donors (for example, by bypassing payams when approaching schools). While school governing bodies play a key role in school-level management, teachers and youth lack representation in decision-making processes, which when combined with inequalities in access to professional and economic opportunities, can increase their risk for involvement in conflict.
Local opportunities for representation in education sector administration and management reflect wider structures and dynamics of political authority at sub-national levels, including appointments based on ethnic, military, or political connections. These processes contribute to the reproduction of factional political systems, competition over access to political opportunities and resources, grievances over exclusion from decision-making opportunities, and limit trust in higher levels of government. Discussions with central and sub-national government officials reflected tensions between the perceived need for centralized policy development and management systems (contributing to state and nation-building processes), and the perceived importance of locally-responsive service delivery.
CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

8.1 Chapter introduction

Recent quantitative research drawing on international data (FHI 360, 2015) demonstrates a consistent relationship between educational inequalities and violent conflict, and that violent intra-state conflict is more than twice as likely to occur in countries where education inequities exist. In South Sudan, quantitative analysis indicates that while the provision of school infrastructure and resources improved markedly between 2009 and 2013, the proportion of students enrolled in upper primary levels is very low and overall enrolment began to decline before the current civil war, that is, during a period of relative peace and stability. This illustrates the importance of examining factors other than violent conflict (such as systemic inequalities) that affect education access, resource allocation, and outcomes. This study provides important insights into how such inequities are produced or reproduced through the education sector and how education governance, as a reflection of broader political economy dynamics, can be an effective entry point for governance reform that can contribute to sustainable peace and development and reduce the risk of conflict. This chapter provides a summary of key research findings and offers recommendations on how to capitalize on education’s peacebuilding role in conflict-affected settings.

8.2 Key research findings: Reflecting on the 4Rs

Quantitative analysis of education, census, and conflict data revealed clear patterns of inequality in educational access, resources, and outcomes in South Sudan. Inequalities were particularly clear across different states and across counties within states. For example, states in the Greater Upper Nile region experienced low access to school facilities and resources as well as low enrolment in upper primary grades, while southern counties were generally characterized by more adequate school resources and outcomes compared to central and northern counties. Analysis of EMIS and conflict data reveals that states with the highest occurrence of conflict events since 2011 (Unity, Upper Nile, Jonglei) have the lowest provision of educational resources and the lowest percentage of students in upper primary, reflecting the relationship between conflict occurrence and inequalities in educational resources and outcomes. These concerns were reflected in qualitative interviews, during which participants described the effects on education access, resources, and outcomes of inequalities associated with geographic location, rural communities, socio-economic status, livelihoods activities (e.g. cattle-keeping), and older youth. These were perceived as contributing to pressures for conflict. Governments and donors should pay attention to these consistent patterns of resource distribution inequalities between counties in decision-making on allocation of material resources (e.g. infrastructure, facilities) as well as human resources (e.g. teacher deployment).

Redistribution. In South Sudan, a range of policy initiatives and programs have aimed to address different dimensions of educational inequity. However, specific policy strategies, including those focusing on girls’ education and students with disabilities, reflect the influence of global education agendas. Less attention is thus paid to context-specific dimensions of inequity linked to conflict in South Sudan, including ‘pastoralist’ communities and older youth. While some key dimensions of inequity linked to conflict are considered in programs such as the AES and vocational training, in practice, implementation is limited. Gaps between policy and practice are linked to under-resourcing of the education sector, which received 5 per cent of the national budget in 2014-15, compared to nearly 50 per cent for rule of law and security sectors. Under-resourcing of the education sector is reflected in per-student spending, which was as low as SSP 143.5 (USD 48.5) at the primary level in 2014-2015, as well as in poor teacher salaries, which is of particular concern given the current economic climate.

Redistribution efforts are also limited by budget allocations and expenditures to equity priorities within MoEST. This is reflected in the gap between stated policy priorities and budget allocations and outturns. For example, in 2014-2015, AES received 1 per cent of the education budget and TVET received 0.5 per cent, although in 2013-2014 only 21 per cent of AES allocations was disbursed and no TVET allocations were disbursed. In this sense, approaches to the (re)distribution of opportunities and resources (including
increasing support for private education services) on the part of both the government and donors may be reproducing certain dimensions of inequity linked to conflict along geographic, socio-economic, ethnic, and other lines. Resource allocation to subnational (state and county) levels, such as government budget transfers, reflects an equal but not necessarily equitable approach. There is no systematic policy to redress existing and historically-driven disparities across geographic areas. While school-based resource allocation by donors may be based on ‘conflict-sensitive’ criteria, reflecting knowledge of resource-related tensions and conflicts, attention should be paid to the potential contribution of allocation approaches to further entrenching patterns of marginalization and exclusion for particular population groups and geographic communities.

Following the CPA, the expansion of education services was described as a key ‘peace dividend’, with little attention to how approaches to the (re)distribution of opportunities and resources might reproduce inequity and contribute to future conflict. Failure to deliver these ‘dividends’ and meet community expectations has affected perceptions of government legitimacy and trust. This in turn has significant implications for confidence in political representation and vertical dimensions of cohesion (and reconciliation) between communities and authorities. (Re)distribution of education opportunities and resources in South Sudan has been hugely affected by the outbreak of violent conflict and associated humanitarian responses. This has raised concerns about (government) representation in education service provision, the emergence of a ‘parallel’ system of education in conflict-affected contexts, geographic inequities in humanitarian-development resource allocation, as well as perceptions of ‘conflict dividends’.

Recognition. The role of schools in bringing together members of diverse communities is often identified as a key contribution of the education sector. However, education services promoting unity and cohesion may not necessarily be equitable, and may actually contribute to further inequity and exclusion. For example, there are geographic and socio-economic inequities in access to national secondary schools, which are intended to bring together students from diverse communities. While responses to diversity and conflict represent opportunities to address the legacies of violence and contribute to (re)building both horizontal and vertical relations of trust, the ways in which policies and practices affirm or exclude diverse identities or forms of violence can reinforce patterns of inequity and contribute to pressures for continued conflict.
Teachers as well as students experience horizontal and vertical inequities that affect recognition and cohesion. Fragmented recruitment and management approaches, ‘localized’ deployment in remote counties or payams, recruitment and promotion based on patronage networks, salary disparities between sectors (e.g. security versus education) and within education (e.g. national and state teachers, permanent and contract teachers), and language capacity differences (English versus Arabic) contribute to inequities along geographic, ethnic, and socio-economic lines. These reflect broader political and economic dynamics contributing to pressures for conflict, including allocation of opportunities and resources to mobilize and reward connections, as well as the negative effects on vertical relations of trust in government.

**Representation.** South Sudan’s Local Government Act refers to a system of decentralized governance based on the devolution of power and authority to state and local governments. However, participant descriptions of sector management reflected a deconcentrated form of decentralization based on centralized policy decisions with limited political authority at the sub-national level and little space for representation of local education officials. School and payam level participants felt their voices and concerns are not clearly heard, and were often undermined, by higher government levels and donors (for example, by bypassing payams when approaching schools). While school governing bodies play a key role in school-level management, teachers and youth experience lack of representation in decision-making processes, which, when combined with inequalities in access to professional and economic opportunities, can increase their risk for involvement in conflict.

Local opportunities for representation in education sector administration and management reflect wider structures and dynamics of political authority at sub-national levels, including appointments based on ethnic, military, or political connections. These processes contribute to the reproduction of factional political systems, competition over access to political opportunities and resources, grievances over exclusion from decision-making opportunities, and limit trust in higher levels of government. Discussions with central and sub-national government officials reflected tensions between the perceived need for centralized policy development and management systems (contributing to state and nation-building processes), and the perceived importance of locally-responsive service delivery.

**Reconciliation.** These elements of redistribution, recognition, and representation indicate that broader processes of reconciliation, which involves addressing the past and the effects of conflict as well as horizontal and vertical trust, take place through inter-personal exchange and engagement. Reconciliation will also take place through addressing the structural and historical grievances that underpin tensions and pressures for conflict, which are connected to relations between communities and between communities and authorities. While relations between groups may be facilitated through recognition of identity and diversity in education structures and content, vertical trust between communities or schools and government, and between levels of government, is negatively affected by inadequate redistribution of education opportunities and resources, limited attention to vertical aspects of recognition, and limited opportunities for representation in decision-making. These elements of reconciliation are of critical importance when considering the connections between education governance, inequity, and peacebuilding. Limited vertical trust, along with a perceived lack of power and representation in decision-making, has significant implications for perceived government legitimacy on the part of communities as well as perceived marginalization across demographic and geographic communities. This potentially weakens state-society relations and perceived state legitimacy and contributes to pressures for conflict.

Overall, responses to addressing inequity and conflict through education sector management, governance, and service delivery in South Sudan by government, non-governmental, and international actors, reflect the influence of global education agendas. These present less than systematic responses to locally and nationally-driven needs and priorities associated with inequity and conflict and include an EFA and MDG-driven focus on gender, disability, and primary education, as well as broader education and peacebuilding priorities focusing on economic growth and security. While these might contribute to positive education outcomes...
In South Sudan, education system policies and content have the potential to (re)produce patterns of cultural violence. This is linked to languages of instruction (including the selection of national languages), the validation of particular versions of history and citizenship, ministry narratives that dismiss or disrespect ‘bad’ or ‘backward’ communities or cultures, and the development of formal curricula that focus on ‘productive’ economic activities and are not aligned with the economic and cultural priorities of diverse communities. The cultural and economic relevance of education programs is of particular importance for cattle-keeping communities, as over 85 per cent of South Sudan’s population is engaged in livestock care (FAO, 2012). These patterns of inequity contribute to pressures for violence linked to political, economic, and cultural marginalization in terms of representation in decision-making, recognition of identities and livelihoods, and access to relevant education opportunities.

Teachers as well as students experience horizontal and vertical inequities that affect recognition and cohesion. Fragmented recruitment and management approaches, ‘localized’ deployment in remote counties or payams, recruitment and promotion based on patronage networks, salary disparities between sectors (e.g. security versus education) and within education (e.g. national and state teachers, permanent and contract teachers), and language capacity differences (English versus Arabic) contribute to inequities along geographic, ethnic, and socio-economic lines. These reflect broader political and economic dynamics contributing to pressures for conflict, including allocation of opportunities and resources to mobilize and reward connections, as well as the negative effects on vertical relations of trust in government.

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and peacebuilding processes, limited attention given to addressing the root causes of violent conflict, including context-specific economic, cultural, political, and social dimensions of inequity, can impede both sustainable peace and development and, importantly, sustainable quality learning for children and young people in South Sudan. The education sector can play a central role in addressing different dimensions of violence. While commendable efforts are being made to do so, some key dimensions of inequity linked to education management and governance have been accorded limited attention. When considering questions of inequity, the importance of perceived inequity or marginalization must be seriously considered. Even when legal frameworks or policy responses exist, they may not be disseminated or implemented, and their existence or implementation does not erase decades of violence, marginalization, and inequity that have been experienced by diverse communities.

Both the qualitative and quantitative research findings suggest that there are clear inequities being reproduced, or produced, by the management and governance of South Sudan’s education sector and current policy and program approaches (on the part of local, national, and international actors), which contribute to tensions linked to violent conflict. However, the findings also suggest that there are clear opportunities to address these inequities and contribute to sustainable peace, development, and learning processes, building on local and national priorities. In this sense, the education sector can serve as a model for inclusion, equity, and peacebuilding via other sectors within South Sudan and beyond.

8.3 Connecting education and peacebuilding processes

While educational inequities prioritized by participants are linked to ongoing conflict in South Sudan, connections between education and peacebuilding actors (both national and international) remain limited, despite some policy, curriculum, and project efforts to initiate dialogue on the peacebuilding role of education by UNICEF PBEA and other partners. Based on the findings of this research, some recommendations can be identified to support policy and program development by government, non-governmental, and international actors to promote educational inclusiveness and equity while strengthening connections between education and peacebuilding processes and better address both drivers and legacies of conflict in South Sudan.

The Agreement of the Resolution of the Conflict, signed in August 2015, largely replicates pre-2013 power-sharing and security arrangements and does not refer to the key peacebuilding role of the education sector. This research indicates that broader dimensions of political economy and associated inequities reflected in South Sudan’s education system contribute to pressures for conflict, but also have the potential to contribute to sustainable peace and development. This ought to be reflected in ongoing peace and governance negotiations, as well as in future education policy processes.

When considering governance of the education sector in South Sudan, it is important to note that it is not solely the responsibility of MoEST or education donors and partners. Multiple institutions, including other ministries and international and national partners, play key roles in processes affecting the sector. The Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Public Service, MoCYS, MoGCSW, ministries concerned with particular education or training programs (e.g. agriculture), peacebuilding bodies (e.g. SSPRC), and state-level Ministry of Local Government (meant to play a key role in both education and peacebuilding efforts) are critical actors in promoting economic, political, and cultural dimensions of equity to support sustainable peace and development.

8.4 Recommendations

An education system that better promotes sustainable peace and development in South Sudan should be grounded in national and local realities and able to address both the drivers and legacies of conflict. This requires conflict-sensitive, evidence-based policy formation, rooted in national and local policy dialogue. If it is to be successful, this requires important organizational changes and commitments from national and regional government actors and institutions, international donors, national and international NGO communities, and UN education and security actors. While the education system alone cannot resolve the drivers or the legacies of conflict, it can play a much greater role in supporting vital peacebuilding processes in South Sudan.
The research findings outlined in this report illustrate the importance of addressing multiple dimensions of inequity and promoting peacebuilding objectives as part of humanitarian and development efforts, both during and after situations of violent conflict. Waiting until conflict has ‘ended’ to begin considering the peacebuilding role of education can result in the reproduction and exacerbation of inequity and violence. It is hoped that the following recommendations will be considered in the developing education and peacebuilding policies, strategies, and programs in humanitarian, recovery, reconstruction, and development processes in South Sudan:

**Promoting equity in education through redistribution**

- Examine the potential for school management and student admissions approaches to address entrenched patterns of marginalization along gender, socio-economic, ethnic, and geographic lines and to privilege already-advantaged groups. This is particularly important for national schools (which are cited as contributors to cohesion and peacebuilding) and private schools (which are described as promoting education quality and choice).

- Implement strategies to address existing imbalances and ensure equitable access to education opportunities in terms of gender, ability, socio-economic status, and community (e.g. pastoralist, rural) background. This might include the implementation of specific admissions criteria, quotas, or subsidies for students from marginalized groups in national and private schools and training programs (e.g. vocational or livelihoods training).

- Acknowledge, and attempt to address, factors that can affect education and training outcomes for marginalized groups, such as structural discrimination in legal or customary systems (e.g. right to own land or control financial resources) and recognition of local livelihoods systems.

- Adopt, or continue to use, conflict-sensitive criteria or guidelines to inform allocation of resources such as school support, addressing conflict ‘drivers’ and peacebuilding objectives rather than a solely risk-informed conflict response. The time required for negotiating conflict-sensitive decisions (e.g. with government, communities, or partners) should be built into project timelines.

- When resources or services (from both government and partners) are allocated to particular areas or communities, ensure that reasons for decisions are clearly explained to key actors particularly schools, payam offices, and county departments. Clear explanations about why programs are implemented in some counties and not in others, or why one school receives support while another does not, might reduce perceptions of inequity or marginalization. This transparency is crucial in building government legitimacy and vertical trust and cohesion.

- When financial support (e.g. scholarships, stipends) for education (e.g. secondary, post-secondary) is provided to young people, strategies such as quotas should be adopted to address existing imbalances and ensure equitable access to opportunities in terms of gender, ability, socio-economic status, and community (e.g. pastoralist, rural) background.

- Align salary reforms and advancement policies across and within sectors, to support the valorization and professionalization of education sector personnel, including teachers, and to promote equity across sectors. This includes alignment with recent salary scale revisions in the health sector and within the education sector (e.g. university teaching staff).

- As part of decentralization and budget support programs, consider revising resource allocation policies such as budget transfers to promote equitable allocation to redress existing disparities, rather than equal allocation based on existing resources (e.g. schools, personnel).

- As part of decentralization and budget support programs, continue to strengthen local government capacity in areas of budgeting, monitoring, transparency, and accountability.
Support efforts to bridge humanitarian and development efforts by continuing development-oriented programs (including governance and peacebuilding objectives) in EiE contexts, ensuring the provision of alternative and post-primary education and training (supporting transitions for diverse young people), and considering the transition of EiE teachers to the formal education sector.

To the greatest extent possible, increase the proportion of government and donor resources allocated to the education sector in order to support the attainment of stated education goals in a manner that reduces inequities.

Promoting equity in education through recognition

- Support the establishment of local border schools (including boarding schools) between counties and payams at both primary and secondary levels, and prioritize rural conflict-affected communities. These could also be promoted as part of school construction programs as well as community-based peacebuilding and reconciliation processes.

- Ensure that curricula are relevant to the cultural and livelihoods systems of diverse communities, such as cattle-keeping and rural communities in response to specific needs and preferences and support horizontal and vertical social cohesion and respect for diversity. This might involve the integration of cultivation and animal husbandry elements into both formal and non-formal curricula, along with elements of informal or traditional learning prioritized by communities.

- Respect and value diverse communities and their livelihoods, particularly for cattle-keeping communities, through education policies and programs as well as in how education actors (including ministry officials, partners, and teachers), speak about and engage with different communities. This involves acknowledging the importance of livelihoods activities such as cattle herding in community life, strengthening livelihoods activities rather than ‘culture change’, and positively representing communities and traditions.

- Involve members of ‘marginalized’ communities, including cattle-keeping and rural communities, in the development of education policies and curriculum materials. This can provide an opportunity for representation in decision-making, and also support the development of curricula that recognize the cultural and economic systems and traditions of diverse communities, based on communities’ determination of how they are represented.

- Ensure clarity and transparency in the selection of national languages for instruction by ensuring consistency in policies (e.g. level responsible for language selection) and engaging community members, schools, and local education authorities in decision-making. Open and transparent language policy development can help to allay fears of cultural marginalization, which often underpin tensions. In the longer term, the written development of other national languages could be supported.

- Approaches to the development of history and citizenship education should consider the recognition of diverse experiences, narratives, and identities, as well as the potential for ‘shared’ histories and identities to entrench systems of cultural and political marginalization. These dimensions of recognition can play a key role in contributing to social cohesion and reconciliation processes.

- Strengthen psychosocial support services in learning spaces at all levels for students as well as teachers and education managers affected by violence and trauma to respond to conflict and violence in and outside of education settings.
Promoting equity in education through representation

- In addition to promoting ‘local’ representation in national language selection, future curriculum revision or development processes should consider county and payam representation. Although this would require more time and resources, it would facilitate recognition and representation of the significant diversity within states (ethnic, linguistic, geographic, etc.).

- Consider questions of voice and power when supporting decentralization efforts. This would enable moving beyond a purely technical focus, in order to enhance perceptions of trust and legitimacy. This might include setting strategies to increase representation in decision-making, mechanisms to ensure that schools and payams can easily communicate concerns to higher ministry levels, and ensuring that government and partner actions do not undermine their limited power, for example, by bypassing payams when approaching schools.

- Strengthen community participation in education management and decision-making processes, including decisions about relevant school curricula and monitoring the implementation of education programs.

- When conducting assessments or studies involving schools and local government offices, ensure that findings or reports are communicated to stakeholders, particularly schools (managers, teachers, and students). This is a way of recognizing their contributions and explaining resource-allocation decisions.

- As part of teaching training (pre and in-service), identify and implement strategies to target members of marginalized communities, including women and teachers from rural and cattle-keeping communities. Quotas, subsidies, and childcare provision could increase their representation in the education sector, and support them to serve as role models in their schools and communities.

- Design and implement initiatives to enhance teachers’ professional status, including their status and recognition from society, ministry officials, and the wider government. Initiatives might be integrated into existing community awareness programs (e.g. girls’ education), in order to facilitate implementation with minimal resources. This is linked to increasing teacher salaries and access to material support.

- Facilitate access to English language and literacy training for teachers, in order to support integration and capacity. Resources supporting basic literacy and intensive English programs for security forces (e.g. police, soldiers) could be more equitably reallocated to ensure support for teachers (and as a result, students).

- Identify and implement strategies to promote equitable youth representation such as affirmative action strategies or quotas for young women, youth from rural or cattle-keeping communities, or those with lower levels of education in youth unions.

- Consider vertical dimensions of cohesion and reconciliation as well as horizontal inter-group relations. Central and local government officials ought to engage directly with school governing bodies to strengthen vertical relationships. On their part, donors should critically examine how their approaches influence relations between governments and communities, and between levels of government.

- Strengthen the coordination of the Peacebuilding Reference Committee across MoEST departments, including internal and external representation, and strengthen its legitimacy and relevance in institutional processes.

Beyond the specific policy recommendations outlined above, this study also points to how the inequities perpetuated via education contribute to conflict, rather than conflict merely interrupting education, as is often
argued by the Education in Emergencies (EiE) discourse. Addressing inequalities and structural issues around the management of education service delivery can work on broader political economy factors in conflict settings that can contribute to conflict, and thus have an important preventative role. These inequalities take different forms, including the quality and relevance of education, which are often ignored by dominant global paradigms for inclusion and equity. Crucially, this study suggests that sustainable approaches to addressing inequalities and factors which give rise to conflict are rooted in development programming, rather than in responsive emergency programming. This speaks to the importance of mainstreaming conflict-sensitive and peacebuilding approaches to the entire portfolio of education programming, rather than restricting peacebuilding and education work to emergency and post-conflict settings.
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Education Sector Governance, Inequity, Conflict and Peacebuilding in South Sudan


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Appendix 1: Detailed descriptions of research sites

Central Equatoria state

Central Equatoria state (CES) is home to South Sudan's national capital, Juba, which is also the state capital. The 2008 Population Census estimated the state population to be roughly 1.1 million (NBS, 2011a), although estimates do not reflect the number of returnees from neighbouring states and countries during and after the census period. By 2010, approximately 91,000 South Sudanese had returned to CES (UNMIS, 2010b). The state is home to roughly 14 ethnic groups, including Bari, Mundari, Kakwa, Lokoya, Pajali, and Makaraka (UNMIS, 2010b). Roughly 65 per cent of the population lives in rural areas (lower than in many other states), with the highest population density of all states and a poverty rate of 44 per cent in 2008-09, people aged 15 and older reported a literacy rate of 44 per cent while 42 per cent of those aged six and older had never been to school. 58 per cent of the population depended on crop farming or animal husbandry as their primary livelihood source, while 21 per cent were paid employees (NBS, 2011a). CES includes six counties (Juba, Lainya, Morobo, Kajo-Keji, Terekeka, and Yei), and data was collected in two payams in Juba County.

CES has experienced conflict between groups within the state (including between Bari and Mundari communities), as well as cross-border conflict involving groups in Lakes states (UNMIS, 2010b). The state has been heavily affected by displacement resulting from the current civil war. The violence that erupted in Juba in December 2013 involved the targeting of Nuer civilians and soldiers by predominantly Dinka security forces (Amnesty International, 2014; HRW, 2014), causing significant displacement. In July 2015, there were over 74,000 IDPs in Central Equatoria, with approximately 29,000 living in UNMISS Protection of Civilians (POC) sites in Juba (European Commission, 2015), mainly from Nuer communities.

Western Equatoria state

In 2008, Western Equatoria state (WES) had a population of roughly 620,000 (SSCCSE, 2009), which includes eight main ethnic groups, including Azande, Avokaye, Balanda Baka, Beli, Fertit, Moru, and Mundu (UNMIS, 2010e). Approximately 84 per cent of the population lives in rural areas, with a poverty rate of 42 per cent in 2008-09, people aged 15 and older reported a literacy rate of roughly 33 per cent while 52 per cent of those aged six and older had never been to school. Ninety per cent of the population depended on crop farming or animal husbandry as their primary livelihood source, while 9 per cent were paid employees (NBS, 2011e). Livelihoods in WES are based primarily on farming, with rich agricultural production and lower livestock ownership compared to other states (UNMIS, 2010e). WES includes ten counties (Mundri West, Mundri East, Maridi, Mvolo, Ibba, Yambio, Ezo, Nzara, Nagero, and Tambura), and data was collected in Yambio, the state headquarters.

Participants in WES described insecurity and conflict (often involving youth) in border counties such as Mvolo, Mundri East, Mundri West, and Maridi, including between farming communities and cattle-keepers from Lakes state. They also reported frequent disputes over land ownership (which, as one participant stated, account for the largest proportion of court cases in Yambio). Although participants in WES emphasised their history of peace and stability (one ministry official referred to the state’s ‘peaceful culture’), armed violence has recently broken out in Yambio and Maridi. WES borders the DRC to the south and CAR to the west. Past insecurity has been associated with Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) activity, particularly along southern and western state borders (UNMIS, 2010e). WES is home to refugees from the DRC, displaced primarily by LRA activity in 2009, as well as refugees fleeing on-going violence in the CAR, with nearly 9,000 refugees in the state in July 2015 (UNHCR, 2015).

Western Bahr el Ghazal state

In 2008, Western Bahr el Ghazal (WBG) had a population of roughly 333,000, the smallest of all states, although it is the second largest geographically (SSCCSE, 2009). Between 2004 and 2010, an estimated
122,000 people returned from Sudan and other neighbouring countries (UNMIS, 2010a). The population includes three main ethnic groups, including Dinka, Luo (Jur), and Fertit. While WBG is home to a more visible Muslim community than some other states, Christians are the dominant religious community (UNMIS, 2010a). Approximately 57 per cent of the population lives in rural areas, with the lowest population density of all states, and a poverty rate of 43 per cent. In 2008-09, people aged 15 and older reported a literacy rate of roughly 34 per cent, while 62 per cent of those aged six and older had never been to school. 64 per cent of the population depended on crop farming or animal husbandry as their primary livelihood source (NBS, 2011d). WBG covers forested areas and fertile agricultural land, supporting small-scale farming supplemented by small-scale cattle raising (UNMIS, 2010a). The state includes three counties (Wau, Jur River, and Raja) and one municipality. Data was collected in Wau Municipality, the state headquarters.

Participants in WBG described tensions associated with inter-group conflict (between Dinka, Fertit, and Luo communities) during the previous civil war. Dinka and Jur communities were linked to the SPLM/A, while Fertit were linked to the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) (UNMIS, 2010a). Participants also described conflict between farming communities and cattle-keeping communities arriving from Warrap state, disputes over land ownership, and insecurity along northern borders due to the targeting of Sudanese rebel groups by the Sudanese government. WBG borders the CAR to the west and Sudan’s South Darfur to the north, and the presence of the SPLA, SAF, and other armed groups and militias along the northern border contributes to insecurity (UNMIS, 2010a).

Warrap state

In 2008, Warrap had a population of roughly 973,000 (SSCCSE, 2009). The population is predominantly Dinka (Jieng), with minority groups including Luo (Jur Chol and Jur Manager) and Bongo. Warrap is home to many returnees and refugees from Sudan, due to its proximity to the north (BCSSAC et al., 2012b; UNMIS, 2010d), with approximately 115,000 people returning to the state between 2005 and 2010 (Saferworld, 2011). Warrap has historically been the most ‘under-developed’ state in South Sudan (UNMIS, 2010d), a point emphasised by numerous participants from the state. Approximately 91 per cent of the population lives in rural areas, with a poverty rate of 64 per cent. In 2008-09, people aged 15 and older reported a literacy rate of roughly 16 per cent, while 87 per cent of those aged six and older had never been to school (the highest proportion of all states). Eighty-seven per cent of the population depended on crop farming or animal husbandry as their primary livelihood source (NBS, 2011c). Warrap is home to roughly 1.6 million cattle (SSCCSE, 2010b), which represent the dominant livelihood source. However, in recent years, delayed rainfall and drought have increased food insecurity as well as limiting access to water and grazing land (UNMIS, 2010d), a point emphasised by participants from the state. Warrap includes six counties (Twic, Gogrial East, Gogrial West, Tonj North, Tonj East, and Tonj South). Data was collected in Kuajok, the state headquarters, in Gogrial West County, and in three payams in Tonj East County.

Participants in Warrap reported insecurity along its eastern borders, due to conflicts over cattle raiding, borders, and control of water points and grazing land between groups in Tonj North, East, and South counties and groups from Unity and Lakes. Similar conflicts occur between groups from different payams and counties within the state (e.g. different Dinka sections), leading to cycles of reprisal violence (BCSSAC et al., 2012b; Saferworld, 2011; UNMIS, 2010d). Some participants in Warrap state described the role played by gelweng, youth often armed with small weapons and responsible for protecting cattle and community members. While gelweng carry community respect to their protective role in families and communities, as some government representatives in Warrap explained, due to their central role in protecting community resources, these youth are generally not engaged in formal education or employment, and are involved in violent inter-group conflict.

Tensions and conflicts in Warrap state are linked to economic pressures, food insecurity, and environmental pressures such as delayed rainfall. Warrap borders Sudan’s South Kordofan as well as the contested Abyei area, and insecurity has been associated with the movement of groups from these areas as well as attacks from northern rebel and militia groups and the border presence of both the SPLA and SAF (BCSSAC et al., 2010b; UNMIS, 2010d).
Upper Nile state

In 2008, Upper Nile state (UNS) had a population of roughly 964,000 (SSCCSE, 2009). The state is home to three main ethnic groups, including Shilluk, Dinka, and Nuer (Jikany and Gajaak), as well as Berta, Burun, Dajo, and Mabani, with counties dominated by particular groups (BCSSAC et al., 2012a; UNMIS, 2010c). Approximately 75 per cent of the population lives in rural areas, with a poverty rate of 26 per cent, the lowest of all states. In 2008-09, people aged 15 and older reported a literacy rate of roughly 45 per cent, while 68 per cent of those aged six and older had never been to school. Fifty-nine per cent of the population depended on crop farming or animal husbandry as their primary livelihood source, while 15 per cent were paid employees (NBS, 2011b). The population relies on agro-pastoralist livelihoods activities, primarily agriculture, although this has been affected by increased flooding in recent years (BCSSAC et al., 2012a).

UNS includes 13 counties (Akoka, Bailet, Fashoda, Longochuk, Maban, Maiwut, Makal, Manyo, Melut, Luakpiny/Nasser, Panyikang, Renk, and Ulang). Data was collected in Malakal, the state headquarters, including in Malakal POC, and in Wau Shilluk, both in Makal County. Historically, UNS has had limited representation in the SPLM/A hierarchy (UNMIS, 2010c), and many militia groups have operated in the state during the previous civil war due to its proximity to the north (BCSSAC et al., 2012a). Significant oil deposits are located in the state, making it politically and economically valuable. However, communities have not benefited from the state’s oil resources, either through allocation of oil revenues or local development initiatives (BCSSAC et al., 2012a).

UNS has experienced frequent conflict between various groups over county borders, grazing land, and water points (between Lou Nuer and Jikany Nuer groups, and between Dinka and Nuer and Dinka and Shilluk groups), with violence (including cattle raiding) associated with seasonal movement toward rivers. Security has also been affected by cross-border conflict (including cattle raiding and border disputes), between communities in Upper Nile’s southern counties and Jonglei (BCSSAC et al., 2012a; UNMIS, 2010c). UNS borders Ethiopia to the east, and Sudan to the northeast. Insecurity in the state has been linked to the presence of both SPLA and SAF along the northern border, and to the movement of groups from Sudan and Ethiopia to rivers in UNS during the dry season (BCSSAC et al., 2012a; UNMIS, 2010c). The presence of military barracks in the state has also been associated with significant sexual violence (BCSSAC et al., 2012a).

UNS is one of the states most affected by the on-going conflict, as the centre of SPLM-IO activity in the country. In December 2013, most Nuer security forces joined the opposition, which targeted Dinka and Shilluk civilians (Amnesty International, 2014; HRW, 2014). Malakal has changed hands several times, and several military commanders have defected from both government and opposition forces. On-going fighting in the state has resulted in massive population displacement. In July 2015, there were roughly 245,000 displaced persons in Upper Nile, with nearly 31,000 people living in the Malakal POC (European Commission, 2015), primarily from Dinka and Shilluk communities, as well as some Nuer. In addition to IDPs, there are also over 134,000 refugees in UNS (UNHCR, 2015).
## Appendix 2: Decentralized roles and responsibilities in the education sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Central MoEST</th>
<th>State MoEST</th>
<th>County education department (CED)</th>
<th>Payam education office</th>
<th>School governing bodies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Develop policies, standards, strategies, and curricula</td>
<td>• Disseminate education policies and guidelines</td>
<td>• Deliver primary and alternative education (with payam offices)</td>
<td>• Participate in county planning and budgeting</td>
<td>• Formulate school development plan and budget</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Determine distribution of education staff across states</td>
<td>• Develop plans and budgets based on national policies and strategies</td>
<td>• Manage County Education Centres, payam education offices</td>
<td>• Deliver primary and alternative education (with CEDs)</td>
<td>• Manage school funds, including capitation grants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Set qualifications and responsibilities of teachers and education managers</td>
<td>• Allocate state and county transfers</td>
<td>• Manage budget transfers for CEDs, payam offices, schools</td>
<td>• Manage day-to-day contact with schools</td>
<td>• Purchase materials with school funds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Develop sector budgets, allocate resources to states</td>
<td>• Monitor primary and alternative education delivery</td>
<td>• Manage teacher transfers and supervision</td>
<td>• Conduct school inspections</td>
<td>• Day-to-day supervision of head teachers and teachers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Manage secondary exams and national assessments</td>
<td>• Deliver secondary education and TVET</td>
<td>• Supervise education infrastructure</td>
<td>• Support PTAs and SMCs (with CEDs)</td>
<td>• Monitor student and teacher attendance and achievement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Manage EMIS</td>
<td>• Recruit, deploy, and manage teachers</td>
<td>• Compile inspection reports and send to state ministry</td>
<td>• Monitor use of capitation grants</td>
<td>• Provide EMIS data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Monitor state-level service delivery</td>
<td>• Coordinate in-service teacher training</td>
<td>• Manage county EMIS data</td>
<td>• Collect EMIS data</td>
<td>• Collaborate with school inspectors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Manage TTIs and national secondary schools</td>
<td>• Manage state inspection system</td>
<td>• Monitor PTAs and SMCs (with payam offices)</td>
<td>• Report on budget performance (to state ministry)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Manage primary examinations</td>
<td>• Report on budget performance (to central ministry)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: DFID-GESS, 2014; GoSS, 2009, 2010; GRSS, 2012a; MoEST, 2014c; RSS, 2012; World Bank, 2012
Appendix 3: Key education, governance, and peacebuilding policies and strategies

Development policies and strategies

- South Sudan Development Plan 2011-13: Realising freedom, equality, justice, peace and prosperity for all (GoSS, 2011)
- South Sudan Vision 2040: Towards freedom, equality, justice, peace and prosperity for all (GRSS, 2011)
- Governance policies and strategies
- Joint Plan of Action – Local Services Support: A joint plan to strengthen the capacity of local governments to deliver public services (GRSS, 2013)
- Laws of Southern Sudan: The Local Government Act 2009 (GoSS, 200)
- The Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan 2011 (GoSS, 2011)

Education policies and strategies

- Curriculum framework: South Sudan (MoEST, 2014)
- General Education Act (GRSS, 2012)
- General Education Strategic Plan 2012-2017: Promoting learning for all (GRSS, 2012)
- Girls’ Education Strategy for South Sudan 2015-2017 (MoEST, 2015)
- Policy for Alternative Education Systems (MoEST, 2014)
- Primary education: Service delivery framework (RSS, 2012)
- Southern Sudan Teachers’ Professional Code of Conduct (MoEST, 2008)
- State and local government education sector planning, budgeting and reporting guidelines for fiscal year 2014/15 (MoEST, 2014)

Child, youth, and gender policies and strategies

- National Gender Policy (MoGCSW, 2012)
- South Sudan National Disability and Inclusion Policy (MoGCSW, 2013)
- South Sudan Youth Development Policy (MoCYS, 2014)
- Standard operating procedures for gender based violence prevention, protection and response in South Sudan (MoGCSW, 2014)

Peacebuilding policies and strategies

- Comprehensive strategic dimensions for healing, peace and reconciliation for all South Sudanese (CNHPR, 2013)
- Laws of South Sudan: Peace and Reconciliation Commission Act, 2012 (Ministry of Justice, 2012)
- Statement of the principles of the National Platform for Peace and Reconciliation (NPPR, 2014)
- South Sudan Peace and Reconciliation Commission Strategic Plan 2013-2015 (SSPRC, 2013)
Appendix 4: Data collection documents

Information sheet for key stakeholder informants

Study title: Education Sector Governance in South Sudan and Kenya

Invitation

You are being invited to take part in a research study on education sector governance and its role in promoting sustainable peacebuilding. Before you decide to participate in this study, it is important for you to understand why this study is being done and what it will involve. Please read the following information carefully. You can discuss it with others if you wish, and you should feel free to ask the researcher if you have any questions about the study.

What is the purpose of this study?
The purpose of this study is to understand the role of education sector governance in promoting sustainable peacebuilding in Kenya and South Sudan. This includes studying what key stakeholders think about the role of education governance in promoting peace, equity, social cohesion and resilience. Participants will include government representatives from central, state, and county levels and representatives of international and non-government organisations.

Why have I been invited to participate?
You are being invited to participate in this study because of your role as a key education sector stakeholder in your country.

Do I have to take part?
Participation in this study is completely voluntary. It is up to you to decide if you wish to take part in the study or not. You are free to refuse to participate. Even if you decide to participate now, you can refuse to answer certain questions or you can choose to withdraw from the study at any time, and there will be no negative consequences. If you decide to withdraw from the study, you do not have to give a reason, and none of the information that you share will be used.

What will happen to me if I take part?
If you decide to participate in this study, you will be asked to take part in a one-on-one interview with the researcher. The researcher will ask you to share your ideas about the issues mentioned above. This interview will last around 45 minutes and you can choose where the interview will take place. The interview will be in English. The researcher will take notes during the interview, and you will be asked if the interview can be recorded, so that it can later be transcribed. The researcher may contact you after the interview if there are any additional questions.

What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part?
Participating in this study will take around 45 minutes of your time. The discussion will take place at a location that you choose, to make it as convenient as possible for you. The discussion might cause some feelings of stress, if difficult experiences such as conflict, violence, or being excluded are discussed. The researcher will not ask any questions about your personal experiences in these areas. These experiences will only be discussed if you introduce them and the discussion will continue only as long as you decide. If you feel upset at any time you can decide to refuse to answer any questions, end the interview, or end your participation in the study.

What are the possible benefits of taking part?
Participation in this project will provide an opportunity to share your thoughts about educational governance, equity, social cohesion and peacebuilding in Kenya and South Sudan and help improve UNICEF policies and strategies around the world. It is important to study these issues in order to have a better understanding of how education sector governance can better contribute to long term and sustainable peacebuilding. The study findings will be shared with representatives from the government and international organisations who are involved in the education system in both Kenya and South Sudan.

Will my information in this study be kept confidential?
Personal information will only be collected with your consent. Identifying information, including your name and your role, will not be shared with anyone and will not be included in the research reports. The information that you share will never be identified with your name, and will only be identified by a code on documents and in the research reports. All of the information that you share will be kept confidential by the researcher.
Education Sector Governance, Inequity, Conflict and Peacebuilding in South Sudan

You can ask for your information to be removed and destroyed even after the discussion. You can do this at any time until the written report has been prepared, then the information cannot be removed from the report. You can ask the researcher for a copy of the transcript of the interview to review and provide comments before it is included in the research report. All of the research documents and recordings will be stored and saved in a locked cabinet or on a password-protected computer. The information that you share will only be used for the purposes of the study described in this document. Only the researcher and the research supervisors will have access to the study information.

What should I do if I want to take part?

The researcher will call you two days after you have received this information sheet, to ask you if you wish to participate in an interview. If yes, you will then decide on a date, time, and location for the interview.

What will happen to the results of the research study?

The results of this study will be used for the final UNICEF report and aspects drawn upon to produce a series of articles and research briefings. You can ask the researcher to give you a copy of this report and any other products that emerge from this research. The results of the study will also be shared during presentations with government ministries and international organisations and during university conferences. All of the information that you share will be kept anonymous and confidential in the reports and presentations. The researchers will give you a copy of the study findings to review and approve before the final report is prepared.

Who is organising and funding the research?

The research is funded by UNICEF and being carried out by a team of 4 international researchers. Professor Mario Novelli, University of Sussex is the lead researcher and will also lead the South Sudan research. Professor Alan Smith, University of Ulster will lead the Kenya research. Gabrielle Daoust and Caroline Marks, from Sussex and Ulster respectively, will conduct fieldwork in collaboration with local partners in each country.

Who has approved this study?

This study has been approved by the School of the Education and Social Work ethical review process and by the Social Sciences Cluster Research Ethics Committee (C-REC) at the University of Sussex. The Ministries of Education from South Sudan and Kenya respectively have given permission for this study to take place, which was facilitated by UNICEF.

Contact for Further Information

If you have any questions or would like more information about the study, you can contact the lead researcher at the University of Sussex

Professor Mario Novelli
Department of Education
Telephone: +44 12 73 67 86 39
E-mail: M.Novelli@sussex.ac.uk

South Sudan Researcher:
Gabrielle Daoust
Telephone: 0926064932
E-mail: G.Daoust@sussex.ac.uk

Thank you

Thank you very much for taking the time to read this information sheet. Please feel free to ask the researcher if you have any questions about the information that is provided, or if you have any other questions about the study.

Date
January 1, 2015
Interview consent form

Project title: Education Sector Governance in South Sudan and Kenya

You should feel free to ask the researcher if you have any questions about this consent form or if you have other questions about the study. Please take the time to read this form carefully before signing. You can ask for new information at any time during the study. You will be given a copy of the signed form to keep.

I agree to take part in this study. The study has been explained to me and I have read and understood the Information Sheet, which I may keep for records. I have had the opportunity to ask questions which have been answered by the researcher.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I understand that agreeing to participate in this study means that I am willing to:</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Participate in a one-on-one interview with the researcher</td>
<td>Yes_____</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Allow the interview to audio recorded</td>
<td>No_____</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Be available if the researcher has other questions after the interview</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| I understand that any information I share is anonymous and private, and that my name and personal identifying information will be not included in the research reports. I understand that the research will keep my information confidential, except if required by law. |   |
| | Yes_____ |
| | No_____ |

| I understand that the information I share will only be used for the purposes of the study described in the Information Sheet, and that the data will be stored and saved in a secure location. |   |
| | Yes_____ |
| | No_____ |

| I understand that I can ask for a copy of the interview transcript to review before it is included in the report, and that I can review and approve the study findings before the final report is prepared. |   |
| | Yes_____ |
| | No_____ |

| I understand that my participation in this study is voluntary, that I can choose not to participate in the study, that I can choose not to answer certain questions, and that I can withdraw from the study at any time without any negative consequences and without giving a reason. |   |
| | Yes_____ |
| | No_____ |

| I agree to the processing of my personal information for the purposes of this research study. I understand that this information will be kept strictly confidential and handled in accordance with the United Kingdom’s Data Protection Act 1998. |   |
| | Yes_____ |
| | No_____ |

Participant name: ____________________________________________

Researcher name: ____________________________________________

Signature: ____________________________________________

Signature: ____________________________________________
Interview questions for key stakeholders

Follow-up probing questions will be drawn upon to expand each question depending on the response. These interviews are intended to gain a better understanding of national and international perspectives on key issues and challenges around the governance of education in South Sudan.

1. Could you tell me a little about your role in relation to education in South Sudan?

2. How do you think the education system is related to the on-going conflict and tension in the country? In your state or county?

3. In what way do you think educational governance systems and practices (management, policy reform, coordination) are addressing or contributing to on-going conflict and tensions?

4. Which regions of the country or state do you think require most educational attention and effort?

5. Is there sufficient attention? If not, why do you think that is?

6. Which sectors of the education system do you think require the most attention to address inequalities?

7. Is there sufficient attention? If not, why do you think that is?

8. What role do you think recent educational reforms such as decentralization have played in addressing inequalities within the governance system?

9. What role have international actors played in addressing or contributing to addressing educational inequalities?

10. What policies and strategies do you think need to be adopted in order to better address educational inequalities?
United Nations Children’s Fund
Eastern and Southern Africa Regional Office (ESARO)
UNON, Gigiri
P.O. Box 44145-00100 Nairobi, Kenya
Tel. Office +254 20 762 2741,
Website: www.unicef.org/esaro

For further information contact:
Neven Knezevic (PhD)
nknezevic@unicef.org
Humanitarian Action, Resilience and Peacebuilding Section (HARP)

Camille Baudot,
Regional Education Advisor (ESARO)
cbaudot@unicef.org